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Abstract
In a world where cryptographic devices take part in our everyday activities, it be-
comes very important to secure these devices against malicious users. To achieve
this goal, security research is devoted to the design of secure systems by exploring
new attack techniques ahead of adversaries and proposing efficient countermeasures
against those attacks.
In this thesis, we focus on the security of public key cryptographic algorithms,
and more precisely on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). ECC is broadly used
for implementing asymmetric cryptographic protocols in embedded devices due to
the small key length, low memory and power requirements compared to equivalent
RSA implementations.
Physical attacks constitute a common threat against the security of embedded
devices. An adversary can recover secret information by measuring the execution
time of an algorithm, its power consumption, the electromagnetic (EM) emanations,
the photon emissions or other physical quantities that could give a meaningful physi-
cal leakage. These attacks, which exploit the physical leakage of secret information
from cryptographic devices, are characterized as side-channel analysis (SCA) at-
tacks. Within this area of attacks, there are various methods of analysis, such as
Simple Power Analysis (SPA), Differential Power Analysis (DPA) and Collision
Analysis (CA). SPA uses a single power trace or a few traces and draws conclu-
sions over the secret data by this instantaneous power consumption of a single run
of the algorithm under attack. DPA uses statistical methods to extract information
from multiple traces over different time periods. CA exploits the leakage of two
portions of traces when the same intermediate values are used. We observe that the
trend of SCA attacks is shifting more towards collision and horizontal types attacks
as known randomization-based countermeasures are effective in protecting crypto-
graphic algorithms against SPA and DPA attacks.
In this aspect, the contribution of this thesis is two-fold. We first present a new,
powerful attack technique, called Online Template Attacks (OTA), with broad ap-
plicability in various ECC implementations. OTA leans towards the horizontal type
of attacks, since it needs only one trace from the device under attack, in order to
retrieve the secret key. Therefore, common countermeasures, such as randomization
of the scalar, are not effective against this attack. We show practical results on vari-
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ous platforms and elliptic curves and at the same time, we present countermeasures
that could prevent OTA.
In the second part of this thesis, we present and evaluate algorithmic and nu-
merical countermeasures, in order to give new insights in secure implementations
of ECC. More precisely, we first present the Boolean-XOR Splitting technique, a
countermeasure inspired by masking techniques that are common in symmetric al-
gorithms. Boolean-XOR Splitting can be applied to exponentiation and scalar mul-
tiplication algorithms with minimal impact on performance, since it is based on
Boolean shares. It is shown how an exponent can be efficiently split into two shares,
where the exponent is the XOR sum of the two shares, typically requiring only an
extra register and a few register copies per bit. Our novel exponentiation and scalar
multiplication algorithms can be randomized for every execution and combined with
other blinding techniques, maintaining at the same time the regularity feature. In this
way, both the exponent and the intermediate values can be protected against various
types of side-channel attacks. We perform a security evaluation of our algorithms
using the Mutual Information framework and we verify formally that they are se-
cure against first-order attacks. The resistance of the proposed algorithms against
side-channel attacks is practically verified with Test Vector Leakage Assessment
(TVLA).
The Residue Number System (RNS) arithmetic is gaining grounds in public key
cryptography, because it offers fast, efficient and secure implementations over large
prime fields or rings of integers. In cryptographic applications of public key cryp-
tography, the recommended bit length varies between 256 bits (for ECC) to 3072
bits (for RSA). RNS-based implementations offer the possibility to perform the re-
quired modulo operations on smaller numbers by distributing the integer operations
on the residue values. These computations can, furthermore, be executed indepen-
dently over each modulus, allowing parallelization of the calculations. We explore
the potentials of this numerical representation as a countermeasure for secure ECC
implementations. More specifically, variations of RNS-based Montgomery Power
Ladder scalar multiplication algorithms are evaluated using a generic and thorough
methodology based on the TVLA and template attacks. Our data and location de-
pendent template attacks show that even protected implementations of RNS are vul-
nerable to these attacks.
Samenvatting
In een wereld waarin cryptografische apparaten deelnemen aan onze dagelijkse ac-
tiviteiten, wordt het erg belangrijk om deze apparaten te beveiligen tegen kwaad-
willende gebruikers. Om dit doel te bereiken, wordt veiligheidsonderzoek gewijd
aan het ontwerpen van veilige systemen door nieuwe aanvalstechnieken te verken-
nen voorafgaand aan vijandige gebruikers en efficiënte tegenmaatregelen tegen die
aanvallen voor te stellen.
In dit proefschrift richten we ons op de veiligheid van cryptografische algorit-
men met openbare sleutels, en specifiek op Elliptic Curve Cryptografie (ECC). ECC
wordt algemeen voor het implementeren van asymmetrische cryptografische proto-
collen in ge"integreerde systemen gebruikt vanwege de kleine sleutellengte, lage
geheugen- en stroomvereisten vergeleken met gelijkwaardige RSA-implementaties.
Fysieke aanvallen vormen een veelvoorkomende bedreiging voor de beveiliging
van ingebedde apparaten. Een kwaadwillende gebruiker kan geheime informatie
herleiden door de uitvoeringstijd van een algoritme, het stroomverbruik, de elek-
tromagnetische (EM) emanaties, de fotonenemissies of andere fysieke grootheden
te meten die een zinvolle fysieke lekkage zouden kunnen geven. Deze aanvallen,
die gebruikmaken van de fysieke lekkage van geheime informatie van cryptografis-
che apparaten, worden gekenmerkt als side-channel analysis (SCA) aanvallen. Bin-
nen dit gebied van aanvallen zijn er verschillende analysemethoden, zoals Simple
Power Analysis (SPA), Differential Power Analysis (DPA) en Collision Analysis
(CA). SPA maakt gebruik van een of enkele stroomsporen en trekt conclusies over
de geheime gegevens door dit directe energieverbruik van een enkele uitvoering van
het aangevallen algoritme. DPA gebruikt statistische methoden om informatie uit
meerdere sporen te extraheren over verschillende tijdsperioden. CA exploiteert het
lekken van twee delen van sporen wanneer dezelfde tussenliggende waarden worden
gebruikt. We zien dat de trend van SCA-aanvallen meer verschuift naar botsingen en
horizontale aanvallen, omdat bekende tegenmaatregelen op basis van randomisatie
effectief zijn in het beschermen van cryptografische algoritmen tegen SPA- en DPA-
aanvallen.
In dit aspect is de bijdrage van dit proefschrift tweeledig. We presenteren eerst
een nieuwe, krachtige aanvalsmethode, genaamd Online Template Attacks (OTA),
met brede toepasbaarheid in verschillende ECC-implementaties. OTA leunt in de
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richting van het type horizontale aanvallen, omdat het slechts één spoor van het
aangevallen apparaat nodig heeft om de geheime sleutel te herleiden. Daarom zijn
veelvoorkomende tegenmaatregelen, zoals randomisatie van de scalair, niet effectief
tegen deze aanval. We tonen praktische resultaten op verschillende system en ellip-
tische krommen en tegelijkertijd presenteren we tegenmaatregelen die OTA kunnen
voorkomen.
In het tweede deel van dit proefschrift presenteren en evalueren we algoritmis-
che en numerieke tegenmaatregelen om nieuwe inzichten te geven in veilige im-
plementaties van ECC. Om precies te zijn, presenteren we eerst de Boolean-XOR
Splitting techniek, een tegenmaatregel die is gebaseerd op masking, die veel in sym-
metrische algoritmen gebruikt wordt. Boolean-XOR Splitting kan worden toegepast
op exponentiatie en scalaire vermenigvuldigingsalgoritmen met minimale impact
op de prestaties, omdat deze is gebaseerd op Booleaanse shares. Er wordt getoond
hoe een exponent efficiënt kan worden gesplitst in twee delen, waarbij de expo-
nent de XOR-som van de twee delen is, waarbij doorgaans slechts een extra reg-
ister en enkele registerkopieën per bit nodig zijn. Onze nieuwe exponentiatie en
scalaire vermenigvuldigingsalgoritmen kunnen voor elke uitvoering worden geran-
domiseerd en gecombineerd met andere blinderingstechnieken, waarbij tegelijker-
tijd de regelmatigheidsfunctie behouden blijft. Op deze manier kunnen zowel de
exponent als de tussenliggende waarden worden beschermd tegen verschillende
soorten side-channel aanvallen. We voeren een veiligheidsevaluatie van onze al-
goritmen uit met behulp van het Mutual Information-framework en we verifiëren
formeel dat ze beveiligd zijn tegen aanvallen van de eerste orde. De weerstand van
de voorgestelde algoritmen tegen side-channel aanvallen is praktisch geverifieerd
met Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA).
De Residue Number System (RNS) wint terrein in cryptografie met openbare
sleutels, omdat dit rekenkunde snelle, efficiënte en veilige implementaties biedt over
grote priemlichamen of ringen van gehele getallen. Bij cryptografische toepassin-
gen van cryptografie met openbare sleutels varieert de aanbevolen bitlengte tussen
256 bits (voor ECC) tot 3072 bits (voor RSA). Op RNS gebaseerde implementaties
bieden de mogelijkheid om de vereiste modulus-bewerkingen in kleinere aantallen
uit te voeren door de gehele bewerking over de residuwaarden te verdelen. Deze
berekeningen kunnen bovendien voor elke modulus onafhankelijk worden uitgevo-
erd, waardoor parallellisatie van de berekeningen mogelijk is. We verkennen de mo-
gelijkheden van deze numerieke weergave als een tegenmaatregel voor veilige ECC-
implementaties. In het bijzonder, variaties van RNS-gebaseerde Montgomery Power
Ladder scalaire vermenigvuldigingsalgoritmen worden geëvalueerd met behulp van
een generieke en grondige methodologie op basis van de TVLA- en sjabloonaan-
vallen. Over de beveiliging van RNS tonen onze gegevens en locatie afhankelijke
sjabloonaanvallen aan dat zelfs een beschermde implementatie kwetsbaar is.
Περίληψη
Η λειτουργία της κοινωνίας μας είναι piλέον άρρηκτα συνδεδεμένη με το διαδίκτυο
και κατ΄ εpiέκταση με την εξέλιξη σε εpiιστήμες όpiως piληροφορική, piρωτόκολλα
εpiικοινωνίας και ασφάλεια piληροφοριών. Σε έναν κόσμο όpiου οι συσκευές κρυpi-
τογραφίας αpiοτελούν τμήμα της καθημερινότητας μας, είναι piολύ σημαντικό να
piροστατεύσουμε αυτές τις συσκευές αpiό κακόβουλους χρήστες. Η έρευνα ως
piρος την ασφάλεια αυτών των συσκευών και τον ευρύτερο σχεδιασμό συστη-
μάτων ασφαλείας εpiικεντρώνεται στην ‘εξερεύνηση’ νέων τρόpiων εpiιθέσεων,
piρολαμβάνοντας τις εpiιθέσεις αpiό κακόβουλους χρήστες (χάκερς), και στην
piρόταση αντιμέτρων piου μpiορούν να piροστατεύσουν τα συστήματα αpiό αυτές
τις εpiιθέσεις.
Σε αυτήν την διpiλωματική διατριβή, εpiικεντρωνόμαστε στην ασφάλεια κρυpiτο-
γραφικών αλγορίθμων δημόσιου κλειδιού, και ειδικότερα στην Κρυpiτογραφία
Ελλειpiτικών Καμpiυλών (ECC). Η Κρυpiτογραφία Ελλειpiτικών Καμpiυλών χρησι-
μοpiοιείται ευρέως για την υλοpiοίηση piρωτοκόλλων ασύμμετρης κρυpiτογραφίας
σε ενσωματωμένες συσκευές λόγω του μικρού μήκους κλειδιού και των χαμη-
λών αpiαιτήσεων σε μνήμη και ενέργεια συγκριτικά με ισοδύναμες υλοpiοιήσεις
του αλγορίθμου RSA.
Οι φυσικές εpiιθέσεις αpiοτελούν μία συνηθισμένη αpiειλή για την ασφάλεια
ενσωματωμένων συσκευών. Κάpiοιος piου σκοpiεύει να εpiιτεθεί σε μία συσκευή
μpiορεί να ανακαλύψει μυστικές piληροφορίες μετρώντας τον χρόνο εκτέλεσης
ενός αλγορίθμου, την κατανάλωση ρεύματος, την ηλεκτρομαγνητική ακτινοβολία
και άλλες φυσικές ιδιότητες του κυκλώματος, οι οpiοίες μpiορούν να δώσουν
χρήσιμες και αξιοpiοιήσιμες piηγές ‘διαρροής’ piληροφορίας. Αυτού του τύpiου οι
εpiιθέσεις, piου εκμεταλλεύονται τη φυσική διαρροή μυστικών piληροφοριών αpiό
κρυpiτογραφικές συσκευές, χαρακτηρίζονται ως εpiιθέσεις piαράpiλευρου καναλιού
(side-channel attacks-SCA). Στα piλαίσια αυτού του είδους εpiιθέσεων, υpiάρχουν
διάφορες μέθοδοι ανάλυσης των δεδομένων, όpiως για piαράδειγμα η Αpiλή Ανά-
λυση Ρεύματος (SPA), Διαφορική Ανάλυση Ρεύματος (DPA) και Ανάλυση Συ-
γκρούσεων (CA). Η ανάλυση SPA χρειάζεται ένα ή ελάχιστα ηλεκτρικά σήματα
ώστε να βγάλει συμpiεράσματα για τα μυστικά δεδομένα αpiό τη στιγμιαία κατανά-
λωση ρεύματος κατά τη διάρκεια μίας εκτέλεσης του αλγορίθμου υpiό εpiίθεση. Η
ανάλυση DPA χρησιμοpiοιεί στατιστικές μεθόδους για να εξάγει piληροφορίες αpiό
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piολλαpiλά σήματα σε διαφορετικές χρονικές piεριόδους. Η ανάλυση CA αξιοpiοιεί
τη διαρροή piληροφοριών αpiό δύο τμήματα του σήματος όταν χρησιμοpiοιούνται οι
ίδιες ενδιάμεσες τιμές. Τα τελευταία χρόνια, piαρατηρούμε ότι εpiικρατεί η τάση
να χρησιμοpiοιούνται εpiιθέσεις piαράpiλευρου καναλιού οριζόντιου τύpiου (SPA,
CA), καθώς γνώστα αντιμέτρα piου βασίζονται σε τυχαιοpiοίηση μεταβλητών
είναι αpiοτελεσματικά για την piροστασία αλγορίθμων ενάντια σε SPA και DPA
εpiιθέσεις.
Αpiό αυτήν την σκοpiιά, η συνεισφορά αυτής της διpiλωματικής είναι διττή.
Καταρχάς, piαρουσιάζουμε μία νέα και ισχυρή εpiίθεση, την εpiονομαζόμενη On-
line Template Attack (OTA), piου μpiορεί να χρησιμοpiοιηθεί ευρέως σε διάφορους
αλγορίθμους ελλειpiτικών καμpiυλών. Η OTA κλίνει piρος τις εpiιθέσεις οριζόντιου
τύpiου, αφού χρειάζεται μόνο ένα σήμα αpiό την συσκευή υpiό εpiίθεση, ώστε να
ανακτήσει το μυστικό κλειδί. Συνεpiώς, συνήθη αντιμέτρα, όpiως η τυχαιοpiοίηση
του piολλαpiλασιαστή (scalar) ή του εκθέτη (exponent), δεν είναι αpiοτελεσματικά
ενάντια σε αυτήν την εpiίθεση. Παρουσιάζουμε την εφαρμογή της εpiίθεσης αυτής
σε διαφορετικές piλατφόρμες και ελλειpiτικές καμpiύλες, ενώ ταυτόχρονα piροτεί-
νουμε αντιμέτρα piου θα μpiορούσαν να χρησιμοpiοιηθούν για να piροστατεύσουν
τις συσκευές αpiό εpiιθέσεις τύpiου OTA.
Στο δεύτερο μέρος αυτής της διατριβής piαρουσιάζουμε και αξιολογούμε
αλγοριθμικά και αριθμητικά αντιμέτρα, με σκοpiό να δώσουμε νέες ιδέες για
την ασφαλή υλοpiοίηση αλγορίθμων ελλειpiτικών καμpiυλών. Πιο συγκεκριμένα,
piαρουσιάζουμε piρώτα την τεχνική Boolean-XOR Splitting, ένα αντιμέτρο εμpi-
νευσμένο αpiό τις τεχνικές masking, piου χρησιμοpiοιούνται ευρέως σε αλγορίθμους
συμμετρικής κρυpiτογραφίας. Η τεχνική Boolean-XOR Splitting μpiορεί να χρησι-
μοpiοιηθεί σε εκθετικούς και piολλαpiλασιαστικούς αλγορίθμους με ελάχιστες
εpiιpiτώσεις στην αpiόδοση και ταχύτητα υλοpiοίησης, εpiειδή βασίζεται σε Boolean
piράξεις. Δείχνουμε piώς ένας εκθέτης μpiορεί να χωριστεί αpiοτελεσματικά σε
δύο μέρη, με τέτοιον τρόpiο ώστε ο εκθέτης να είναι το XOR-άθροισμα των δύο
μερών. Αυτό αpiαιτεί συνήθως μόνο έναν εpiιpiλέον καταχωρητή και μερικές αντι-
γραφές καταχωρητών για κάθε bit. Η νέα και piρωτότυpiη μέθοδος piου piροτείνουμε
μpiορεί να εφαρμοστεί και σε εκθετικούς (RSA) και σε piολλαpiλασιαστικούς
(ECC) αλγορίθμους, μpiορεί να δώσει τυχαία αpiοτελέσματα για κάθε εκτέλεση
του αλγορίθμου, καθώς και να συνδυαστεί με τεχνικές blinding, διατηρώντας
piαράλληλα την ιδιότητα της ομαλότητας και κανονικότητας του αλγορίθμου. Με
αυτόν τον τρόpiο, τόσο ο εκθέτης (ή piολλαpiλασιαστής) όσο και οι ενδιάμεσες
τιμές piροστατεύονται ενάντια σε διάφορους τύpiους SCA. Παρουσιάζουμε μια αξι-
ολόγηση των αλγορίθμων μας ως piρος την ασφάλεια βασιζόμενοι στο piλαίσιο
του Mutual Information και αpiοδεικνύουμε ότι οι αλγόριθμοι είναι ασφαλείς σε
εpiιθέσεις piρώτου τύpiου. Η αντίσταση των αλγορίθμων σε εpiιθέσεις piαράpiλευρου
καναλιού εpiιβεβαιώνονται και με την εφαρμογή των στατιστικών τεστ Test Vector
Leakage Assessment (TVLA).
Το σύστημα αριθμητικής υpiολοίpiων (Residue Number System-RNS) χρησι-
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μοpiοιείται ευρέως στην κρυpiτογραφία δημόσιου κλειδιού, εpiειδή piροσφέρει γρή-
γορες, αpiοτελεσματικές και ασφαλείς υλοpiοιήσεις σε piεδία μεγάλων piρώτων αρι-
θμών και δακτύλιους ακεραίων. Στις εφαρμογές κρυpiτογραφίας δημόσιου κλει-
διού, τα piροτεινόμενα μήκη κλειδιών κυμαίνονται μεταξύ 256 bits για το ECC
και 3072 bits για το RSA. Οι υλοpiοιήσεις piου βασίζονται στο RNS δίνουν τη
δυνατότητα να εκτελούνται οι αpiαραίτητες piράξεις με υpiόλοιpiα σε μικρότερους
αριθμούς, διανέμοντας τις piράξεις ακεραίων στις αντίστοιχες τιμές τους ως
υpiόλοιpiα. Αυτοί οι υpiολογισμοί μpiορούν εpiίσης να εκτελεστούν ανεξάρτητα
για κάθε υpiόλοιpiο, εpiιτρέpiοντας την piαράλληλη εκτέλεση των υpiολογισμών.
Ερευνούμε τις δυνατότητες αυτής της αριθμητικής αναpiαράστασης ως αντιμέτρο
για υλοpiοιήσεις ECC. Πιο συγκεκριμένα, αξιολογούμε piαραλλαγές υλοpiοιήσεων
του piολλαpiλασιασμού Montgomery Power Ladder βασιζόμενοι σε μια γενική και
διεξοδική μεθοδολογία, χρησιμοpiοιώντας TVLA και εpiιθέσεις τύpiου templates.
΄Οσον αφορά την ασφάλεια του RNS οι template εpiιθέσεις μας στα δεδομένα
και στην θέση του μυστικού κλειδιού, δείχνουν ότι ακόμα και piροστατευμένες
υλοpiοιήσεις είναι ευάλωτες σε τέτοιου τύpiου εpiιθέσεις.
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Introduction
Η αρχή είναι το ήμισυ του piαντός - Well begun
is half done
Aristotle
Cryptography is characterized as the art of writing secret codes. In this regard,
cryptanalysis is the art of breaking them.
Cryptography, by its definition, is associated with secrets. It comes from the
Greek words κρυpiτό (krypto, hidden) and γράφειν (grafein, to write). From the an-
cient ways of encrypting messages with Scytale [Kel98] to the modern ways based
on computationally hard to solve problems, the aim of encryption is the same: the
sender and the receiver want to communicate securely over an insecure channel and
keep their communication secret from adversaries. Cryptographic research is ad-
vancing over the last 40 years, in order to provide secure means of communication
over the most popular and insecure channel, i.e. the Internet.
Cryptanalysis, the study on ciphertexts for retrieving the secret messages with-
out knowing the key, is an active research area that offers many techniques to break
into security systems. The aim of cryptanalytic techniques is to find efficient ways to
break cryptographic algorithms by mathematical analysis either of the algorithms or
by relations between inputs (plaintexts) and outputs (ciphertexts) of the algorithms.
Linear cryptanalysis takes advantage of high probability occurrences of linear ex-
pressions involving plaintext bits, while differential cryptanalysis exploits the high
probability of certain occurrences of plaintext differences and differences in the out-
put of the algorithm. They are both a type of chosen plaintext attack, in the sense
that the attacker is able to select inputs and examine outputs in an attempt to de-
rive the key. The attacker is usually assumed to have access to a "black-box", where
he is able to choose what input to feed in the algorithm, but he does not have any
specific information of how the algorithm works. By finding vulnerabilities in the
algorithms or by weakening the security level of a protocol, researchers are capable
1
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to propose countermeasures to protect security systems.
Side-channel analysis (SCA) can be considered as the most applied part of
cryptanalysis, where the adversary takes advantage of implementation leakage pro-
duced by devices executing a cryptographic algorithm. While the goal of a side-
channel attacker is the same as a cryptanalyst, i.e. to find vulnerabilities and break
a secure algorithm, the means that they use to achieve this goal are different. As
opposed to "black-box" and mathematical properties, SCA deals with a "grey-box"
attack design and physical properties. Exploitable leakage comes from the execu-
tion time, the power consumption, the electromagnetic emanations or even by the
noise produced by electric components during an execution of an algorithm. All this
side-channel information, which can be obtained during execution of the algorithms,
give to the adversary some extra insight about the system and that is the reason why
SCA is considered as "gray-model".
Despite the advances in cryptographic research, the security breaches and at-
tacks are an emerging threat for users and enterprises. Online fraud appears in many
forms, email spam, phishing, online scams, hacking users’ accounts and many oth-
ers. This sort of attacks are not related to side-channel attacks, since they exploit
mainly protocol vulnerabilities, resulting in buffer overflows, denial-of-service, priv-
ilege escalation etc. Debit and credit cards are common targets for these attacks
with huge economic impact. According to the Dutch payments’ association report
of 2018,1 the total loss from payment frauds in the Netherlands reached 12.8 million
euros in 2017 [Ned18].
Side-channel information can be exploited when protocol vulnerabilities are
combined with hardware equipment, in order to attack a system. Side-channel anal-
ysis is performed on microcontrollers used for embedded applications. Therefore,
they affect a broad range of products, such as smart cards, mobile phones, hardware
wallets, RFID tags and automotive electronic control units to name a few. An attack
of this kind with high impact was the so-called "EMV PIN verification - wedge vul-
nerability" affecting at least 730 million payment cards in circulation [MDAB10].
The group from the University of Cambridge performed a man-in-the-middle attack,
which suppresses the PIN Verify command to the card, and tells the terminal that the
PIN has been verified correctly, even during online transactions. Researchers from
Radboud University report that EMV vulnerabilities can be exploited in payment
smart cards, affecting billion of cards worldwide [CGdR+15,vdBOYPdR]. The fact
that EMV is an old protocol suite using outdated symmetric key algorithms (3DES
instead of AES) and requiring backwards compatibility between the different pro-
tocol variants, make it very hard to provide fixes for secure transactions.
Regarding payment systems, side-channel attacks pose a serious threat against
hardware wallets. With the remarkable cryptocurrency expansion at the end of 2017,
1The website gives the tables and numbers when the Dutch language is selected - switching the
website to English would make those numbers disappear.
3the need to store and trade cryptocurrency in a secure way emerged. During the
past two years, companies producing hardware wallets experience exponential in-
crease in demand [Int]. Hardware wallets need to be designed in a secure way offer-
ing defense in depth and security in layers and storing keys on a secure element.
Hoenicke [Hoe15] presented a practical side-channel attack on a Trezor wallet,
where he was able to recover the private key using the information leaked during the
public key generation, when the wallet was not protected by a passphrase. Updating
the firmware to the latest version is enough to defend against this attack, but still the
threat of side-channel attacks against hardware wallets is not eliminated.
Pay TV is another industry that is affected by side-channel attacks. The number
of pay TV subscribers worldwide is projected to pass the one billion mark by 2020,
growing by 92% since 2014 [SP]. Pay TV decoders use smart cards, in order to
control video access. There are various techniques or videos online that show how
to hack such cards. Witteman presented [Wit17] a card sharing attack (a relay attack
to avoid paying TV subscription fees) of 1 million cards, which would result in a
loss of 90 million euros from the pay TV industry. However, a major shift in viewing
habits towards streaming services such as Netflix and Amazon Prime appeared in
2018. When subscriptions to streaming services overtake pay TV users, protection
against side-channel attacks will switch to software protection for the TV industry.
In the beginning of 2018, two critical vulnerabilities in modern processors ap-
peared. Spectre [KGG+18] and Meltdown [LSG+18] are cache timing side-channel
attacks that exploit hardware vulnerabilities of processors, in order to either read
data or get access to secure memory locations with no access privileges. Passwords
stored on personal computers, mobile devices or the cloud can leak due to these
attacks. A year after the publication of the two original flaws, more exploitable
weaknesses related to this class of "speculative execution" have been published, but
an efficient way to fix them is still not proposed. This is due to the fact that soft-
ware patches are not enough; we need to conceptually rethink how processors are
made [New18].
Automotive is a fast growing industry that will be affected by SCA attacks.
The Internet of Things (IoT) in automotive market is projected to grow at a com-
pound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 27.55% leading to a global revenue of 104
billion dollars by 2023 [RM,aut]. Quite a lot of researchers, organizations and com-
panies worldwide are working towards the establishement of a secure IoT auto-
motive ecosystem. It is challenging to provide hardware security, cloud security,
attack detection systems and privacy protection at the same time. Dedicated Hard-
ware Security Modules (HSM) are usually deployed to provide security features
in the microcontrollers used in automotive industry. However, many publications
(for instance lectures from the escar conferences [Esc], the papers from Milburn et
al. [MCW+18, MT18] and Jain et al. [JWAG18] to name a few) showed that side-
channel attacks are still possible in this field and new types of countermeasures are
needed, in order to provide secure automotive solutions.
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How is it possible to have this huge amount of attacks, when thousands of cryp-
tographic experts work for the security of digital systems?
The answer lies in the implementation details. Cryptographic devices leak infor-
mation and when this leakage can be exploited, then compromising the system and
recovering secrets is unavoidable. The adversaries can have an easier task, when
countermeasures are not applied, sensitive data are sent in clear, authentication
mechanisms are not implemented correctly or protocol flaws are not fixed.
1.1 Motivation
Common daily actions would not be possible without the advances of research on
cryptography. For instance online banking, ATM withdrawal, secure texting (Viber,
WhatsApp, Signal) rely on fundamental cryptographic protocols, such as AES for
encryption, digital signatures (DSA, ECDSA) or key exchange protocols (Diffie-
Hellman). The vast majority of adult population carries a few cryptographic devices
every day, such as payment cards and mobile phones. Sensitive private information
is stored in cryptographic devices and the main goal of cryptographers is to protect
them against various types of attacks.
The security of embedded devices, even devices with dedicated cryptographic
processors, is dependent on resilience against side-channel attacks (SCA). Power
consumption [KJJ99], electromagnetic emanations [GMO01, QS01, AARR03] and
other forms of side-channel information leakage can expose the sensitive data of an
implementation (usually a cryptographic key), through the use of various types of
SCAs, such as Simple Power Analysis (SPA), Differential Power Analysis (DPA)
[KJJ99] and Template attacks [CRR02, MO09]. The above attacks can be charac-
terized as passive, in the sense that the adversary observes the leakage of physical
quantities and draws conclusions about the secret data by analyzing this leakage.
Fault Attacks (FA) are active attack scenarios in the area of SCA, and they usually
require more sophisticated equipment, in order to successfully inject a fault. The
aim of the adversary is to inject a fault in the cryptographic operation that manip-
ulates the key; this fault can be used to alter the expected execution order of the
algorithm and eventually to extract the key [BDL01].
Embedded devices have limited resources in terms of memory and space al-
location, hence it is necessary to implement cryptographic algorithms with these
constraints in mind. Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is suitable for lightweight
protocols due to the small key length and memory requirements compared to equiv-
alent RSA implementations. ECC is broadly used for digital signatures (ECSDA)
and for establishment of a common secret key (ECDH). Sometimes ECC is also
used for encryption (EC El-Gamal), but this is not a common practice, since sym-
metric cryptography offers faster algorithms for encrypting messages. By the time
this thesis started, in 2013, the adoption of ECC in IT security systems was rising
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and there was an emerging need for secure ECC real-world implementations. Al-
though there were already many published papers on attacks, countermeasures and
evaluations of ECC implementations, for instance
At the same time, the relevant research results for side-channel attacks on sym-
metric algorithms could not be compared to ECC evaluations. It is obvious that
there was space for exploring new attack techniques and countermeasures in the
asymmetric setting. And that was a big challenge, since asymmetric cryptography
in general, and ECC in particular, provides slower operations than symmetric key
algorithms. Therefore, the acquired traces that need to be collected and analyzed are
very large. Moreover, some known attack techniques are not directly applicable to
protocols such as ECDSA. For instance, DPA as proposed by Kocher et al. [KJJ99]
does not apply to ECC protocols, where a scalar is used only once, like in ECDSA
or in ephemeral Diffie-Hellman. The latter is incompatible with the requirement of
DPA to collect many power traces of computations on the same secret data.
We overcame these challenges by using the appropriate equipment, by adapting
the known attack techniques to our measurements and by exploring new ways of
attacking/securing ECC implementations. The richness of the mathematical struc-
tures behind ECC, the various ways of representing a scalar and other algorithm-
dependent features, created opportunities for many unique side-channel attacks ex-
ploiting those features. These techniques will be explained in the rest of this thesis.
1.2 Research Questions
There are various ways to implement ECC algorithms in embedded devices. In prin-
ciple, the following techniques can lead to a secure implementation of an algorithm.
• The algorithm runs in constant time: Regarding cryptography, a constant time
implementation means that the execution time does not depend on secret data.
More precisely, there should be no branches on data that are supposed to be
kept secret (exponent or scalar) and carries during modular multiplication
should be handled in the same way as the results with no carries. This tech-
nique is important, as conditional branches and differences in the execution
time according to the manipulated key bit are an easy target for attack and
exploitation.
• The sensitive data are not used in clear: Masked (or blinded) implementations
hide the sensitive data (usually the secret exponent or scalar). There are var-
ious ways to mask a value depending on the properties of the field that this
value belongs to. For instance, there is Boolean, multiplicative, or additive
masking. SPA cannot be applied to masked values, the adversary needs to be
able to observe this value in two different time instances, and, therefore, he
needs to apply DPA techniques.
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• The secret keys are changed regularly: Secret keys should change in every ex-
ecution of the algorithm, or every few executions. In cryptographic protocols
that are used for key exchange, there should be two public keys, one that is
long-term and verified by a certification authority, and one that is short-term
(or ephemeral), it is signed by the long-term key for authentication, and it is
used for one (or a few) session(s). In this way, an adversary who is able to
capture one execution of the algorithm, is not able to perform SPA. If he is
able to capture many executions of the algorithm, he could apply DPA, but
if different keys are used, then he cannot recover them in a straight-forward
way.
In most of real-world applications, at least one of the above mentioned tech-
niques is not implemented correctly. This issue can be caused by careless design
decisions or by speed reduction created by the adoption of many countermeasures,
which makes them impractical to use.
In this context, the main research question that arises is "Which practical and
theoretically supported techniques can be developed to make ECC cryptographic
implementations more side-channel resilient?". This question involves many param-
eters and requirements, in order to be answered. This fact motivates our research in
the following, more concrete, subquestions:
1. What are the vulnerabilities of "secure" algorithms? Are there new attack
techniques that would make it hard for a developer to implement secure ECC
algorithms?
There is a constant need for secure implementations. Algorithms that were
considered secure 10 years ago might not be secure anymore, due to the dis-
covery of new attack techniques. Thinking as an adversary and finding new
vulnerabilities in a system is the first step towards a proposal for secure im-
plementations.
2. Which countermeasures are efficient against newly proposed attacks? Can we
propose new, efficient countermeasures to protect public-key algorithms?
Every time a new attack technique shows up, there is a proposal of counter-
measures that would thwart it. Countermeasures are expensive to implement
in terms of time of execution and computational resources. It is, therefore,
technically not possible to integrate many countermeasures in one implemen-
tation that has specific requirements for area, gates, power consumption and
speed. ECC algorithms in particular started being broadly used in the last
decade, after the relevant patents expired. They offered a compact and fast
way to perform public-key protocols, and they found many applications to
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embedded chips with power or size limitations, such as RFID tags. With the
broad use of ECC and the challenges of software developers to implement
big-number arithmetic in small-size circuits, a strong need emerged for se-
cure ECC implementations. Countermeasures that were appropriate for RSA,
for instance RSA-CRT, are not applicable to ECC. Others, such as the square-
and-always-multiply, could be easily adapted for ECC, yielding the double-
and-add-always algorithm. But still, the underlying mathematical structure
and field operations in ECC offer the potential for applying new countermea-
sures, for instance working with unified formulas for addition and doubling
can make some template and collision attacks hard to succeed.
3. Can we provide a systematic evaluation of countermeasures and choose a
combination of them according to the security requirements?
Practical evaluation of an ECC implementation using various countermea-
sures is obviously happening in side-channel labs. Evaluators have found var-
ious ways to attack ECC implementations, even in the presence of counter-
measures. By experience acquired from many projects over the course of the
years, software and hardware designers are capable to propose a combination
of efficient countermeasures to their clients. However, the details of these de-
signs and evaluations are not publicly available, and they would still be very
useful for the research community, in order to validate the existing proposals,
to establish the status of secure ECC algorithms and to promote new research
directions in the field.
1.3 Organization of This Thesis
This thesis presents the results of the research performed, in order to answer the
above mentioned research questions. More precisely, the chapters are organized as
follows:
Chapter 2 gives an overview of Elliptic Curve Cryptography, covering aspects
of the arithmetic of elliptic curves, various scalar multiplication algorithms
and cryptographic protocols that use elliptic curves. The goal of this chapter
is to provide background about different aspects of elliptic curves, which is
necessary in order to comprehend the rest of the chapters.
Chapter 3 explores the side-channel attacks applicable to elliptic curve algo-
rithms. After an introduction to the most known side-channel attack tech-
niques, this chapter gives a broad literature overview of important attacks on
elliptic curve implementations, and more specific on the scalar multiplication
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operation, which is the most sensitive operation during the execution of ellip-
tic curve protocols, since it manipulates the private key. A description of the
Test Vector Leakage Assessment is also given with focus on adaptations for
public-key algorithms.
Chapter 4 presents a new, elegant and efficient attack technique called Online
Template Attacks (OTA). OTA is a novel attack technique that resides be-
tween horizontal and template attacks. This chapter introduces the theoret-
ical aspects of OTA and shows how the attack applies to different scalar-
multiplication algorithms by specific examples. A practical OTA is performed
on double-and-add-always scalar multiplication on an ATMega card. The at-
tack is generalized on Weierstrass curves of an implementation of mbedTLS
on a Cortex-M4 micro-controller. Moreover, distinguishers from machine learn-
ing are applied during the template matching phase of OTA, in order to im-
prove the success rates of the attack. A discussion on vulnerabilities of imple-
mentations and efficient countermeasures against OTA concludes this chapter.
Contribution of the author: The author established the theoretical
foundations that would make the attack applicable to many scalar mul-
tiplication algorithms and developed the attack technique on which
the practical experiments are based. This research resulted in two pa-
pers, namely "Online Template Attacks" in Indocrypt 2014 [BCP+14]
and an extensive version of this work in the Journal of Cryptographic
Engineering [BCP+17]. After the successful application of the power
analysis OTA on the Edwards curve 25519, she investigated the wide
applicability of the attack to other platforms and curves, resulting in
the work of "Dismantling real-world ECC with Horizontal and Verti-
cal Template Attacks" [DPN+16]. In the follow-up work from Özgen
et al. [OPB16], the author proposed and co-supervised a Master thesis
project on using distinguishers from machine learning (classification
methods) together with OTA, which resulted in correct predictions on
the scalar bit and a successful application of OTA. All these results
are also included in the book chapter "Recent Developments in Side-
Channel Analysis on Elliptic Curve Cryptography Implementations"
in [PBM17].
Chapter 5 proposes algorithmic countermeasures to protect various scalar multi-
plication algorithms against known side-channel attacks. These countermea-
sures are based on a new technique called Boolean XOR splitting, that breaks
the exponent or the scalar into Boolean shares and performs the correspond-
ing algorithms using these shares. The security of the proposed algorithms
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is verified theoretically using the Mutual Information (MI) framework and
practically using the Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) methodology.
The coauthors of the corresponding paper created the diagrams of MI and
performed the practical TVLA experiments; both are included at the end of
this chapter for the sake of completeness.
Contribution of the author: The author contributed in the theoretical
validation of the idea and more precisely in the application of Boolean
XOR splitting in scalar multiplication algorithms for ECC. Applying
the XOR splitting technique to elliptic curves needs special care, be-
cause of the point at infinity, as it is explained in Chapter 5. The author
verified the correctness of the algorithms using Sage scripts. Moreover,
she participated in the security evaluation of the algorithms against
template attacks. The results of this research are included in the paper
"Boolean XOR Splitting" [TPP18].
Chapter 6 explores the potential of the Residue Number System (RNS) as a nu-
merical countermeasure against side-channel attacks on elliptic curves. Scalar
multiplication, the key operation behind elliptic curve cryptography, is com-
posed of arithmetic operations over finite fields. Thus, the introduction of
RNS as a number system for arithmetic of the field elements can be a step
towards increasing the side-channel resistance of cryptographic algorithms.
However, this does not constitute enough protection against SCAs and fault
attacks nor does it guarantee efficient implementations.
Contribution of the author: This chapter is a collection of the results
from the following published papers "Residue Number System as a
Side-Channel and Fault Injection Attack Countermeasure in Elliptic
Curve Cryptography" [FPBS16], "Secure and Efficient RNS Software
Implementation for Elliptic Curve Cryptography" [FPS17] and "Prac-
tical Evaluation of Protected Residue Number System Scalar Multipli-
cation" [PFPB19]. The author participated in the high-level design of
secure variations of the RNS implementation, which can be found in
the GitHub repository of Fournaris [Fou18b]. The main contribution of
the author is the practical evaluation of the various RNS implementa-
tions using the Test Vector Leakage Assessment methodology and the
Template Attacks adapted to the specific implementation and available
platforms.
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis by summarizing the most important results and
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proposing practical ways to achieve secure elliptic curve cryptographic im-
plementations. Research directions and yet-undiscovered potentials for secure
implementations that stem out of this thesis are also presented as future work.
Chapter 2
Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Nothing can be truly replicated. Not a love, not a
jewel, not a single line.
Patti Smith, M Train
Public-key cryptography is the branch of cryptography that includes asymmetric
algorithms used for key exchange, digital signatures, authentication and encryption.
The principles of public-key agreement were established by Diffie and Hellman in
the mid 70’s [DH76] and provided new directions for the cryptographic commu-
nity. The most important outcome of their research is the elimination of the need
to establish a common encryption key prior to the communication phase, usually
during an offline key agreement. Each user of a cryptographic protocol has in his
possession a public and private key pair, which derive from the same mathemati-
cal object and which have a very interesting property. The public parameter can be
used by everyone to perform encryption or verification of a signature, actions that
are mathematically represented by an exponentiation or multiplication. However,
inverting this operation, i.e. decrypting a message or creating a valid signature on a
document, is a computationally hard problem and requires knowledge of the private
key. Public-key algorithms have a variety of applications, such as network security
protocols (SSL/TLS, SSH, IPsec), banking systems (PIN verification, authentica-
tion), communication applications (WhatsApp, Viber, Signal, Messenger), digital
certificates and so on.
The most known and widely adopted public-key cryptosystem is RSA by Rivest,
Shamir and Adleman [RSA78]. It is based on factorization and its security relies on
the difficulty of extracting modular e-th roots when the factorization of the mod-
ulus is unknown. In this thesis we focus on Elliptic curve cryptosystems and we
use the relevant mathematical notation, but the notation, and consequently the al-
gorithms and countermeasures, can be easily transformed to multiplicative notation
and applied to RSA.
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Elliptic curves are mathematical objects with interesting algebraic and geo-
metric properties that have been studied over a hundred years by mathematicians.
Among the most fascinating applications of elliptic curves are algorithms for fac-
toring integers, primality tests and the Taniyama–Shimura–Weil conjecture which
is fundamental to proving Fermat’s last theorem. This chapter provides prelimi-
nary knowledge about elliptic curve cryptography that is necessary to comprehend
the results in the remainder of this thesis; it does not intend to be exhaustive. For
a more comprehensive study of the topic, the interested reader is referred to the
books [HMV03, CFA+05, Sil09, Sil94, Gal12].
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) was introduced in 1985 independently by
Miller [Mil85] and Koblitz [Kob87]. It is broadly used for implementing asym-
metric cryptographic protocols (public-key encryption and digital signatures); it is
preferred for embedded devices due to the small key length and memory require-
ments compared to equivalent RSA implementations. For instance, a 256-bit field
curve provides a security level of 128 bits, which is roughly equivalent to a 3248-bit
RSA key (see [BCC+12] for more details).
The security of elliptic curve cryptosystems relies on the difficulty of solving
the Discrete Logarithm problem on elliptic curves defined over finite fields of large
characteristic or binary fields. In this chapter, the three basic aspects of ECC are
presented, namely the arithmetic of elliptic curves in Section 2.1, scalar multipli-
cation algorithms on elliptic curves in Section 2.2 and cryptographic protocols in
Section 2.3.
2.1 Arithmetic of Elliptic Curves
Elliptic curve arithmetic is performed in terms of the underlying field operations.
For ECC, the curves are defined over prime or binary fields.
Definition 2.1.1. A prime field Fp, where p > 3 is a prime, is a finite field with p
elements, which determines it uniquely up to isomorphism. It is represented by the
set of integers {1, ..., p} with the addition and multiplication operations performed
modulo p.
Definition 2.1.2. A binary field of order 2m consists of all the binary polynomials
of degree at most m− 1, F2m = {am−1zm−1 + ...+a1z+a0 : ai ∈ F2}. Addition,
multiplication and inversion of field elements are performed modulo an irreducible
binary polynomial f(z) of degree m.
Definition 2.1.3. The characteristic of a field F is defined as the smallest number
m > 0 such that m · e = e+ e+ · · ·+ e = 0, where e is the unit element of F.
Given these introductory definitions, we can proceed with defining the arith-
metic properties of elliptic curves used in cryptography.
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2.1.1 Coordinate Systems
An elliptic curve E over the finite field K, denoted as EK , can be defined in terms
of solutions (x, y) to one of the equations defined in Section 2.1.2. The pairs that
verify these equations represent the affine coordinates of a point over the curve E .
From the addition rules on an elliptic curve, the necessary operations are addition,
multiplication and inversion over K. Inversion is the most expensive operation and
can be avoided by using other types of coordinate systems for the pointsP = (x, y).
We hereby present the most commonly used coordinates systems that can be found
in cryptographic implementations of elliptic curve protocols.
Projective coordinates
In the projective coordinate system, each point P = (x, y) is represented by three
coordinates (X,Y, Z), where x = XZ , y =
Y
Z , with Z 6= 0.
Jacobian coordinates
In the Jacobian coordinates system, each point P = (x, y) is represented also by
three coordinates (X,Y, Z), with x = X
Z2 , y =
Y
Z3 , Z 6= 0.
López-Dahab coordinates
In the López-Dahab system, the relation for the point (X,Y, Z) is x = XZ , y =
Y
Z2
with Z 6= 0.
2.1.2 Forms of Elliptic Curves
There are several types of elliptic curves defined by their curve equation. Below we
will treat some commonly used forms.
Weierstrass curves
Definition 2.1.4. An elliptic curve defined over a field K is defined by the Weier-
strass equation
EK : y2 + α1xy + α3y = x3 + α2x2 + α4x+ α6 . (2.1)
Together with the point at infinity O, the set (EK ∪ O,+) forms an Abelian group
with neutral element O.
Detailed proofs that the three axioms for abelian groups hold for Equation 2.1
can be found in [Sil09, Chapter 3] and of [Ste09, Chapter 6].
When the characteristic of the field char(K) is not 2 or 3, then the general
Weierstrass form can be simplified to
EK : y2 = x3 + αx+ β. (2.2)
In the following, it is assumed that char(K) 6= 2, 3. Adding the points P = (x1, y1)
and Q = (x2, y2) gives a third point on the curve, namely P + Q = (x3, y3)
according to the formulæ
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{ x3 = λ2 − x1 − x2,
y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1,
with λ = y1 − y2
x1 − x2 if P 6= ±Q and λ =
3x21 + α
2y1
if P = Q.
For points represented in Jacobian coordinates P = (X1, Y1, Z1) and Q =
(X2, Y2, Z2), the addition of P and Q with P 6= ±Q is P +Q = (X3, Y3, Z3) with
X3 = F 2 − E3 − 2BE2, Y3 = F (BE2 −X3)−DE3, Z3 = Z1Z2E, (2.3)
where A = X1Z22 , B = X2Z21 , C = Y1Z32 , D = Y2Z31 , E = A − B, F =
C − D [BL]. Jacobian addition needs 12M + 4S, with M and S the number of
multiplications and squarings overK, respectively. Point doubling can be performed
very efficiently with only 3M + 6S using the formulæ
X3 = B2 − 2A, Y3 = B(A−X3)− Y 41 , Z3 = Y1Z1, (2.4)
where A = X1Y 21 , B =
1
2(3X
2
1 + αZ41 ).
Figure (2.1) Point addition on an elliptic curve
Weierstrass curves are standardized and widely used in cryptography [AX98,
Res00, NIS13, BSI10]. However, they had a main drawback regarding their side-
channel resistance; namely their addition formulæ were incomplete and not unified.
An elliptic curve addition law is complete if it correctly computes the sum of any
two points in the group without exceptions. The addition law is unified if addition
and doubling of points can be computed by the same formulæ. As it is obvious
from the previous formulæ, addition and doubling are handled differently and the
point at infinity gives an exceptional case. In [BL95], Bosma and Lenstra presented
complete formulæ for Weierstrass curves, which had an exceptional case for the
pair of points (P,Q) if and only if P − Q is a point of order two. In [RCB16],
Renes, Costello and Batina presented complete addition formulæ for prime order
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elliptic curves E/Fq : y2 = x3 + αx + b with q ≥ 5, which require only 12
field multiplications 12M. 1 The complete addition formulæ using homogeneous
representation of a point are
X3 = (X1Y2 +X2Y1)(Y1Y2 − α(X1Z2 +X2Z1)− 3bZ1Z2)
−(Y1Z2 + Y2Z1)(αX1X2 + 3b(X1Z2 +X2Z1)− α2Z1Z2),
Y3 = (Y1Y2 + α(X1Z2 +X2Z1) + 3bZ1Z2)(Y1Y2 − α(X1Z2 +X2Z1)
−3bZ1Z2) + (3X1X2 + αZ1Z2)(αX1X2 + 3b(X1Z2 +X2Z1)
−α2Z1Z2),
Z3 = (Y1Z2 + Y2Z1)(Y1Y2 + α(X1Z2 +X2Z1) + 3bZ1Z2)
+(X1Y2 +X2Y1)(3X1X2 + αZ1Z2)
The completeness property of the addition law offers the possibility to have secure
ECC implementations. By removing the “branching" to handle exceptional cases,
some side-channel attack vulnerabilities relying on handling exceptional cases can
be prevented. It is trickier, but still possible, to achieve secure ECC implementa-
tions also without complete addition formulæ, but the difference between addition
and doubling operations should be handled carefully. The way the multiplication
is handled in the underlying field operations, and more specifically the handling of
carries, is very crucial for side-channel leakages as we will see in the next chapters.
Edwards curves
Edwards curves, introduced by Edwards in [Edw07], were the first curves shown to
have a complete addition law. Applications of Edwards and twisted Edwards curves
in cryptography are extensively studied by Bernstein and Lange [BL07, BL09] and
Hisil et al. [HWCD08]. An Edwards curve is defined over a field K with char(K) 6=
2 by the equation:
Ed : y2 + x2 = 1 + dx2y2, (2.5)
where d ∈ K\{0, 1}. The Edwards addition law for two points P = (x1, y1) and
Q = (x2, y2), in affine coordinates, is given by the following formulæ:
P +Q = (x3, y3) = (
x1y2 + y1x2
1 + dx1x2y1y2
,
y1y2 − x1x2
1− dx1x2y1y2 ). (2.6)
This addition law is unified, i.e. the same formula can be used for both addition and
doubling without exceptional cases. The neutral element is the point (0, 1). If d is
not a square, then the addition law is complete and there are no exceptional cases
for the neutral element.
1For the overview on elliptic curves in this section, we omit counting the multiplications by a con-
stant (Mα) and the additions A, which are used for extensive comparison results in some publications.
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Twisted Edwards curves, introduced in [BBJ+08], are a generalization of Ed-
wards curves with the form Eα,d : y2 + αx2 = 1 + dx2y2. The addition law for
twisted Edwards curves is a generalization of Equation (2.6):
P +Q = (x3, y3) = (
x1y2 + y1x2
1 + dx1x2y1y2
,
y1y2 − αx1x2
1− dx1x2y1y2 ). (2.7)
The cost of addition and doubling on Edwards curves depends on the form of the
curve and the coordinates chosen by the developer. An overview of all types of
curves and coordinates is given in the Explicit Formulas Database [BL]. The imple-
mentation of Bernstein et al. in [BBJ+08] uses inverted twisted Edwards coordinates
and needs 9M + 1S for addition and 3M + 4S for doubling. The most efficient im-
plementation of twisted Edwards curves is given by Hisil et al. [HWCD08] using
8M for addition with suitably selected curve constants.2
Montgomery curves
In [Mon87], P. L. Montgomery defined the following form of elliptic curves over
finite fields of odd characteristic:
EM : By2 = x3 +Ax2 + x, B(A2 − 4) 6= 0. (2.8)
Let P1 = (x1, y1) and P2 = (x2, y2) be points on EM . Then, the point P3 =
(x3, y3) = P1 + P2 can be calculated using the following formulæ:
Addition formulæ (P1 6= ±P2)
λ = (y2 − y1)/(x2 − x1)
x3 = Bλ2 −A− x1 − x2
y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1
Doubling formulæ (P1 = P2, y1 6= 0)
λ = (3x21 + 2Ax1 + 1)/(2By1)
x3 = Bλ2 −A− 2x1
y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1
Montgomery arithmetic is very efficient with additional speed-up by computing
only (X,Z) coordinates of intermediate points [Sta03]. We set (x, y) = (X/Z, Y/Z)
and present the operations in projective coordinates, as described in [Mon87]. We
note here that the point nP = (Xn, Yn, Zn) is the n-times multiple of the point
P = (X,Y, Z). The addition and doubling formulæ for (m+n)P = mP +nP are
as follows:
2The developer can choose to use different formulæ for addition and doubling in twisted Edwards
curves for extra efficiency in the implementation or unified formulæ for resistance against side-channel
attacks.
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Addition formulæ (m 6= n){
Xm+n = Zm−n[(Xm − Zm)(Xn + Zn) + (Xm + Zm)(Xn − Zn)]2
Zm+n = Xm−n[(Xm − Zm)(Xn + Zn)− (Xm + Zm)(Xn − Zn)]2
Doubling formulæ (m = n)
4XnZn = (Xn + Zn)2 − (Xn − Zn)2
X2n = (Xn + Zn)2(Xn − Zn)2
Y2n = (4XnZn)((Xn − Zn)2 + ((A+ 2)/4)(4XnZn))
In [IMT], it is shown that the loop iteration in the Montgomery power ladder 2.2.4
using (X,Z) coordinates is performed in only 11M + 4S. Moreover, as presented
in [OKS00], the number of additions and doublings in scalar multiplications on
Montgomery form elliptic curves only depends on the bit length of the key and not
on the bit patterns or the bit itself at a certain position of the scalar.
Hessian curves
A Hessian curve over a field K is defined by the cubic equation
EK : x3 + y3 + z3 = dxyz, (2.9)
where d ∈ K and d3 6= 27. Hessian and twisted Hessian curves are interest-
ing for cryptography due to their small cofactor 3 and their side-channel resis-
tance [HWCD09, JQ01, BCKL15]. Moreover, the Hessian addition formulæ (also
called Sylvester formulas) can be used for doubling, a fact that provides a form of
unification.
In [FJ10], Farashahi and Joye presented efficient unified formulæ for generalized
Hessian curves:
EK : x3 + y3 + cz3 = dxyz, (2.10)
where c, d ∈ K, c 6= 0 and d3 6= 27c. The unified formulæ are complete for certain
parameter choices. More precisely, the group of K-rational points on a generalized
Hessian curve has complete addition formulæ, if and only if c is not a cube in K.
The fastest known addition formulæ on binary elliptic curves with 9M + 3S for
extended projective coordinates and 8M + 3S for mixed affine-projective addition
are presented in [FJ10]. The sum of two points P , Q represented in extended pro-
jective coordinates by (Xi : Yi : Zi : Ai : Bi : Ci : Di : Ei : Fi), where
Ai = X2i , Bi = Y 2i , Ci = Z2i , Di = XiYi, Ei = XiZi, Fi = YiZi and for i = 1, 2,
is the point P +Q = (X3 : Y3 : Z3 : A3 : B3 : C3 : D3 : E3 : F3) with
X3 = cC1F2 +D1A2
Y3 = B1D2 + cE1C2
Z3 = A1E2 + F1B2,
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with A3 = X23 , B3 = Y 23 , C3 = Z23 , D3 = X3Y3, E3 = X3Z3, F3 = Y3Z3.
The complete addition formulæ for twisted Hessian curves of cofactor 3 in
[BCKL15] give the fastest results for prime-field curves with 8.77M for certain
curve parameters. Bernstein et al. [BCKL15] ran the scalar multiplication algorithm
for 10000 random 256-bit scalars, i.e., integers between 2255 and 2256 − 1, using as
input the costs of twisted Hessian operations and got 8.77M per bit as the average
cost of the resulting addition chain.
2.2 Scalar Multiplication Algorithms
Elliptic curve operations are used for cryptographic protocols such as the Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) for digital signatures, Elliptic Curve
ElGamal as an encryption/decryption scheme, and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) as a key exchange scheme. The main operation in all those protocols using
ECC is scalar multiplication of a point P on a curve with an integer k.
Computing the result of a scalar multiplication on an elliptic curve can be done
in a similar way as exponentiation in RSA. A simple and efficient algorithm is
binary scalar multiplication, where an n-bit scalar k is written in its binary form
(k0, k1, ..., kn−1)2 with k =
∑
i ki2i, ki ∈ {0, 1}. A binary algorithm processes a
loop, scanning the bits of the scalar (from the most significant bit to the least sig-
nificant one, or the other way around) and performing a point doubling only if the
current bit is 0 or a doubling and an addition if the bit is 1.
Scalar multiplication algorithms take as input a point P in affine or projective
coordinates and the scalar k. The result is the point [k]P on the curve. During the
execution of the algorithm, mixed coordinates can be used for an additional speed-
up [CMO98].
Scalar multiplication is a sensitive operation from a security point of view, since
it manipulates the secret key k and returns the result according to the bits of the
key. Naïve implementations of scalar multiplication with if-statements are subject
to side-channel attacks, and more precisely timing attacks. Coron’s randomization
countermeasures of point or scalar, as presented in [Cor99], can thwart timing or
DPA attacks, but not SPA attacks. SPA leakage is present when there is a difference
in operation flow between only doubling or doubling-and-addition. Point additions
and point doublings may result in different leakage patterns and since these opera-
tions are key dependent, the key could be retrieved quite easily. SPA resistant algo-
rithms based on unified formulæ are regular algorithms, which perform a constant
operation flow regardless of the scalar value. A nice overview of fast and regular
scalar multiplication algorithms is given in [Riv11]. In this section, we present the
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most broadly used regular scalar multiplication algorithms. It is important to note
here, that this is not an exhaustive presentation of scalar multiplication algorithms;
we focus only on the algorithms used by the implementations that we attacked and
protected in terms of this research.
2.2.1 Left-to-right double-and-add Algorithm
The straightforward implementation of scalar multiplication on an elliptic curve
involves repeated doubling and addition operations. When the bit of the scalar is 0,
a doubling is performed, and when the bit is 1 a doubling is followed by addition.
In the following algorithm, we show how such an implementation could be written.
Algorithm 1: The left-to-right double-and-add algorithm
Input: P , k = (kn−1, kn−2, . . . , k0)2
Output:Q = [k]P
1 R0 ← P ;
2 for i← n− 2 down to 0 do
3 R0 ← 2R0 ;
4 if ki = 1 then
5 R1 ← R0 +P ;
6 end
7 end
8 returnR0
In the next chapter, we show the vulnerabilities caused by the conditional state-
ment if ki = 1.
2.2.2 Left-to-right double-and-add-always Algorithm
The double-and-add-always algorithm was initially proposed by Coron in [Cor99]
as a first attempt to avoid if-statements and therefore prevent the identification of
different operations. The algorithm performs a point doubling followed by a point
addition in a for loop, scanning the scalar bits from the most significant to the least
significant one. Both operations are performed in every loop and according to the
key bit, the final assignment toR0 will be eitherR0 orR1. There are no conditional
statements in the algorithm, but there is one key-dependent assignment, which can
leak secret information. Another important remark is that R0 is initialized by P
instead of O, in order to avoid exceptional cases given by the point at infinity.
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Algorithm 2: The left-to-right double-and-add-always algorithm [Cor99]
Input: P , k = (kn−1, kn−2, . . . , k0)2
Output:Q = [k]P
1 R0 ← P ;
2 for i← n− 2 down to 0 do
3 R0 ← 2R0 ;
4 R1 ← R0 +P ;
5 R0 ← Rki ;
6 end
7 returnR0
2.2.3 Right-to-left double-and-add-always Algorithm
The binary right-to-left double-and-add-always algorithm proposed by Joye [Joy07]
is shown below as Algorithm 3. The steps of the algorithm are similar to Algorithm 2
with the following differences:
• The bits of the scalar are scanned from the least significant to the most signif-
icant one.
• Two temporary registers are used instead of three and they are both effectively
used, without any dummy operations.
Algorithm 3: Binary right-to-left double-and-add-always algorithm [Joy07]
Input: P , k = (kn−1, kn−2, . . . , k0)2
Output:Q = [k]P
1 R0 ← O;
2 R1 ← P ;
3 for i← 0 up to n-1 do
4 b← 1− ki ;
5 Rb ← 2Rb ;
6 Rb ← Rb +Rki ;
7 end
8 returnR0
Similar to Algorithm 2, there are no conditional statements in this algorithm, but
there is a key-dependent assignment, which can be vulnerable to attacks. However,
there are several attacks that can be mounted on the left-to-right, but not on the
right-to-left algorithm (for instance the Doubling attack, described in Chapter 3, is
only applicable on the left-to-right algorithm).
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2.2.4 Montgomery Power Ladder
The Montgomery Power Ladder (MPL), initially presented by Montgomery [Mon87]
as a way to speed up scalar multiplication on elliptic curves, is one of the most chal-
lenging algorithms for simple side-channel analysis due to its natural regularity of
operations. This algorithm is used as the primary secure and efficient choice for
resource-constrained devices. A comprehensive security analysis of the MPL, given
by Joye and Yen in [JY02], showed that the regularity of the algorithm makes it
intrinsically secure against a large variety of implementation attacks (SPA, some
fault attacks, etc.). The MPL is described in Algorithm 4. For a specific choice of
projective coordinates, as described in Section 2.1.2 and in [Sta03], one can do com-
putations with only X and Z coordinates, which makes this option more memory
efficient than other algorithms.
Algorithm 4: The Montgomery Ladder
Input: P , k = (kn−1, kn−2, . . . , k0)2
Output:Q = [k]P
1 R0 ← O ;
2 R1 ← P ;
3 for i← n− 1 down to 0 do
4 b← 1− ki ;
5 Rb ← R0 +R1 ;
6 Rki ← 2 ·Rki ;
7 end
8 returnR0
2.2.5 Side-Channel Atomicity
Side-channel atomicity is an SPA countermeasure proposed by Chevallier-Mames
et al. [CMCJ04], in which individual operations are implemented in such a way
that they have an identical side-channel profile (e.g. for any branch and any key-bit
related subroutine). In short, it is suggested in [CMCJ04] that the point doubling
and addition operations are implemented such that the same code is executed for
both operations. This renders the operations indistinguishable by simply inspecting
a suitable side-channel. One could, therefore, implement a point multiplication as
described in Algorithm 5.
We note three side-channel equivalent instructions in the while-loop, meaning
that they have the same order of operations and therefore produce indistinguishable
type of leakage. For instance, we can assume that the dummy instruction i← i− 0
is side-channel equivalent to the instruction i ← i − 1. Point doubling will be
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Algorithm 5: Side-Channel Atomic double-and-add algorithm [CMCJ04]
Input: P , k = (kn−1, kn−2, . . . , k0)2
Output:Q = [k]P
1 R0 ← O; R1 ← P ; i← n− 1 ;
2 m← 0 ;
3 while i ≥ 0 do
4 R0 ← R0 +Rm ;
5 m← m⊕ ki ;
6 i← i− ¬m ;
7 end
8 returnR0
performed if m = 0 and depending on the current scalar bit ki, the variable i will
decrement or not. It is worth mentioning that this protected algorithm requires on
average 1.5 · n multiplications, which is the same complexity as the unprotected
double-and-add algorithm.
There are certain choices of coordinates and curves for which this approach can
be deployed by using unified or complete addition formulæ for the group operations.
The unified and complete formulæ of Weierstrass, Edwards and Hessian curves are
described in Section 2.1.2.
2.2.6 Nonadjacent Form
The nonadjacent form (NAF) of a scalar k = ∑ni=0 ki2i is a representation with
ki ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and kiki+1 = 0 for all i ≥ 0. Since 1960, Reitwiesner has shown
that every integer m ∈ Z has exactly one NAF [Rei60] and Gordon proved that the
NAF(m) has the fewest nonzero coefficients of any signed binary expansion of m,
since the expected number of nonzeros in a length n NAF is n/3 [Gor98] on aver-
age. This fact allows further optimizations in the efficiency of scalar multiplication
using NAF [JT01a]. From an efficiency point of view, using NAF for the representa-
tion of the scalar in the double-and-add algorithm is good, because it would require
m doublings and m/3 additions or subtractions on the curve on average.
The use of NAF representation for speeding up the computations on elliptic
curves was initially proposed by Morain and Olivos [MO90], mainly for improving
factorization and primality tests. Inverses on elliptic curves can be computed "for
free", since the inverse −P of a point P = (x, y) geometrically represents the
symmetrical point with respect to the x-axis with coordinates (x,−y). Therefore,
using addition-subtraction chains for scalar multiplication and allowing negative
digits in the binary representation of the scalar is an efficient choice for additive
groups.
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Following the description of Ha and Moon [CHJM03], a scalar k with an n-
bit binary representation can be NAF decoded into an (n + 1)-bit integer d; the
number of subsequent additions-subtractions in the scalar multiplication is equal to
the number of non-zero bits of d. The scalar multiplication with NAF decoded scalar
can be computed as follows:
Algorithm 6: Scalar multiplication with NAF algorithm [CHJM03]
Input: P , n+ 1-bit integer d = (dn, dn−1, . . . , d0),s.t.di ∈ {−1, 0, 1}
Output:Q = d ·P
1 R← 0;
2 for i← x down to 0 do
3 R ← 2R ;
4 if di = 1 then
5 R ← R +P ;
6 end
7 if di = −1 then
8 R ← R −P ;
9 end
10 end
11 returnR
The complexity of Algorithm 6 is n/3 additions and n + 1 doublings on aver-
age. Because of the obvious efficiency on computing a scalar multiplication over
elliptic curves, the NAF representation and different variations of it with window
methods has been extensively examined in the cryptographic community. Ha and
Moon [CHJM03] proposed a randomized version of the signed-scalar representa-
tion, in order to protect the implementation against certain side-channel attacks.
They insert a n-bit long random number r, whose bits have the value 0 or 1 with
equal probability 1/2. As noted in their paper, the number of non-zero digits in the
randomized version of the algorithm is on average n/2, which is the same as in the
binary case, but a bit slower compared to the unprotected version of the NAF algo-
rithm that needs on average n/3 additions. Of course the random number generator
cost (either in hardware or in software) should also be taken into consideration when
choosing which form of NAF algorithm is suitable for an application.
2.2.7 Fixed-base Comp Methods
In the case that the pointP is fixed, then the scalar multiplication [k]P can be accel-
erated by precomputing multiples ofP , storing them in memory and retrieving them
when necessary. For instance, precomputing the multiples of P , where the scalar is
k = {2, 22, 23, ...} could eliminate the costs of doubling in the scalar multiplication
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routine. Section 3.3.2 of [HMV03] gives a nice analysis of this technique, which
was presented by López and Dahab [LD99] and it is based on the adaptation of the
exponentiation method of Lim and Lee [LL94] for binary fields.
We present here a simplified version of the fixed-base comb multiplier by Brick-
ell et.al [BGMW92], which is one of the fastest scalar multiplication methods avail-
able. As it requires intense precomputations, it is only used for multiplications with
a fixed point, which is in most cases a generator of an elliptic curve (sub-)group.
The following algorithm shows the fixed-base comb method as presented in
[HMV03].
Algorithm 7: Fixed-base comb method [HMV03, Chapter 3]
Input: P , k = (kn−1, kn−2, . . . , k0)2, window width w, d = dn/we
Output:Q = [k]P
1 Precompute [aw−1, ..., a1, a0]P for all (aw−1, ..., a1, a0);
2 k = Kw−1||...||K1||K0;
3 Q ← O;
4 for i← d− 1 down to 0 do
5 Q ← 2Q ;
6 Q ←Q + [Kw−1i , ...,K1i ,K0i ]Q;
7 end
8 returnQ
For this adapted method of Lim and Lee [LL94], the binary representation of
k is first padded on the left with dw − n zeros, where w is the window width. Let
(Kd−1, ...K1,K0) be the base 2w representation of k. Then, k is divided into w bit
strings, each of length d, so that k = Kw−1||...||K1||K0. The Kj bit strings of
length d are written as rows of an array, whose columns are processed one by one.
Brickell et.al [BGMW92] proposed to use partial sums of elements of this array,
for instance Qj =
∑
i:Ki=j 2
wiP for each j. In this way, the scalar multiplication
becomes:
[k]P = ∑d−1i=0 Ki(2wiP ) = ∑2w−1j=1 (j∑i:Ki=j [2wi]P ) = ∑2w−1j=1 jQj
= Q2w−1 + (Q2w−1 +Q2w−2) + ...+ (Q2w−1 +Q2w−2 + ...+Q1)
(2.11)
The values ai represent all the possible bit strings of lengthw. If we set [aw−1, ..., a0]
= aw−12(w−1)d+ ...+a12d+a0 and we precompute 2d/2[aw−1, ..., a0]P , as in step
1 of Algorithm 7, we can accelerate the computation. In this way, the partial sums in
Equation 2.11 can be computed faster and the scalar multiplication is then calculated
as written in the for-loop of the algorithm.
This algorithm is constant-time and it is used by mbedTLS [mbe], in order to
provide security for embedded systems. However, as we show in Chapter 4, it is
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vulnerable to certain types of template attacks, even if some countermeasures are
applied.
2.3 Elliptic Curve Protocols
As mentioned in Section 2.2, ECC primitives are used for cryptographic protocols
such as the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) for digital signa-
tures, the equivalent signature scheme for Edwards curves EdDSA, Elliptic Curve
ElGamal as an encryption scheme, and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) as a
key agreement scheme. In this section, the details of those protocols are described.
In general, the use of elliptic curves in cryptography relies on the difficulty
of solving the Discrete Logarithm Problem, so-called ECDLP, in the finite field
where the elliptic curve is defined. The basic Discrete Logarithm Problem requires
to find k where xk = y and x, y belong to the same cyclic group G with x being
a generator of the group. The elliptic curve version requires to find a scalar k that
satisfies the equation Q = [k]P , where points P ,Q belong to a set of points G on
an elliptic curve. Actually, one works in the cyclic subgroup generated by G, where
G is a point of large prime order ord(n) to avoid trivial attacks. This problem is
known to be computationally difficult and all currently known algorithms to solve
the problem are exponential. As mentioned earlier, the security level achieved using
elliptic curves is higher for the same key size, for instance 256-bit ECC is considered
to be equivalent to 3072-bit RSA achieving 128-bit security.
2.3.1 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) is a variation of the original Diffie-Hellman
key agreement protocol [DH76], where the multiplicative group of integers modulo
a prime p is replaced by the additive group of points on an elliptic curve. As with the
original protocol, ECDH is used when two partiesA andB want to agree on a shared
secret key over a public channel. It is common to use an asymmetric algorithm
to establish the shared secret and continue the encrypted communication using a
symmetric algorithm.
For the establishment of a shared secret with ECDH, the following steps are
necessary:
1. Party A will generate a private key dA and a public keyQA = [dA]G (where
G is the generator for the curve E).
2. Similarly, party B has his private key dB and a public keyQB = [dB]G.
3. PartyB has to send his public key toA, in that wayA can calculate [dA]QB =
[dA · dB]G, and the same holds for party B when he gets the public key of A.
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Before the calculation of the shared key, both parties have to verify that the
points they received belong indeed on the curve and they are of large order.
4. The shared secret is the x co-ordinate of the calculated point [dA · dB]G.
This protocol is simple and it can provide security in a straightforward way. An
eavesdropper over the public channel can know only QA and QB , from which he
can not derive the shared secret.
2.3.2 Elliptic Curve ElGamal
Elliptic Curve ElGamal is the equivalent of ElGamal encryption-decryption protocol
using elliptic curves over a finite field. Following the definition of [Kob87], let q =
pn
′
be a large integer with n′ ∈ Z, E defined over Fq and ord(E) = n. The public
parameters of the cryptosystem are E , q, n and a function f : m 7→ Pm, which
maps messages to points on the curve.
Suppose that party A wants to send an message m encrypted to party B. The
following steps should be followed for an ElGamal encryption protocol:
1. A chooses a secret value x ∈R [1, n − 1] such that 0 < x < n − 1 and
gcd(x, n) = 1, and transmits Y = [x]G to B.
2. Party B chooses a random k with k ∈R [1, n − 1] and creates the ciphertext
(C1, C2) = ([k]G, kY + Pm).
3. A can decrypt the ciphertext by calculating C ′ = xC1 and Pm = C2 − C ′ =
k([x]G) + Pm − x([k]G).
4. The original message m is the result of f−1(Pm).
2.3.3 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithms
Generating and verifying a signature using elliptic curves is equivalent to the origi-
nal Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). However, the high levels of security that can
be achieved by using smaller key size compared to DSA, led ECDSA and similar
signature systems like EdDSA and Ed25519 to be widely adopted. ECDSA, as pre-
sented in [JMV01] is standardized by several organizations (it appears in NIST FIPS
140-2 [FIP01], ANSI X9.62, IEEE 1363-2000 and ISO/IEC 15946-2 standards) and
used by OpenSSL [Fou18a], Bitcoin [Nak09] and other cryptocurrencies.
Each party participating in the signature protocol possesses a key-pair, the pri-
vate key di and the public key Qi = [di]G, i ∈ {A,B}, for parties A and B, where
G is the elliptic curve base point, a generator of the elliptic curve E with large prime
order ord(n). The parameters (E , G, n) are public parameters of the system, on
which both parties have agreed.
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2.3.3.1 ECDSA Signature Generation
Let us assume that party A wants to send m signed to party B.
1. First, A calculates h = hash(m), where hash() is a secure cryptographic
hash function.
2. A selects randomly k ∈R [1, n− 1] and calculates (x1, y1) = [k]G.
3. The signature is the tuple (r, s) = (x1 (mod n), k−1(z+ rdA)), where z the
leftmost bits of h of length [1, n− 1]
2.3.3.2 ECDSA Signature Verification
The verifier, here party B, after receiving the signature pair (r, s) needs to verify
that this is valid following the next steps:
1. Verify that r, s belong in the interval [1, n− 1].
2. Compute e = hash(m) and w = s−1 (mod n).
3. Compute u1 = ew and u2 = rw (mod n).
4. Compute V = [u1]G+ [u2]QA. If V = O, then reject the signature.
5. Convert the x-coordinate of V to an integer x¯. If u = x¯ (mod n) = r, then
accept the signature.
The Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm (EdDSA) as described in the
original paper [BDL+12] is a signature scheme using Schnorr signatures and Twisted
Edwards curves, aiming to speed up signature generation with the same security lev-
els. The parameters of the scheme include an elliptic curve E over a finite field Fq,
where q is an odd prime, a base point G ∈ E(Fq) of large prime order l and a colli-
sion resistant hash function mathcalH with 2b-bit output length, where 2b−1 > q,
so that elements of Fq and curve points in E(Fq) can be represented by strings of b
bits. The rational points of the groupmathcalE(Fq) of Fq) have order 2cl, where 2c
is a public parameter and called the cofactor. For Ed25519 the curve Curve25519
and the hash function SHA-512 are used.
Each party participating in the EdDSA signature protocol possesses a key-pair,
the private key d with |d| = b chosen uniformly at random, and the public key
Q = [s]G, with |s| = b the least significant b-bits ofH(d).
2.3.3.3 EdDSA Signature Generation
Let us assume that party A wants to send m signed to party B.
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1. First, A selects randomly d and calculates s = H0,...,b−1(d) the b least signif-
icant bits ofH(d).
2. A computes r = H(Hb,...,2b−1(d),m) and R = [r]G.
3. The signature is the tuple (R,S) = ([r]G, r +H(R,A,m) (mod l)), where
R ∈ E(Fq) and 0 ≤ S leql.
2.3.3.4 EdDSA Signature Verification
The verifier, here party B, after receiving the signature pair (R,S) needs to verify
that this is valid following the next steps:
1. Verify that R is indeed a point on the curve mathcalE(Fq) and S belongs in
the interval (0, l).
2. Compute h = H(R,Q,m), where Q is the public key of A.
3. If 2cSG = 2cR+ 2chQ, then accept the signature.
Chapter 3
Side Channel Attacks on Elliptic
Curves
It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has
data. Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit
theories, instead of theories to suit facts.
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle-Sherlok Holmes
Cryptographic protocols used in a broad range of applications have one com-
mon property, their security relies on a hard mathematical problem. This problem
is usually shown to be hard to solve in a polynomial time. In the case of ECC, this
hard problem is ECDLP as described in Section 2.3.
The traditional security model assumes that the attacker has access to the public
keys, he can request many signatures or messages to be encrypted and he knows
how the protocol works. The only thing that the adversary does not know is the
secret key, which he tries to retrieve by solving the underlying mathematical prob-
lems. In this setting, and depending on the security game in which we suppose the
adversary participates, a cryptographic scheme can have different levels of secu-
rity. For instance, in a perfectly secure scheme the ciphertext does not reveal any
information about the plaintext, whether in a semantically secure scheme any infor-
mation revealed on the ciphertext is not enough to extract useful information about
the plaintext.
In practice, however, when a cryptographic algorithm is implemented on a spe-
cific platform, the same theoretical models are not relevant anymore. The classical
security games for encryption or signatures do not recover keys, but reason about
(in)distinguishability or forgeries. The ability to recover the secret key goes beyond
that and amounts to a "total break". There is information leakage from the power
consumption or electromagnetic emanation from the operating device, which can
not be avoided and the use of countermeasures is necessary, in order to provide se-
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curity. This sort of leakage, known as side-channel leakage, can be simulated by
information theoretic models, which demonstrate the ability of the attacker to re-
cover the keys. There are various side-channel attacks that make an implementation
vulnerable and threatens its security; these attacks regarding ECC implementations
are presented in this chapter. A systematic methodology to evaluate the leakage of a
device based on several statistical tests, known as Test Vector Leakage Assessment
(TVLA) is also explained in Section 3.6; it is used later for this thesis, in order to
evaluate the leakage of proposed countermeasures. However, by using TVLA the
leakage is only detected, it cannot be exploited. It is, therefore, used for an initial
evaluation of a device and when leakage is detected, there are various attack meth-
ods to recover the secret keys.
3.1 Theoretical models for Side-Channel Attacks
Electronic devices that use cryptographic algorithms and store secret keys are vul-
nerable to various types of attacks. The non-invasive attacks are performed by ob-
serving the power or electromagnetic activity of devices, while they perform cryp-
tographic operations, and without altering the circuits permanently. This sort of at-
tacks are called side-channel attacks. There are passive attacks, where the attacker
observes only the activity of the device while operating correctly, and active attacks,
where the attacker intervenes and tries to induce faults during the execution of the
cryptographic algorithms. In this thesis, we deal only with passive side-channel at-
tacks.
Side-channel analysis as a method of extracting cryptographic keys was first pre-
sented by Kocher [Koc96], who noted that timing differences in the execution time
of a modular exponentiation could be used to break instances of RSA [RSA78].
Subsequently, Kocher et al. [KJJ99] observed that the instantaneous power con-
sumption could reveal information on intermediate states of any cryptographic algo-
rithm, since the instantaneous power consumption has, in many cases, been shown
to be proportional to the Hamming weight of the data being manipulated [BCO04].
It has also been shown that the electromagnetic emanations around a device can be
exploited in the same way [GMO01,QS01]. Attacks based on these observations are
typically referred to as Simple Power Analysis (SPA), Differential Power Analysis
(DPA), Simple Electromagnetic Analysis (SEMA) and Differential Electromagnetic
Analysis (DEMA).
During the design phase of a digital circuit, simulations of the power consump-
tion are used, in order to determine if each component meets the design require-
ments or not. Power simulations describe the behavior of a device running algo-
rithms with certain values. From an attacker’s point of view, power simulations at
a behavioral level are interesting, because they show data dependencies that may
influence the security of the implementation.
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The most widely adopted power models that are used to map simulated transi-
tions to power traces are the Hamming-weight and Hamming-distance model. The
Hamming weight of a value v is defined as the number of ones in its binary repre-
sentation. Therefore, the Hamming-weight model is based on the number of ones in
a certain value.
Definition 3.1.1. The Hamming Distance of two strings of the same length v0, v1
corresponds to the number of bit strings that differ from v0 to v1. This means that
HD(v0, v1) can be defined as follows: HD(v0, v1) = HW (v0 ⊕ v1).
The Hamming-distance model (HD) is used to deduce the power consumption
values from the transitions that occur at the output of logic cells during dynamic
power consumption of a circuit. Basically, by counting the 0 → 1 and 1 → 0
transitions that occur in a digital circuit during a certain time interval, exploitable
information over the manipulated secret key can be derived. According to [MOP07],
in power simulations the Hamming-distance model assumes for simplicity that all
cells contribute to the power consumption equally, and that there is no difference
between 0→ 1 and 1→ 0 transitions. However, in practice the power consumption
of a 0 → 1 transition is higher than the one for 1 → 0 transition. The HD model
is mostly used to describe the power consumption of buses and registers, and it is,
therefore, appropriate to perform hardware side-channel attacks. Implicitly, since
all software runs on hardware, this leakage model is also used for software attacks.
The choice of the appropriate model depends on the measurement setup and the
placement of the trigger.
The Hamming-weight (HW) model is simpler, in the sense that it takes into ac-
count the power consumption of data that are processed. The attacker assumes that
the power consumption is proportional to the bits that are set to 1 in the value of
interest. By observing the value of one bit before and after it is processed, we can
notice differences in the power consumption. If the cell that processes the value v
always stores the same value before processing v (it is for instance a register that is
always initialized to 0), then the power consumption is directly or inversely propor-
tional to the initial bits of this value. If the value that is stored in this initialization
register is a random variable, then comparing the initial and processed values will
not give any useful information to the attacker; the results will be independent. The
HW model might seem simpler to simulate for a cryptographic devices, but it offers
less side-channel information to the attacker and it is used when the HD model gives
no useful information.
3.2 Simple Power Analysis on Elliptic Curves
Cryptographic implementations are vulnerable to simple power analysis (SPA) or
simple electromagnetic attacks (SEMA) if there are distinct patterns in a trace,
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which depend directly on the key. Kocher et al. [KJJ99] defined SPA in the fol-
lowing way:
Definition 3.2.1. Simple Power Analysis (SPA) is a technique that involves directly
interpreting power consumption measurements collected during cryptographic oper-
ations. SPA can yield information about a device’s operation as well as key material.
In practice, SPA is applied to a scenario when one or only a small number of
power traces in available to the attacker. In the ECDSA setting for instance, the
ephemeral key that is used in the protocol can be retrieved with SPA. Implemen-
tations that involve conditional branching are vulnerable to SPA. The scalar mul-
tiplication in ECDSA is implemented as a sequence of point doubling and point
addition operations. If the implementation is done as in Algorithm 1, then SPA is
applicable and an adversary is able to recover the secret scalar bits, as long as he
can distinguish between doubling and addition patterns.
Coron [Cor99] was the first to observe that a straightforward implementation
of scalar multiplication is vulnerable to SPA and he proposed countermeasures and
regular algorithms to thwart this type of attack. Örs et al. [ÖOP03] demonstrated the
first practical results of SPA on FPGAs for an ECC hardware implementation. The
following figure, taken from [ÖOP03] shows in practice how the differences in the
power consumption of doublings (0) and additions (1) can be identified and reveal
the secret scalar.
Figure (3.1) Power consumption trace of 160-bit double-and-add point multipli-
cation [ÖOP03]
3.3 Differential Power Analysis on Elliptic Curves
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks are widely used for attacking symmetric
algorithms. A few published papers discuss DPA on ECC, mainly due to the fact that
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ECC operations produce traces with millions of samples, which are hard to process
in a DPA setting. Another reason why DPA is not broadly applicable to ECC, is the
fact that session or ephemeral keys are often used, for instance in digital signatures.
When the keys change regularly, then it is not possible to collect a large number of
traces and exploit the dependencies between the keys and the power consumption.
DPA attacks need a large number of power traces that are collected while a cryp-
tographic algorithm performs an interesting operation. The main advantage of DPA
compared to SPA is the limited knowledge on the cryptographic device; usually
only knowledge of the cryptographic algorithm used, is adequate to perform a DPA
attack. DPA reveals the data dependencies of the power consumption; it usually
requires sophisticated statistical analysis of the power traces.
The general attack strategy described in [MOP07] gives a good insight into
DPA. For the case of scalar multiplication it consists of the following steps:
1. Choose an intermediate result of the executed algorithm. In the case of a DPA
against a scalar multiplication, an interesting intermediate result is the output
of each round of the iteration over the scalar bits.
2. Measure Power Consumption. Traces ti of n samples can be collected each
time the interesting intermediate result is calculated. These traces need to be
aligned using several alignment techniques from signal processing.
3. Calculating Hypothetical Intermediate Values. For ECC scalar multiplication,
these hypothetical values can be the multiples of the base pointm ·P ,m ∈ Z.
4. Mapping Intermediate Values to Power Consumption Values. Power con-
sumption values are calculated based on simulations using the Hamming-
weight or the Hamming-distance models. The quality of the simulated traces
is based on the attacker’s knowledge of the device and it will affect the success
rate of the DPA attack.
5. Comparing the Hypothetical Values with Power Traces. At this point, the at-
tacker compares the hypothetical values to the real power traces, i.e. simulated
traces about all possible multiples of the base point, are compared to the real
traces. Those traces that give the highest correlation to the real traces are the
ones which are produced by the correct multiple mj ·P .
Similar attack strategies can be applied when we want to attack other operations in
ECC, for instance finite field operations, modular reductions etc.
There are various statistical metrics, such as correlation coefficient, Pearson’s
coefficient, difference of means, that can be used to find the highest values for this
comparison. Usually, distinguishers that take into account variances, for instance
distance of means, are the ones that would give the highest matching results.
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Coron [Cor99] describes an interesting DPA attack on scalar multiplication. As-
suming that we know how the points are represented in memory during computation,
we can correlate bits of the point that is processed with the specific bit of the point
stored in memory and in this way compute if the processed point is already used by
the card or not.
As we mentioned in the beginning of this section, DPA on ECC is quite demand-
ing in terms of processing power and memory requirements. A DPA-like attack on
pairings is described in [PV04]. More precisely, the secret key, represented by a
point SID = (x1, y1), is recovered by guessing the value y1 bit-by-bit and compar-
ing it to the decryption signal taken during proper executions of the algorithm. In
CT-RSA 2018 an attack by Samwel et al. [SBB+18] on EdDSA is another example
of a practical DPA attack on an ECC protocol. The deterministic part of EdDSA
is exploited, by performing DPA on the underlying hash function, SHA-512. This
indicates that a protocol using ECC can be attacked in practice in various ways by
attacking other building blocks of the protocol than the ECC operations. However, a
practical DPA attack on a real-world ECC implementation targeting purely elliptic
curve operations is still not published.
3.4 Collision Attacks
The definition of collision attacks in [MOP07] is quite simple and complete.
Definition 3.4.1. Suppose that we are able to observe the power consumption of
two consecutive executions of an encryption algorithm with two different inputs di
and d∗i , and the unknown key kj . In a collision attack we exploit the fact that an
intermediate value vij can be the same in these two different execution, that means
vi,j = f(di, kj) = f(d∗i , kj).
The collision of the two intermediate values can occur only for certain key val-
ues, which allows reducing the key space for the secret key. There are various types
of attacks that are based on this observation, and this is what we are going to de-
scribe in this section.
3.4.1 Collision-correlation Attacks
As mentioned above, collision attacks exploit leakages by comparing two portions
of the same or different traces exploiting the same power being consumed when val-
ues are reused. The Big Mac attack [Wal01] is the first theoretical attack on public
key cryptosystems, in which only a single trace is required to observe key depen-
dencies and collisions during an RSA exponentiation. Witteman et al. performed a
similar attack on the RSA modular exponentiation even in the presence of blinded
messages [WvWM11]. Clavier et al. introduced horizontal correlation power anal-
ysis (CPA), as a type of attack where a single power trace is enough to recover the
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private key [CFG+10]. They also extended the Big Mac attack by using different
distinguishers, such as the correlation factor between Hamming weights. Compared
to the Big Mac attack, where the attacker is able to distinguish between operations
(squarings and multiplications), by horizontal collision-correlation it is possible to
validate guesses based on the manipulation of intermediate results. Therefore, this
attack is also applicable when the implementation is regular, which is not the case
for the Big Mac Attack.
A special type of collision attack is the doubling attack proposed by Fouque
and Valette [FV03]. The main assumption of this attack is that an adversary can dis-
tinguish collisions of power trace segments (within a single or more power traces)
when the device under attack performs the same computation twice with the same
data, even if the adversary is not able to tell which exact computation is done. Colli-
sion of two computations will not reveal the value of the operand. Yen et al. extended
this attack to the Refined Doubling Attack (RDA) [YKMH05], where the adversary
is assumed to be able to detect the collision between two modular squarings, i.e.
detecting if the squared value is the same or not. Collisions of computations cannot
be distinguished; the only knowledge obtained is that ki = ki−1 if a collision is
detected. Based on the derived relationship between every two adjacent private key
bits (either ki = ki−1 or ki 6= ki−1) and a given bit (e.g., k0 or km−1), all other
private key bits can be derived uniquely. RDA is a powerful attack technique that
works against some scalar multiplication algorithms, which are resistant against the
doubling attack (e.g. the Montgomery power ladder).
3.4.2 Horizontal Attacks
An interesting class of side-channel attacks is the Horizontal Analysis attack, where
a single trace is used to recover the secret scalar. The main characteristic of the traces
that makes horizontal attacks possible lies in the fact that the operation sequences of
doubling-adding and doubling-doubling can be distinguished. The attacker applies
the classical correlation analysis using different parts of time samples in the same
side-channel trace to recover the secret scalar bit-by-bit. This technique can be use-
ful to attack protected implementations, where the secret value or unknown input is
blinded. The first horizontal attacks were applied to RSA implementations; exten-
sion of those to ECC implementations is straightforward, since scalar multiplication
and exponentiation algorithms have the same operation steps.
The so-called Big Mac attack from Walter [Wal01] is the first attack of this kind,
where squarings (S) are distinguished from random products or multiplications by
a constant (denoted both as M for the sake of simplicity) and the secret exponent
of an RSA exponentiation can be recovered from a single execution curve. The
distinction is possible because of the different amount of gate switching activity in
(the same) underlying multiplier. In the simulated traces from the original paper, the
difference in the statistical values corresponding to M or S is quite large; it increases
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as the modulus length gets larger with 0% error rate for modulus larger than 768 bits.
Although the principle of Big Mac could be applied to ECC implementations, where
doublings and additions are distinguishable operations, a practical direct application
of the attack on real measurements, performed by Danger et. al [DGH+16] failed,
mainly due to the small scalar length compared to the equivalent exponent length
in RSA. The authors of [DGH+16] proposed an improvement of Big Mac, where
combining several patterns depending on scalar bits, made it possible to recover the
scalar.
The term horizontal was first introduced by Clavier et al. in [CFG+10], where
the authors performed a horizontal correlation analysis to compute the correlation
factor on several segments extracted from a single execution curve of a known mes-
sage RSA encryption. More specifically, their proposed method starts by finding a
sequence of elementary calculations (Ci)j that processes the same mathematical op-
eration (e.g. field multiplication) and depends on the same part of the secret scalar.
The outputs Oij of the calculations Ci(Xi) that depend on the same input value Xi
will give high correlation results and in this way, they can be distinguished from
outputs of computations with different input values. Horizontal correlation analysis
was performed on RSA using the Pearson correlation coefficient in [CFG+10] and
triangular trace analysis of the exponent in [CFG+12].
The first horizontal technique relevant to ECC is the doubling attack, presented
by Fouque and Valette in [FV03]. The most recent attack, proposed by Bauer et al.
in [BJPW14], is a type of horizontal collision correlation attack on ECC, which
combines atomicity and randomization techniques. A basic assumption of collision
attacks is the fact that an adversary is able to distinguish when two field multipli-
cations have at least one common operand. Based on this assumption, their attack
consists of the following steps:
• Identify two elementary calculations in the field C1, C2 that are processed
N times with inputs from the same distribution. The correlation between the
random output values O1, O2 must depend on the same secret sub-part s.
• For each of theN processings of Ci get an observation lij , with j ∈ [1, ..., N ].
• Compute the Pearson correlation coefficient on the two samples of observa-
tions ρ = ρ((l1j )j , (l2j )j).
• Deduce information on the secret scalar from ρ by using an appropriate distin-
guisher that shows which observation is more similar to the real secret value.
Simulated traces show that the horizontal collision correlation attack is applicable
to atomic implementations 2.2.5 and to implementations based on unified addition
formulæ over Edwards curves.
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Two publications on blinded asymmetric algorithms propose the combination of
horizontal and vertical techniques, in an attempt to provide more practical attacks
against blinded implementations and avoid the complex signal processing phase.
Bauer et al. [BJPW13] at Indocrypt 2013, presented an attack on RSA blinded ex-
ponentiation based on this approach. They took advantage of the side-channel leak-
age of the entire long-integer modular multiplication without splitting the trace into
parts of single precision multiplications. However, their attack requires a small pub-
lic exponent (no greater than 216 + 1) and an exponent blinding factor smaller than
32 bits. Their observation that the scalar blinding does not mask a large part of the
secret value, led Feix et al. [FRV14] a year later to exploit this vulnerability ver-
tically on a ECC implementation. The most significant part of the blinded scalar
can be recovered with a horizontal attack. The least significant part of the scalar is
retrieved by using vertical analysis (several execution traces) and the information
leaked in the previous steps of the attack.
3.4.3 Vertical Attacks
A recent classification of attacks has categorized all the statistical attacks on mul-
tiple traces as Vertical Analysis, in comparison to the Horizontal Analysis that is
performed on one or a few traces. Indeed, these techniques combine a single time
sample t on many side-channel traces to perform the analysis leading to the recovery
of the secret data manipulated at this instant t in a “vertical" way.
The term vertical is first mentioned in the paper of Clavier et al. [CFG+10], to
categorize the techniques that require many traces, in order to extract a key. It can be
that many points on the same trace are used or the same point in different execution
instances; in both cases at least two power execution traces are required and they
should be manipulated together by the attacker. The classical DPA and CPA tech-
niques thus fall into this category. In Indocrypt 2014 Feix et al. [FRV14] referred
to the vertical collision correlation, when the attacker uses the fact that the scalar
blinding does not mask a large part of the secret. This side-channel vulnerability
can be exploited vertically, i.e. using several execution traces of the potential values
for each input bit, and the attacker can recover this unmasked part with collision
correlation. Moreover, the least significant part of the secret can be recovered using
vertical collisions. By guessing the next w unknown bits of scalar k, we can com-
pute guessed blinded scalars d(i). Then a classical vertical correlation attack can be
performed to validate the guesses.
Vertical leakage was also exploited in [DPN+16], where the authors used mul-
tiple template traces to perform pattern matching, when the propagation of carry
was during scalar multiplication (and therefore, no visual horizontal difference in
the traces). The exploitable vertical leakage comes from the HW of the value stored
in the register or the HD between two values stored in the same register, which is
basically the same principle as in DPA types of side-channel attacks.
Chapter 3. Side Channel Attacks on Elliptic Curves 38
3.5 Template Attacks
The most powerful SCA attack from an information theoretic point of view is con-
sidered to be a template attack (TA).
3.5.1 Theoretical Aspects of Template Attacks
In the original paper by Chari et al. in [CRR02], template attacks are introduced as
a combination of statistical modeling and power analysis attacks consisting of two
phases, as follows:
• The first phase is the profiling or template-building phase, where the adver-
sary builds templates to characterize the device by executing a sequence of
instructions on fixed data. Focusing on an “interesting pattern” or finding the
points of interest is very common in this phase.
• The second phase is the template-matching phase, in which the adversary
matches or correlates the templates to actual traces of the device. By applying
some signal processing and classification algorithms to the templates, it is
possible to find the best matching for the traces.
In this type of attacks, the adversary is assumed to have in his possession a de-
vice which behaves similarly to the device under attack (target device), in order to
build template traces. In his device he can simulate the same algorithms and imple-
mentations that run in the target device. For the template-matching phase several
distinguishers and classification algorithms are proposed; in the next section the
most common classifiers are presented.
The practical application of TAs is shown on several cryptographic implemen-
tations such as RC4 in [RO04] and elliptic curves in [MBO+05]. Medwed and Os-
wald demonstrated in [MO09] a practical template attack on ECDSA. Their attack
required an offline DPA attack on the EC scalar multiplication operation during the
template-building phase, in order to select the points of interest. They also need 33
template traces per key bit. Attacks against ECDSA and other elliptic curve signa-
ture algorithms only need to recover a few bits of the ephemeral scalar for multiple
scalar multiplications with different ephemeral scalars and can then employ lat-
tice techniques to recover the long-term secret key [RS01, MHMP13, BvdPSY14].
The lattice attack works by constructing a lattice problem from the obtained digital
signatures and side channel information, and then applying lattice reduction tech-
niques to solve this problem. Nguyen and Shparlinski showed how to recover the
secret key of 160-bit ECDSA using only seven consecutive bits that leaked from
signatures with ephemeral keys [NS03]. However, if an attacker only gets a single
trace, he still needs to recover sufficiently many bits of an ephemeral scalar from
side-channel information to be able to compute the long term key.
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3.5.2 Common Distinguishers
In this section, the most common distinguishers used in SCA for correlation analysis
and template-matching are presented. Machine Learning techniques for classifica-
tion and clustering are broadly used in SCA, in order to distinguish between traces
with high noise ratios.
According to [HIM+13], unsupervised clustering is generally useful in side-
channel analysis when profiling information is not available and an exhaustive parti-
tioning is computationally infeasible. The authors presented an attack on an FPGA-
based elliptic curve scalar multiplication using the k-means method. In [PITM14],
Perin et al. used unsupervised learning to attack randomized exponentiations.
Lerman et al. showed in [LPB+15] that Machine Learning techniques give bet-
ter classification results when there is limited ability of the adversary to perform
profiling of the device and in a high dimensionality context, where many parame-
ters affect the leakage of the device. Indeed, combining three side-channel leakages
and a clustering-based approach for non-profiled attacks, gives higher success rates
than traditional template attacks, as shown by Specht et al. in [SHKS15].
The success rate of Online Template Attacks (presented in the next section)
are significantly improved in [OPB16] by using the k-nearest neighbour approach,
naïve Bayes classification and the Support Vector Machine method for template
classification. In order to explain these techniques, we first give the definition of the
Euclidean distance and the Pearson correlation coefficient.
3.5.2.1 Euclidean Distance
The Euclidean distance between two points is defined as the square root of the sum
of the squares of the differences between the corresponding point values:
dEUC =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(xi − yi)2 .
In the SCA setting, a realization of a random variableX corresponds to x. A sample
of n observations or traces of X is denoted by (xi)1≤i≤n, where the index i denotes
the different observations or the different time when an observation occurs in the
same trace.
3.5.2.2 Pearson correlation
The Pearson correlation coefficient measures the linear independence between two
observations X and Y :
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In SCA, the Pearson correlation coefficient is used to describe the difference in the
Hamming weight between the observations from the device under attack and the
key hypothesis.
3.5.2.3 Mutual Information
The Mutual Information distinguisher uses the value of the Mutual Information be-
tween the observed measurements and a hypothetical leakage to rank key guesses.
From a theoretical point of view, Mutual Information Analysis is a non-profiled
metric that can detect any kind of data dependency in the physical measurements.
The mutual information between two random variables X and Y can be calculated
as follows:
I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X | Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(X,Y ) (3.1)
where H(X) = ∑x∈X Pr[X = x] · log(Pr[X = x]) the Shannon entropy of a
random variable X on a discrete space X . The conditional entropy H(X | Y ) =
−∑yinY Pr(X = x | Y = y) log2 Pr(X = x | Y = y) quantifies the amount of
information needed to describe the outcome of a random variable X given the value
of a known random variable Y .
3.5.3 Classification Algorithms
3.5.3.1 Naïve Bayes Classification
The naïve Bayes classification method is based on probability concepts, and more
precisely on Bayes theorem for conditional probabilities of independent events
[Bra13]. According to the conditional probability model, let x = (x1, . . . , xn) be
the vector of problem instances (independent variables) to be classified, each one
having a feature n. Each instance is assigned a probability p(cj |x1, . . . , xn), for
1 ≤ j ≤ k and k possible classes. The set of classes c1, c2, . . . , ck is mutually ex-
clusive and exhaustive. Using Bayes’ theorem, the posterior conditional probability
is p(cj |x) = p(cj) p(x|cj)p(x) for 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Assuming that each event and posterior
probability is independent on each previous event, the conditional distribution over
the class variable c is p(cj |x1, . . . , xn) = 1Z p(cj)
∏n
i=1 p(xi|cj) for 1 ≤ j ≤ k
where the evidence Z = p(x) is a scaling factor dependent only on x1, . . . , xn, that
is, a constant if the values of the feature variables are known.
The naïve Bayes classifier is a function that combines the naïve Bayes proba-
bility model with a decision rule. One common rule is to pick the hypothesis that is
most probable; that is the maximum value of the a posteriori probability. For each
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class ci, we pick as classifier the class index that gives the maximum value for an
event.
3.5.3.2 k-Nearest Neighbour
The k-Nearest Neighbour Classification kNN is a classification method based on
the closest instances of the training set to the unlabeled data. Basically, according
to [Bra13], it consists of the following two steps:
1. Choose the number of k closest instances (from the training set) to the sample.
2. The majority label (class) for the chosen closest instances will be class for the
unlabeled data.
The distance metric plays an important role as we determine the closest instance.
In kNN, we can use the Euclidean distance or the Manhattan distance. The value
k indicates the number of the already-classified closest instances that are chosen in
order to classify the next unlabeled data. The default value is 1, but with larger value
for k it is possible to obtain higher success rate with less template traces. Figure 3.2
shows an example with k = 2 and k = 4 close instances; if the new sample is closer
to A, it will be classified in the “A-class".
Figure (3.2) kNN method for k = 2 and k = 4
3.5.3.3 Support Vector Machine
A Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a supervised learning model that produces
a discriminative classifier formally defined by a separating hyperplane. In other
words, given labeled training data, the algorithm outputs an optimal hyperplane
which categorizes new examples. Figure 3.3 shows such a hyperplane. An optimal
hyperplane, as defined in [Alp10], is the one that gives the largest minimum distance
to the training points, because in this way noisy data will still be classified correctly.
Therefore, the optimal separating hyperplane maximizes the margin of the training
data. An SVM model is a representation of the examples as points in space, mapped
so that the examples of the separate categories are divided by a clear gap that is as
wide as possible. New examples are then mapped into that same space and predicted
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to belong to a category based on which side of the gap they fall on. The classifier in
an SVM can be non-linear for data sets that are not easily separable, but in our anal-
ysis a linear classifier gives very good results. In machine learning, support vector
Figure (3.3) SVM: distance to the hyperplane for two sets of training data
machines (SVMs, also support vector networks[1]) are supervised learning models
with associated learning algorithms that analyze data and recognize patterns, used
for classification and regression analysis. Given a set of training examples, each
marked for belonging to one of two categories, an SVM training algorithm builds a
model that assigns new examples into one category or the other, making it a non-
probabilistic binary linear classifier. In addition to performing linear classification,
SVMs can efficiently perform a non-linear classification using what is called the
kernel trick, implicitly mapping their inputs into high-dimensional feature spaces.
3.6 Test Vector Leakage Assessment
Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) is a leakage detection procedure, initially
proposed by Cryptography Research (CRI) [GJJR11] and used as a first step towards
evaluation of the SCA resistance of device under test. A generic univariate test is
used to scan the traces obtained from the device, which is evaluated as non-leaky
if the tests at all points of every trace are below a certain threshold. The statistical
tests are chosen in a way that is independent of the leakage model.
More precisely, the case that there is no leakage (null hypothesis) is tested
against the case that there is leakage at a certain intermediate point LP . Let ntr
be the number of traces that the evaluator collects and ns the number of samples
in each trace. Following the notation of [ZDD+17], let L = {L1, . . . , Lns} be the
measurement traces representing the realization of our implementation with mean
values L¯i and the noise follows the normal distribution N(0,1). The null hypothesis
for the traces means that the expected value from our measurements is the same as
the measured value, if there is no leakage, i.e. L¯exp = L¯i ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , ns}.
Following the widely adopted methodology for t-test from [GJJR11, NLD15,
TG16, CMV+17], there should be two sets of traces, A and B, with ntr/2 traces
in each set; half of the traces are taken with a fixed input and half with random
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input. If the null hypothesis holds, there should be no differences in the t-test statis-
tics measured from each trace set. The Welch’s t-test is commonly used for TVLA
evaluations. The test statistic value is:
si =
L¯i,A − L¯i,B√
σ2i,A
nA
+
σ2i,B
nB
. (3.2)
There is a broad bibliography on symmetric key cryptographic evaluations us-
ing TVLA; theoretical advances of the technique, multivariate higher order tests
[MOBW13,SM16,DCE16] and various statistical metrics are presented [BGN+14,
BGG+14, PV17]. However, since its introduction to public-key algorithms in 2011
[JRW11], it was rarely used for theoretical analysis and practical evaluation in this
research field. Most notably, Tunstall and Goodwill [TG16] give an overview of
cases and algorithms that can be applied during public key TVLA evaluations.
Nascimento et al. [NLD15], Chmielewski et al. [CMV+17] used it for evaluation of
Curve25519 on Chipwhisperer and the complete Weierstrass formulæ on an FPGA
respectively.
For the Welch’s t-test, current TVLA evaluations use the critical value of 4.5
[GJJR11, NLD15, TG16, CMV+17], which corresponds to a statistical significance
level of α < 0.00001 for the univariate test. The threshold of 4.5 is sufficient when
symmetric-key algorithms are evaluated, because of the small number of samples
in each trace (order of hundreds). However, in public-key cryptography, the traces
are usually larger, requiring thousands or million samples for capturing a meaning-
ful part of the operation under evaluation. In [CMV+17] the authors observe some
peaks above the threshold for the protected implementation, which ended up to be
ghost peaks. Their rationale is that first they observed few of these peaks in the fixed
versus random t-test. Then, they took two trace sets with random values and applied
the same test. The peaks observed before did not appear again at the same spots,
meaning that they were not dependent on the input.
In most published works, the significance level of a < 0.00001 does not con-
sider the total number of samples on the trace. As noted in [ZDD+17], the overall
significance level increases as the number of leakage points on the trace increases.
Therefore, the authors propose to adjust the significance level according to the num-
ber of points on a trace. For long traces, meaning for more than 105samples per
trace, the overall test statistic value will be larger than 4.5 and therefore a non-leaky
device can not pass the TVLA t-testing with the critical value of 4.5. Hence, Balasch
et al. [BGG+14] suggested raising the critical value to 5 for longer traces based on
numerical experiments. For longer traces, as the ones obtained from the implemen-
tation of public key algorithms, a non-leaky device can not pass the t-test even with
this higher value of 5.
In general, t-tests are effective in detecting some vulnerabilities of an implemen-
tation, but they do not give specific results on the type of leakage. TVLA evalua-
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tions are hardly ever applied correctly. All detected vulnerabilities should be verified
with repeating the tests on a second acquisition, which is independently generated.
However, since trace acquisitions are expensive, there are other alternatives pro-
posed, such as the correlation-based method [DS16], which can give better results
with fewer traces, because larger parts of the trace are exploited and more efficient
statistics is used. Moreover, TVLA evaluations usually ignore false negative type
of errors (type II error rate β), which indicate the probability to reject a false null
hypothesis. The statistical power of a test is defined as the probability of correctly
rejecting a false null hypothesis [MOBW13] pi = 1− β. TVLA, as it is usually per-
formed, does not consider the power of the statistical procedure it proposes. Mather
et al. [MOBW13] propose a thorough analysis to check the impact on statistical
power of the tests, in order to estimate the minimum sample size required to de-
tect an effect of a given size. Higher statistical power indicates increased robust-
ness and minimizes the requirements for large sample sets; avoiding expensive and
time-consuming acquisitions can speed-up the evaluation process. This is explained
concretely in a tutorial [Pro18], but it is out of scope of this thesis.
3.6.1 TVLA for public key
One of the applications of Welch’s t-test is to test the location of one sequence
of independent and identically distributed random variables, as the ones obtained
from SCA measurements. In such a trace set, we are interested in s different null
hypotheses, H1, . . . ,Hs, where s is the number of samples in each trace, and we
would like to check if all of them are true. The probability of making one (or more)
false discovery when performing multiple hypotheses tests, the so-called family-
wise error rate (FWER) or type I errors, is related to the number of samples. The
more samples we get per trace, the higher the FWER will be. In order to calibrate
the significance level, and consequently the threshold of the test, when multiple
sequences of variables are tested, the S˘idák correction should be applied.
The above mentioned calibration makes more sense in the case where we deal
with public key algorithms, where the number of samples per trace are in the order
of millions. The S˘idák correction as defined in [FHY07] is
aSID = 1− (1− a)ns . (3.3)
This formula appeared recently in the side-channel setting in [ZDD+17], where the
authors identified the need to correlate the significance level with the total number
of univariate tests. More precisely, they showed that for a trace set of 106 samples
per trace, the probability that the t-test will fail for the ±4.5 threshold is 0.9987,
reducing only to the half for a threshold value of ±5.
We use this formula to create a Matlab script for evaluating long traces obtained
from a public key implementation in Chapter 6, in order to obtain more accurate
t-test results for our implementation.
Chapter 4
Online Template Attacks
You show the world as a complete, unbroken
chain, an eternal chain, linked together by cause
and effect.
Hermann Hesse, Siddhartha
In this chapter, we present Online Template Attacks (OTA), a novel attack tech-
nique that resides between horizontal and template attacks. While the terminol-
ogy template is used, OTA is not a typical template attack; i.e. no preprocessing
template-building phase is necessary. The templates of certain operations are com-
pared with parts of the target trace and the secret key can be recovered bit-by-bit.
The characterization online comes from the fact that templates are created after the
acquisition of the target trace.
4.1 Introduction
Side-channel attacks exploit various physical leakages of secret information or in-
structions from cryptographic devices and they constitute a constant threat for cryp-
tographic implementations. We focus here on power-analysis and electromagnetic
attacks that exploit the power-consumption and electromagnetic-emanation leak-
age from a device running some cryptographic algorithm. Attacking elliptic curve
cryptosystems (ECC) with natural protection against simple side-channel attacks,
e.g. implementations using complete Weierstrass formulas [RCB16] or Edwards
curves, is quite challenging. The Edwards curves, for instance, proposed by Edwards
in 2007 [Edw07] and promoted for cryptographic applications by Bernstein and
Lange [BBJ+08], can provide fast and complete formulas for addition and doubling.
This is why these types of curves are appealing for memory-constrained devices and
at the same time resistant to classical simple power analysis (SPA) techniques. Al-
though considered a very serious threat against ECC implementations, differential
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power analysis (DPA), as proposed in [Cor99, KJJ99], cannot be applied directly to
ECDSA or ephemeral Diffie-Hellman because the secret scalar is used only once.
This is incompatible with the requirement of DPA to see large number of power
traces of computations on the same secret data. In order to attack various asymmetric
cryptosystems, new techniques that reside between SPA and DPA were developed;
most notably collision [Wal01, SWP03, FV03, YKMH05, HMA+08, BJPW14] and
template attacks [RS01,MO09,MHMP13]. The efficiency of most of those collision-
based attacks is shown only on simulated traces; no practical experiments on real
ECC implementations have verified these results. To the best of our knowledge, only
two practical collision-based attacks on scalar multiplication algorithms have been
published, each of which relies on very specific assumptions and deals with very
special cases. Hanley et al. exploit collisions between input and output operations of
the same trace [HKT15]. Wenger et al. in [WKK13] performed a hardware-specific
attack on consecutive rounds of a Montgomery ladder implementation. However,
both attacks are very restrictive in terms of applicability to various ECC imple-
mentations as they imply some special implementation options, such as the use of
López-Dahab coordinates, where field multiplications use the same key-dependent
coordinate as input to two consecutive rounds. In contrast, our attack is much more
generic as it applies to arbitrary choices of curves and coordinates, and many scalar
multiplication algorithms.
4.1.1 Related Work
In Chapter 3, we presented in detail collision attacks against public key algorithms
that use a single or a few traces to exploit data dependencies during execution of
the same operations. Starting with the Big Mac attack [Wal01] by Walter to the
doubling attack [FV03] by Fouque and Valette and the more recent attacks on ECC
using horizontal collision-correlation [HKT15], we observe that the trend is moving
towards horizontal type of attacks. The main goal of evaluators is to discover the
secret key with as few leakage traces as possible.
As presented in Section 3.5, template attacks are a combination of statistical
modeling and power-analysis attacks consisting of two phases, as follows. The pro-
filing or template-building phase, where the attacker builds templates to characterize
the device by executing a sequence of instructions on fixed data. The second phase
is the matching phase, in which the attacker matches the templates to actual traces
of the device. It is usually enough to recover a few bits of ephemeral keys during
ECDSA algorithms and the rest of the bits are recovered by other techniques, such
as lattice-based attacks. In a nice overview paper on lattice-based attacks, Wong
showed how to recover 156-bit nonces used in ECDSA signatures with 7 known
bits [Won15]. When only 6 bits are known, the lattice-base reduction technique
LLL [LLL82] needs a minimum of 78 tuples (signatures and truncated hashes) to
recover the nonces.
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Still, very few practical attacks are published on ECC implementations. For in-
stance, Medwed and Oswald demonstrated in [MO09] a practical template attack
on ECDSA. Their attack required an offline DPA attack on the scalar multiplication
during the template-building phase and 33 template traces per key bit. Another tem-
plate attack on ECC is presented in [HIM+13]. This attack exploits register location
based leakage using a high-resolution inductive EM probe; therefore, the attack is
considerably expensive to execute. A template attack on a windowed-NAF ECC
algorithm is presented in [ZWMZ14]. However, this attack is applied to an imple-
mentation that is not protected with either, scalar randomization or base-point ran-
domization. Furthermore, contrary to our approach, all of the above attacks require
multiple traces to construct a template.
4.1.2 Our Contribution
In this chapter we introduce an adaptive template-attack technique, which we call
Online Template Attacks (OTA). With this technique the attacker is able to recover
a complete scalar from only one power trace of a scalar multiplication using this
scalar. The attack is characterized as online, because we create the templates after
the acquisition of the target trace. While we use the same terminology, our attack is
not a typical template attack; i.e. no preprocessing template-building phase is neces-
sary. Our attack functions by acquiring one target trace from the device under attack
and comparing patterns of certain operations from this trace with templates obtained
from the attacker’s device that runs the same implementation. Pattern matching is
performed at suitable points in the algorithm, where key bit related assignments take
place by using an automated module based on the Pearson correlation coefficient.
The attacker needs only very limited control over the device used to generate the
online template traces. The main assumption is that the attacker can choose the input
point to a scalar multiplication, an assumption that trivially holds even without any
modification to the template device in the context of ephemeral Diffie-Hellman. It
also holds in the context of ECDSA, if the attacker can modify the implementation
on the template device or can modify internal values of the computation. This is no
different than for previous template attacks against ECDSA.
Our methodology offers a generic attack framework, which is applicable to vari-
ous forms of curves (Weierstrass, Edwards and Montgomery curves) and implemen-
tations. As a proof of concept, we attack the doubling operation in the double-and-
add-always algorithm. Contrary to the doubling attack [FV03], our attack can be
launched against right-to-left algorithms and Montgomery ladder. We further note
that Medwed and Oswald perform a very special template attack based on a set of
assumptions: DPA performed in advance to find intermediate points for templates,
33 template traces, implementation with Hamming-weight leakage that is hardware
dependent and applicability only to ECDSA. Online template attacks do not have
these restrictions, they need only a single target trace, and only a single template
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trace per key bit. The advantages of our attack over previously proposed attacks are
the following:
• It does not require any cumbersome preprocessing template-building phase,
but a rather simple post-processing phase.
• It does not assume any previous knowledge of the leakage model.
• It does not require full control of the device under attack.
• It works against SPA-protected and some DPA-protected implementations
with unified formulas for addition and doubling.
• Countermeasures such as scalar randomization and changing point represen-
tation from affine to (deterministic) projective representation inside the im-
plementation do not prevent our attack.
• It is applicable to the Montgomery power ladder and to constant-time (left-
to-right and right-to-left) scalar multiplication algorithms.
• It is experimentally confirmed on an implementation of double-and-add-always
scalar multiplication on the twisted Edwards curve used in the Ed25519 sig-
nature scheme.
We note here that our attack is a chosen input attack, meaning that the adver-
sary needs to control the input of a scalar multiplication (but not the scalar). Most
ECC implementations use inputs in affine (or compressed affine) coordinates and
internally convert to projective representation. In this chapter we show how to ap-
ply the attack if an attacker controls either the projective coordinates input, or the
affine input (even if it is compressed). Online template attacks require only one tar-
get trace and one online template trace per key bit. We can, therefore, claim that
our technique demonstrates the most efficient practical side-channel attack applica-
ble to ephemeral-scalar ECC. When applied to ECDSA, the proposed attack can be
used in combination with lattice techniques similar to [RS01, BvdPSY14], in order
to derive the whole private key from a few bits of multiple ephemeral keys.
The fact that OTA is a chosen input attack is the main difference between our
technique and the extend-and-prune technique of the original paper about template
attacks [CRR02] featured on RC4. The extend-and-prune technique is an iterative
process, where at each step one more segment of the sample trace is unrolled, which
uses more bits of the unknown key. Each extension results in several hypotheses
about the operation being performed. Templates are used to prune the possible hy-
pothesis values on the key bits while controlling the error probability to be under a
certain threshold. The extended version of OTA, including error detection and cor-
rection and presented in Section 4.5.5, is very similar to the pruning process. If the
matching percentage of 2P and 3P with the target trace are close enough to draw
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a conclusion, then the template traces of 4P , 5P , 6P and 7P can be used; with 4
template traces for the 3rd most significant bit, we can infer both the 3rd and the 2nd
most significant bits. This process is quite simple compared to the pruning process
described in [CRR02].
Having presented the contribution of OTA in the side-channel world, it is de-
sirable to clarify the contribution of the author in this context. In the original pub-
lication [BCP+14, BCP+17], the author established the theoretical primitives that
would make the attack applicable to many scalar multiplication algorithms and de-
veloped the attack technique on which the practical experiments are based. After
the successful application of the power analysis OTA on the Edwards curve 25519,
she investigated the wide applicability of the attack to other platforms and curves,
resulting in the work of “Dismantling real-world ECC with Horizontal and Vertical
Template Attacks" [DPN+16]. In the follow-up work from Özgen et al. [OPB16],
the author proposed and co-supervised a Master thesis project on using distinguish-
ers from machine learning (classification methods) together with OTA, which re-
sulted in correct predictions on the scalar bit and a successful application of OTA.
4.1.3 Organization of this Chapter
This chapter is organized as follows. We introduce and explain the theoretical as-
pects of OTA in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 gives specific examples of how the attack
applies to different scalar multiplication algorithms. Section 4.4 presents the prac-
tical OTA on double-and-add-always scalar multiplication on an ATMega card. In
Section 4.5 the attack on Weierstrass curves on a Cortex-M4 micro-controller is pre-
sented in detail together with the proposed error detection and correction technique.
Distinguishers from the machine learning field are presented in Section 4.6 and they
are applied during the template matching phase of OTA. A discussion on vulner-
abilities of implementations and efficient countermeasures against OTA concludes
the chapter in Section 4.7.
4.2 Online Template Attacks
This section presents the theoretical aspects of online template attacks as applied to
scalar multiplication algorithms.
4.2.1 Defining Online Template Attacks
We define an online template attack (OTA) as a side-channel attack with the follow-
ing conditions:
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1. The attacker obtains only one power trace of the cryptographic algorithm in-
volving the targeted secret data. This trace is called the target trace. The de-
vice, from which the target trace is obtained, is the target device. The fact that
only one target trace is necessary for the attack, makes it possible to attack
scalar multiplication algorithms with an ephemeral, randomized or blinded
scalar.
2. The attacker is generating template traces after having obtained the target
trace. These traces are called (online) template traces.
3. The attacker obtains the template traces on the target device or a similar de-
vice, 1 with very limited control over it i.e. access to the device to run several
executions with chosen public inputs. The attacker does not rely on the as-
sumption that the secret data are the same for all template traces.
4. At least one assignment in the scalar multiplication algorithm is made de-
pending on the value of particular scalar bit(s), but there are no branches with
key-dependent computations. Since we are attacking the doubling operation,
this key-dependent assignment should be during doubling. As a counterex-
ample, we note that the binary right-to-left add-always algorithm for Lucas
recurrences [Joy07] is resistant to the proposed attack, because the result of
the doubling is stored in a non-key-dependent variable.
In the following we show that online template attacks are feasible and can be
applied against implementations of various scalar multiplication algorithms. In fact,
we show that we need only a single template trace per scalar bit. Transfer of the
approach to the corresponding exponentiation algorithms (for example in RSA or
DSA) is straight-forward. Transfer to other cryptographic algorithms is clearly not
trivial; we consider online template attacks as a specialized means to attack scalar
multiplication and exponentiation algorithms.
We present the theoretic primitives of the attack and verify our theory with ex-
periments on the Edwards curve Ed25519 with different types of input; namely with
256-bit projective input, with the reduced 255-bit projective coordinates, and finally
with affine coordinates. Moreover, we verify the applicability of OTA on Weier-
strass curves (Brainpool and NIST) using EM emanations [DPN+16]. A follow-up
work from Özgen et al. [OPB16] verified that OTA can successfully give the correct
prediction on the scalar bit, by using distinguishers from machine learning (classi-
fication methods).
4.2.2 Generic Attack Description
Template attacks consist of two phases, template building for characterizing the de-
vice and template matching, where the characterization of the device together with a
1By similar device we mean the same type of microcontroller running the same algorithm.
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power trace from the device under attack are used to determine the secret [MOP07].
Therefore, the first condition of our proposed attack is typically fulfilled by all at-
tacks of this kind.
It is well known that template attacks against scalar multiplication can generate
templates “on-the-fly”, i.e., interleaving the template building and matching phases.
See, for example, [MO09, Section 5.3]. We take this idea further by building tem-
plates after the target trace has been obtained (condition 2). The attacker, being able
to do things in this order, needs only limited control over the target device. More-
over, the attacker is not affected by randomization of the secret data during different
executions of the algorithm, since he always has to compare his template traces with
the same target trace.
The basic idea consists of comparing the traces for inputs P (target trace) and
2P (online template trace) while executing scalar multiplication and then finding
similar patterns between them, based on hypothesis on a bit for a given operation.
The target trace is obtained only once. For every bit of the scalar, we need to obtain
an online template trace with input [k]P , k ∈ Z, where k is chosen as a function of
our hypothesis on this bit. We hereby note that the template trace is part of the target
trace (for instance it corresponds to the first doubling) and it is compared bit-by-bit
with the target trace. Therefore, alignment of traces is not necessary.
The attack methodology can be summarized as follows:
• Acquire a full target trace from the device under attack, during the execution
of a scalar multiplication.
• Locate the doubling and addition operations performed in each round.
• Find multiples of [m]P , where m ∈ Z,m ≤ k and k is the scalar. These
points are used to create the template traces.
The methodology offers a generic attack framework, which does not require any
previous knowledge of the leakage model nor a specific type of curve. It is appli-
cable to various forms of curves (Weierstrass, Edwards and Montgomery curves),
scalar multiplication algorithms and implementations. Contrary to the doubling at-
tack [FV03], OTA can be launched against right-to-left algorithms and the Mont-
gomery ladder.
The main assumption in the OTA attacker model is in his ability to choose an in-
put point to the scalar multiplication algorithm, in order to generate template traces.
As it is demonstrated in the original paper, OTA works with one target trace from the
device under attack and one template trace per key bit obtained from the attacker’s
device that runs the same implementation. Performing OTA in practice requires the
following assumptions to be made regarding the attacker:
• The attacker knows the input P of the target device.
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• He knows the implementation of the scalar multiplication algorithm and he is
able to compute the intermediate values.
• He can choose the input points on a device similar to the target device.
Furthermore, we work with the following assumptions related to the device:
• The scalar can be randomized or blinded.
• The intermediate values are deterministic.
The OTA is then performed as follows:
1. The attacker first obtains a target trace with input point P from the target
device.
2. He obtains template traces with input points [m]P , m ∈ Z for multiples of
the point P , e.g. 2P or 3P .
3. He compares the correlations between the target and each pair of template
traces. The correct guess is most likely to be the highest correlation.
The OTA technique, as depicted in Figure 4.1, is originally described for binary
algorithms, but it can be easily adapted to the windows method by creating one tem-
plate for a hypothesis made for each window. The attacker model for OTA is more
suitable for the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol, because the input point can
be selected. Nevertheless, this attack can be applied against the ECDSA algorithm,
if the input point of the target device is known or if the attacker can modify the
implementation on the template device and consequently the internal values of the
computation. In this case, the attacker could try to recover the ephemeral key k by
using x1, the x-coordinate of [k]G presented in Section 2.3.3, as input to the target.
This could be useful to recover the long term secret key of the device under attack,
similar to previous template attacks against ECDSA.
At this point, it is important to explain precisely how the interesting points to
generate the template traces are chosen. With the term interesting points we mean
the multiples of the point P that are expected to be the outputs of every iteration of
the scalar multiplication algorithm, i.e. 2P and 3P for the first bit of the scalar. This
is demonstrated with a graphical example depicted in Figure 4.1.
Let us assume that the initial input point to the double-and-add-always algorithm
is P and the most significant bit (KMSB) of our secret scalar is 1. Then, the output
of the second iteration (operations for KMSB−1) is either 2P or 3P . For example,
if KMSB−1 = 0, then the output of the second iteration is 2P and consequently the
template trace for 2P gives higher correlation to the target trace than the template
for 3P . We compute the correlations between the template traces 2P , 3P , and the
target trace, in order to find the most likely key bit. The highest correlation value is
considered to be the right key guess.
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Figure (4.1) How to find the second MSB KMSB−1 in the target trace with the
template trace of 2P
Figure (4.2) How to find the third MSB KMSB−2 in the target trace with the tem-
plate trace of 4P
We continue the same procedure of calculating the two possible outcomes for bit
KMSB−2, which are the template traces for 4P or 5P (if the previous bit was 2P ),
and then finding the highest correlation between the templates and the target trace.
Figure 4.2 shows how the templates for the third bit KMSB−2 can be generated.
In general, for each iteration of the scalar multiplication algorithm, we compare
the second iteration of the scalar multiplication execution (corresponding to the first
doubling operation whose consumption is detected with EM) in the template trace
with the (i+ 1)th execution of the target trace.
In the original paper, pattern matching is performed by using the Pearson cor-
relation coefficient, ρ(X,Y ), which measures the linear relationship between two
variables X and Y . For power traces, the correlation coefficient shows the relation-
ship between two points of the trace, which indicates the Hamming-weight leak-
age of key-dependent assignments during the execution of a cryptographic algo-
rithm. Extension to other distinguishers from machine learning is presented in Sec-
tion 4.2.2; it is the result of our work with Özgen and Batina in [OPB16].
The template matching corresponds to a list of correlation coefficients that show
the relationship between all samples from the template trace to the same consecutive
amount of samples in the target trace. We performed pattern matching for our traces
using an automated module based on the Pearson correlation coefficient, ρ(X,Y ),
which measures the linear relationship between two variables X and Y . For power
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Table (4.1) Two executions of the double-and-add-always algorithm
scalar k = 4 = (1, 0, 0) scalar k = 5 = (1, 1, 0)
R0 = P R0 = P
R0 = 2P ,R1 = 3P , return 2P R0 = 2P ,R1 = 3P , return 3P
R0 = 4P ,R1 = 5P , return 4P R0 = 6P ,R1 = 7P , return 6P
traces, the correlation coefficient shows the relationship between two points of the
trace, which indicates the Hamming-weight leakage of key-dependent assignments
during the execution of a cryptographic algorithm. Extensions to other leakage mod-
els and distinguishers are straightforward. If our hypothesis on the given key bit is
correct, then the pattern match between our traces at the targeted operation will be
high (in our experiments it reached 99%).
In this way we can recover the first i bits of the key. Knowledge of the first i
bits provides us with complete knowledge of the internal state of the algorithm just
before the (i+1)th bit is processed. Since at least one operation in the loop depends
on this bit, we can make a hypothesis about the (i + 1)th bit, compute an online
template trace based on this hypothesis, and correlate this trace with the target trace
at the relevant predetermined point of the algorithm. If this correlation is larger than
a certain threshold, the hypothesis is assumed to be correct, otherwise it is assumed
to be false.
4.3 OTA on Scalar Multiplication Algorithms
4.3.1 Attacking the Left-to-right Scalar Multiplication Algorithm
The core idea and feasibility of the attack is demonstrated through an example based
on the double-and-add-always algorithm described in Algorithm 2. Table 4.1 shows
two executions of the algorithm for two different scalars k = 100 and k = 110.
We note that the first execution of the loop always starts by doubling the input point
P , for all values of k. We assume that kx−1 = 1. Depending on the second-most
significant key bit kx−2, the output of the first iteration of the algorithm will be either
2P or 3P . For any point P we can, therefore, get a power trace for the operation
2P , i.e. we let the algorithm execute the first two double-and-add iterations. In our
setup, we can zoom into the level of one doubling, which will be our template trace.
Then we perform the same procedure with 2P as the input point to obtain the online
template trace that we want to compare with the target trace. If we assume that
the second-most significant bit of k is 0, then we compare the 2P template with the
output of the doubling in the first iteration. Otherwise, we compare it with the online
template trace for 3P .
Assuming that the first (i− 1) bits of k are known, we can derive the ith bit by
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computing the two possible states of R0 after this bit has been treated and recover
the key iteratively. Note that only the assignment in the ith iteration depends on the
key bit ki, but none of the computations do, so it is necessary to compare the trace
of the doubling operation in the (i+ 1)th iteration with the original target trace. To
decide whether the ith bit of k is zero or one, the trace that the doubling operation in
the (i+1)th iteration would give for ki+1 = 0 is compared with the target trace. For
completeness, we can compare the target trace with a trace obtained for ki+1 = 1
and verify that it has a lower pattern match percentage; in this case, the performed
attack needs two template traces per key bit. However, if during the acquisition
phase the noise level is low and the signal is of good quality, an efficient attack can
be performed with only our target trace and a single trace for the hypothetical value
ofRki+1 .
4.3.2 Attacking the Right-to-left double-and-add-always Algorithm
In this section we examine the binary right-to-left add-always algorithm of Joye
[Joy07], below as Algorithm 8. Contrary to Algorithm 2, the computations in the
main loop of the above algorithm clearly depend on the key.
Algorithm 8: Binary right-to-left double-and-add-always algorithm
Input: P , k = (kx−1, kx−2, . . . , k0)2
Output:Q = [k]P
1 R0 ← O;
2 R1 ← P ;
3 for i← 0 up to x-1 do
4 b← 1− ki ;
5 Rb ← 2Rb ;
6 Rb ← Rb +Rki ;
7 end
8 returnR0
Attacking the right-to-left double-and-add-always algorithm of [Joy07] is a type
of key-dependent assignment OTA. We target the doubling operation and note that
the input point will be doubled either in the first (if k0 = 0) or in the second iter-
ation of the loop (if k0 = 1). If k is fixed we can easily decide between the two
by inputting different points, since if k0 = 1 we will see the common operation
2O. If k is not fixed, we simply measure the first two iterations and again use the
operation 2O if the template generator should use the first or second iteration. Once
we are able to obtain clear traces, the attack itself follows the general description of
Section 4.2.2. If we assume that the first i bits of k are known and we wish to derive
the (i+ 1)th bit, this means that we know the values ofR0 andR1 at the start of the
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(i+ 1)th iteration. By making a hypothesis on the value of the (i+ 1)th key bit, we
can decide according to the matching percentage ifR0 orR1 was used.
4.3.3 Attacking the Montgomery Power Ladder
As discussed in Section 2.2.4, the main observation that makes OTA attacks appli-
cable to the Montgomery Power Ladder is that at least one of the computations,
namely the doubling in the main loop, directly depends on the key bit ki. For ex-
ample, if we assume that the first three bits of the key are 100, then the output of
the first iteration will be R0 = 2P . If we assume that the first bits are 110, then the
output of the first iteration will beR0 = 3P . Therefore, if we compare the pattern of
the output of the first iteration of Algorithm 4 with scalar k = 100, we will observe
a higher correlation with the pattern of R0 = 2P than with the pattern of R0 = 3P .
This is demonstrated in the working example of Table 4.2.
Table (4.2) Two executions of the Montgomery ladder
scalar k = 4 = (1, 0, 0) scalar k = 5 = (1, 1, 0)
R0 = P ,R1 = 2P R0 = P ,R1 = 2P
b0 = 1− k0 = 1 R1 = 3P , R0 = 2P b0 = 1− k0 = 0 R0 = 3P , R1 = 4P
b1 = 1− k1 = 1 R1 = 5P , R0 = 4P b1 = 1− k1 = 1 R1 = 7P , R0 = 6P
4.3.4 Side-channel Atomicity
Algorithms that have the property of side-channel atomicity, as described in Sec-
tion 2.2.5 are designed, in order to achieve an identical side-channel profile. Simple
atomic algorithms do not offer any protection against online template attacks, be-
cause the regularity of point operations does not prevent mounting this sort of attack.
We recall here Algorithm 9. As long as there is a key-dependent assignment, as the
one in line 5, OTA can be mounted.
The point 2P , as an output of the third iteration of Algorithm 9, will produce a
power trace with a pattern that is very similar to the trace that would have the point
2P as an input. Therefore, the attack will be the similar to the one described for
the binary left-to-right double-and-add-always algorithm; the only difference is that
instead of the output of the second iteration of the algorithm, we have to focus on
the pattern of the third iteration. In general, when an attacker forms a hypothesis
about a certain number of bits of k, the hypothesis will include the point in time
whereR0 will contain the predicted value. This means that an attacker would have
to acquire a larger target trace to allow all hypotheses to be tested.
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Algorithm 9: Side-Channel Atomic double-and-add algorithm
Input: P , k = (kx−1, kx−2, . . . , k0)2
Output:Q = [k]P
1 R0 ← O; R1 ← P ; i← x− 1 ;
2 n← 0 ;
3 while i ≥ 0 do
4 R0 ← R0 +Rn ;
5 n← n⊕ ki ;
6 i← i− ¬n ;
7 end
8 returnR0
4.4 Practical OTA on Ed25519 implemented on ATMega163
The feasibility and efficiency of OTA is initially shown in [BCP+14,BCP+17] with
practical attacks on the double-and-add-always scalar multiplication running on the
ATMega163 microcontroller [Cor10] in a smart card. The scalar multiplication al-
gorithm is based on the curve arithmetic of the Ed25519 implementation presented
in [HS13]. We hereby give the details of this attack.
4.4.1 Experimental Setup & Tools
Our measurement setup consists of a PC, a Power Tracer and an oscilloscope. The
Power Tracer is a low-noise transparent card reader for SCA-DPA side-channel
power measurements with precise triggering capabilities [Risb]. For acquiring the
traces we used a Picoscope 52032 with sampling rate of 125 M samples per second
for both target trace and online template traces. For the graphical representation of
the traces and analysis of the measurements we used Inspector SCA software [Risa].
The acquisition memory buffer of the Picoscope is limited to 32 M samples.
Since 5 iterations of the scalar multiplication algorithm take around 235 ms, it means
that with sampling rate of 125 M samples per second we can record a trace of
approximately 29.4 M samples.
The scalar multiplication algorithm is based on the curve arithmetic of the Ed25519
implementation presented in [HS13].3 The elliptic curve used in Ed25519 is the
twisted Edwards curve E : −x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2 with d = −(121665/121666)
2http://www.picotech.com/discontinued/PicoScope5203.html
3The code is available online at http://cryptojedi.org/crypto/#avrnacl.
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and base point
P = (1511222134953540077250115140958853151145
4012693041857206046113283949847762202,
4631683569492647816942839400347516
3141307993866256225615783033603165251855960).
For more details on Ed25519 and this specific curve, see [BDL+12].
We modified the software to perform a double-and-add-always scalar multipli-
cation (see Algorithm 2). To illustrate that our attack also works if the template
device is not the same as the target device, we used two different smart cards: one
to obtain the target trace and one to obtain the online template traces. The whole
underlying field and curve arithmetic is the same as in [HS13]. This means in par-
ticular that points are internally represented in extended coordinates as proposed
in [HWCD08]. In this coordinate system, a point P = (x, y) is represented as
(X : Y : Z : T ) with x = X/Z, y = Y/Z, and x · y = T/Z.
4.4.2 Online Template Attack with 256-bit Projective Input
In this section we describe how to apply an OTA if the input supplied to the scalar
multiplication is in extended projective coordinates, i.e, if the attacker has full con-
trol over all coordinates of the starting point. This is a realistic assumption if a proto-
col avoids inversions entirely and protects against leakage of projective coordinates
by randomization as proposed in [NSS04, Section 6]. Recall that for extended co-
ordinates, T is fully determined by X , Y and Z; they are an extension of standard
projective coordinates.
The attack targets the output of the doubling operation. We performed pattern
matching for our traces as described in Section 4.2.2. In this way, we could deter-
mine the leakage of key-dependent assignments during the execution of the algo-
rithm.
We first demonstrate how to attack a single bit and then we present our results
from recovering the five most significant unknown bits of the scalar (recall that the
highest bit is always set to one; see Algorithm 2). The remaining bits can be attacked
iteratively in the same way as described in Section 4.2.2; as stated above we were
not able to recover more than five bits simultaneously due to technical limitations
of our measurement setup.
The first observation from our experiments is that when we execute the same
algorithm with the same input point on two different cards, there is a constant ver-
tical misalignment between the two obtained traces, but the patterns look almost
identical. This fact validates our choice of the correlation coefficient as our pattern-
matching metric, since this metric does not depend on the difference in absolute val-
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ues and therefore the constant misalignment does not affect the results. Figure 4.3
shows this vertical misalignment between the brown trace obtained from the target
and the blue trace obtained from the template device for the same instance of the
algorithm.
Figure (4.3) Similarity between the traces taken for input 2P by the target card
and the templates’ card
For our target trace, we compute a multiple of a point P with coordinates
P x = 0x6218E309D40065FCC338B3127F468371
82324BD01CE6F3CF81AB44E62959C82A,
P y = 0x5501492265E073D874D9E5B81E7F8784
8A826E80CCE2869072AC60C3004356E5,
P z = 0x00000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000000001,
P t = 0x3FC17C25A0F70F2B3113A05A48E6CD8B
CD341E229CB10E4833B819EA5D3A8762.
We know that the most significant bit of the scalar is 1, so after the first iteration
of the double-and-add-always loop the value of R0 is either 2P (if the second bit
of k is zero) or 3P (if the second bit of k is one). We furthermore know from the
addition formulas used by the implementation, that R0 = 2P or R0 = 3P has the
following specific representation in extended coordinates:
2Px = 0xB83008EEB749E519BA5C05E63EDAABA1
E2BA0C92037A02796B1D92A636A49746,
2Py = 0x910B931F833256DB68C1D2597194A774
97C4A9FAD63D042535C511840C51A692,
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2Pz = 0xD098E5677B2A9CCA678238279BFC55B6
0A4B5F377438DF015EC2BFCC83B2B922,
2Pt = 0x180C2E1536BACE17B096A0EE222B0299
AAF2CBEE868CEB1D2D74800E735F48D4;
3Px = 0xEAB3BE0B61DEEB0B915B228B3E00376A
CB7C487114BCB34CD90A1275BA586422,
3Py = 0x2342D54933AFB7E1CA079AE79EC1B9DF
DD45D0CB96DE25DF0C4C474C524B6EEC,
3Pz = 0xA9C7590B5B803C2EAB6BADE97EA9C331
1AE83BC98D659AE13A9D4D0AD6F93D2A,
3Pt = 0x4A9D4C7F687A53B21CFD06DB1400B1EA
7AA4434DE904EF2624D001F49B491434.
To determine the second bit of the secret scalar k, we generate template traces by
inputting exactly those representations of 2P and 3P and computing the correlation
of the first iteration of the template trace with the second iteration of the target trace.
We use the fact that inputs are given in projective representation.
Figure (4.4) Comparison between the trace that comes from input P (target trace,
brown) at second iteration and the trace with input 2P (matching template trace,
blue) at first iteration. For illustration, both traces were obtained from the same card
to avoid vertical misalignment.
In fact, we will see that the correlation between the correct template trace and
the target trace is so much higher than between the wrong template trace and the
target trace, that just one of the two template traces is sufficient to determine the
second bit of k. All subsequent figures are taken with the six most significant bits
of k set to 100110.
Figure 4.4 shows power traces of the second iteration of the target trace (brown)
and the first iteration of the 2P template trace, i.e., the matching template trace.
61 4.4. Practical OTA on Ed25519 implemented on ATMega163
Figure (4.5) Comparison between P (target trace, brown) at second iteration and
3P (non-matching template trace, blue) at first iteration. For illustration, both traces
were obtained from the same card to avoid vertical misalignment.
Figure 4.5 shows power traces of the second iteration of the target trace (brown) and
the first iteration of the 3P template trace, i.e., the non-matching template trace.
For validation of our results, we conducted several experiments with different
input points from the target card and the template card, and computed the correlation
in the obtained power traces. Figure 4.6 shows the correlation of the template trace
(iteration 1) with input 2P to the target trace (iteration 2) in blue and the correlation
of the template trace (iteration 1) with input 3P to the same target trace (iteration 2)
in brown. We notice that the trace obtained from the point 2P is almost identical to
the pattern obtained from the target trace; as expected the correlation is at least 97%
for all our experiments. On the other hand, the correlation of the target trace with
the template trace for 3P is at most 83%. To determine the value of one bit, we can
thus simply compute only one template trace, and decide the value of the targeted
bit depending on whether the correlation is above or below a certain threshold set
somewhere between 83% and 97%.
Figure (4.6) Pattern matching percentage of 2P to P and 3P to P for trace with
P for different cards for template and target traces
Whether we use the same card for target and template traces or different cards,
the results in the correlation do not change. When we use a different card, we notice
a misalignment in the peaks as in Figure 4.6 that disappears if the traces are taken
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from the same card as in Figure 4.7. However, the correlation values are the same
for both situations.
Figure (4.7) Pattern matching percentage of 2P to P and 3P to P for trace with
P obtained from the same card for template and target traces
The results presented so far are obtained while attacking a single bit of the ex-
ponent. When we attack five bits with one acquisition, we observe lower numbers
for pattern matching for both the correct and the wrong scalar guess. The correlation
results for pattern matching are not so high, mainly due to the noise that is occurring
in our setup during longer acquisitions. This follows from the fact that our power
supply is not perfectly stable during acquisitions that are longer than 200 ms. How-
ever, the difference between correct and wrong assumptions is still remarkable as
depicted in Figures 4.8 to 4.12, showing the OTA on five scalar bits k = 100110 at
once. Correct bit assumptions have 84− 88% matching patterns, while the correla-
tion for the wrong assumptions drops to 50 − 72%. To determine the value of one
bit, it is thus necessary to compute only one template trace, and decide on the value
of the targeted bit depending on whether the correlation is above or below a certain
threshold (in this case, the threshold can be set to 80%). The template traces are
always taken during the first iteration and the target trace contains all five iterations.
Note that the input points for the template traces depend on the already recovered
bits of the exponent.
Figure (4.8) Pattern matching percentage of 2P toP and 3P toP obtained for the
2nd MSB of the scalar
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Figure (4.9) Pattern Matching 4P to P and 5P to P obtained for the 3rd MSB of
the scalar
Figure (4.10) Pattern Matching 8P to P and 9P to P obtained for the 4th MSB
of the scalar
Figure (4.11) Pattern Matching 18P toP and 19P toP obtained for the 5th MSB
of the scalar
Figure (4.12) Pattern Matching 38P toP and 39P toP obtained for the 6th MSB
of the scalar
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Note that the attack with projective inputs does not make any assumptions on
formulas used for elliptic curve addition and doubling. In fact, we carried out the
attack for specialized doubling and for doubling that use the same unified addition
formulas as addition. The results were similar: all traces shown above are from the
experiments that used unified addition formulas for both addition and doubling.
4.4.3 Online Template Attack with 255-bit Projective Input
In the previous section, for simplicity, we deliberately ignored the case of coordinate
reduction in the field, in order to make the concept of the attack clear. The imple-
mentation that we attack, for the sake of efficiency, operates on 256-bit coordinates
and not 255-bit coordinates from the field F2255−19. The 256-bit coordinates corre-
spond to the coordinates from F2255−19 by applying the modulo 2255−19 operation;
by using 256 bits the implementation can save time by not performing some modulo
operations.
So far we assumed that we can send to the card the optimized 256-bit coor-
dinates. It is interesting to examine a more complex attack scenario in which we
can only input the 255-bit coordinates. In this section, we show that OTA is suc-
cessful in this scenario as well; a fact that makes OTA a powerful attack technique
independent of the prime p of the field used. Fast modular reduction is implemented
in [HS13] by using simple shifts and additions, which are relatively cheap on AVRs.
Our idea is not to attack a whole doubling operation, but just a single squaring.
More precisely, we show how to perform OTA on the squaring operation of the Z
coordinate. First, let us consider the old 256-bit templates. There are two distinct
attack cases, namely:
• MSB = 0 for the Z projective coordinate (the remaining coordinates can have
the most significant bit equal to 1), therefore the Z coordinate after reduction
remains the same.
In this case, OTA can be applied in a similar way as in Section 4.4.2. We take
the old template coordinates and perform a reduction of all the coordinates
modulo our prime number 2255− 19; then we send those coordinates as input
to the card to obtain the new templates.
• The Z coordinate has MSB = 1 and therefore, there is a 9 bit difference from
the corresponding 256− bit coordinate.
In this case, the reduced point differs from its 256 − bit equivalent in the
MSB and in the least significant byte due to the pseudo-Mersenne prime that
we use (i.e., 2255 − 19). This case is the most interesting and we will analyze
it in the remaining part of this section.
We focus on StepD: the computation ofZ2 (see Figure 4.14 for the details about
the doubling formula that we use); we choose a new Z ′, such that MSBZ′ = 0 and
the rest of the bits are the same as the Z coordinate of the old template.
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So our new point has only 1-bit difference with the original target trace. For this
Z ′, we recalculate X ′, Y ′ and T ′ using the following equations:
X ′ = X · Z ′,
Y ′ = Y · Z ′,
T ′ = T/Z ′,
where X , Y , Z, and T denote the coordinates of the old template.
The results obtained from this attack are similar to the previous section. Fig-
ure 4.13 presents the pattern match between a template trace during computation of
D ← Z2 with template with 1-bit difference, 9-bit difference, or wrong template (it-
eration 1) to the target trace (iteration 2). As expected, the highest peak corresponds
to the template with only 1-bit difference, the slightly smaller peak correspond to
the 9-bit difference, and the lowest peak corresponds to a wrong template.
Figure (4.13) Pattern Matching during computation of D of a template with 1-bit
difference, a template with 9-bit difference, and a wrong template to the target trace
for area of computing D.
Successful key guesses (for the templates that have at most 1-bit difference) give
correlation values between 81% and 86%, while unsuccessful ones are below 76%.
The success and failure rates are different from those in Section 4.4.2 because now
we concentrate on a single squaring and not the whole doubling.
4.4.4 Online Template Attack with Affine Input
The attack as explained in the previous sections makes the assumption that the at-
tacker has full control over the input in projective coordinates. Most implementa-
tions of ECC use inputs in affine (or compressed affine) coordinates and internally
convert to projective representation. The input is now given as (x, y) and at the
beginning of the computation converted to (x : y : 1 : xy). We observe that the
points P , 2P and 3P do not have any coordinates in common with the projective
representations used internally. Already after the first iteration of the double-and-
add-always loop, Z = 1 does not hold anymore. Those attacks are more elaborate,
since the internal point representation changes at every step of the algorithm.
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First we consider an attack on the second most significant bit (which is again set
to zero) and the input point P of the target trace with coordinates
P x =0x6218E309D40065FCC338B3127F468371
82324BD01CE6F3CF81AB44E62959C82A,
P y =0x5501492265E073D874D9E5B81E7F8784
8A826E80CCE2869072AC60C3004356E5.
Choosing the affine versions of 2P and 3P to generate template traces does not
help us now because they do not have any coordinates in common with the projec-
tive representations used internally.4 To successfully perform the attack we need to
modify our approach and take a closer look at the formulas used for point doubling.
We illustrate the approach with the unified doubling formula from [HWCD08].5.
1 : A← (Y1 −X1)(Y2 −X2)
2 : B ← (Y1 +X1)(Y2 +X2)
3 : C ← kT1T2
4 : D ← 2Z1Z2
5 : E ← B −A
6 : F ← D − C
7 : G← D + C
8 : H ← B +A
9 : X3← EF
10 : Y 3← GH
11 : T3← EH
12 : Z3← FG
Figure (4.14) Unified addition/doubling formula from [HWCD08]
4This property follows from the fact that the Z coordinate of 2P during the conversion to extended
coordinates is always set to 0x01 while the Z coordinate of the point P after being squared in the
first iteration of the scalar multiplication loop does not equal 0x01 with overwhelming probability
5For details, see: http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/
auto-twisted-extended-1.html#addition-madd-2008-hwcd-3 These formu-
las contain the operations listed in Figure 4.14
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The main idea of the attack is to focus on the first multiplication (Y1−X1)(Y2−
X2), which in case of a doubling would be (Y − X)2. We give now a detailed
description on how to generate the necessary templates for (Y −X)2.
Let us assume that the target trace with the point P is already acquired and that
we attack bit bi, where 0 ≤ i < x. Firstly, depending on already recovered bits
of the scalar bx, . . . bi+1 (at the beginning we only know that the most significant
bit bx is 1), the coordinates of P , and the bit guess bi ∈ {0, 1}, we can compute
the intermediate value λ = Y − X that is squared in Step 1 (Figure 4.14) during
acquisition of the target trace. Secondly, we search for a new point P i = (x′, y′)
such that Y ′ −X ′ = λ.6 Such a point P i cannot always be found on the curve, but
we can flip the least significant bit of λ and check whether this point belongs to the
curve. If this fails, we flip the bit back and then flip the second least significant bit of
λ; we continue this way with subsequent least significant bits until we find a point
on the curve. From our experiments, we succeed in finding a point on the curve in
a maximum of five trials. Such a point will differ from λ on at most 1 bit (in least
significant byte of the coordinate).
Using the method described above we compute two points P [kx−2 = 0] and
P [kx−2 = 1], where kx−2 indicates the second most significant bit.
P [kx−2 = 0]x = 0x2B1FDBA73C0BB44A21D59EE599B66E5B
470EA5ADB62777A55254E646F0ADE032,
P [kx−2 = 0]y = 0x03FB65D807F4260BD03B6B58CC706A2D
FC19431688EA79511CFC6524C65AEF7C,
P [kx−2 = 1]x = 0x340C1C83C144EA9C5B707C5081FD770C
F6C2C95FC044604B45ABAEF3F4F3EDAE,
P [kx−2 = 1]y = 0x6D9B33C19315B772941CF4ACE2BEF982
088C51BA4265D2DD78EDE3CA8CE6F852.
Similarly to Section 4.4.2, let us assume that the six most significant bits of the
scalar k are set to 100110 (recall that the most significant bit is always set to 1).
When we compare the trace for P as input at the second iteration to the trace for
P [kx−2 = 0] at the first iteration during the second squaring operation (computing
A) then we can observe that the two traces are almost identical, see Figure 4.15 for
details. A is depicted in the highlighted part. The part of the brown trace that is
different from the target trace at 10 msec is due to the fact that ZP [kx−2=0] differs
from the coordinate ZP during the computation of D = Z1Z2.
Figure 4.16 shows the pattern match between a template trace during computa-
tion of A← (Y −X)2 with input pointP [kx−1 = 0] (iteration 1) to the target trace
6Note that we cannot use P (X,Y, Z) “freely”, because now Z 6= 1.
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Figure (4.15) Comparison between P at the second iteration to P [kx−2 = 0] at
first iteration; the area of computing A is highlighted
for P (iteration 2) and the pattern match between the template trace (iteration 1) for
P [kx−1 = 1] to the target trace (iteration 2). We notice that the trace obtained from
the point P [kx−2 = 0] is almost identical to the pattern obtained from the target
trace as expected. The correlation is 86% for the correct key-guess and under 73%
for the incorrect one.
Figure (4.16) Pattern Matching during computation ofA ofP [kx−2 = 0] toP and
P [kx−2 = 1] to P with P obtained for the 2nd most significant scalar bit
Since we know the two most significant bits, we can repeat the attack for the
next 4 most significant bits (in total we will know the 6 most significant bits since
the most significant is always 1). Using the same method for computing the points
P [kx−2 = 0] andP [kx−2 = 1], we compute the point for the 8 subsequent template
points. The pattern matching results for the templates are presented in Figure 4.17,
Figure 4.18, Figure 4.19, and Figure 4.20.
The correlation is 84 − 87% for the correct key guesses. For the non-matching
template point the correlation value of the matching patterns is at most 73%. Once
again, the threshold value of 80% is verified.
4.5 Practical OTA on software implementation of mbedTLS
The applicability of Online Template Attacks was extended to attacks on scalar
multiplication of Brainpool [LMSS14] and NIST [Nat09] curves. In [DPN+16], we
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Figure (4.17) Pattern Matching during computation ofA ofP [kx−3 = 0] toP and
P [kx−3 = 1] to P with P obtained for the 3rd most significant scalar bit the area of
computing A
Figure (4.18) Pattern Matching during computation ofA ofP [kx−4 = 0] toP and
P [kx−4 = 1] to P with P obtained for the 4th most significant scalar bit the area of
computing A
Figure (4.19) Pattern Matching during computation ofA ofP [kx−5 = 0] toP and
P [kx−5 = 1] to P with P obtained for the 5th most significant scalar bit the area of
computing A
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Figure (4.20) Pattern Matching during computation ofA ofP [kx−6 = 0] toP and
P [kx−6 = 1] to P with P obtained for the 6th most significant scalar bit the area of
computing A
propose a generic method to distinguish matching templates and by using two tem-
plates per key bit, we manage to detect and correct errors for wrong bit assumptions.
This fact increases the success rate of the adaptive template attack significantly com-
pared to the original OTA, reaching 99.8% when 100 average template traces are
used. We also take advantage of the horizontal and vertical leakage, which occurs
in the broadly used software implementation of mbedTLS during the modular mul-
tiplication of large integers (256-bit elements).
As mentioned earlier, the scalar multiplication is the main operation in cryp-
tographic protocols using ECC, such as ECDSA signatures [AX98] or the Diffie-
Hellman key-exchange protocol (ECDH) [Nat09]. Many scalar multiplication algo-
rithms are used for efficiency and/or resistance against side-channel attacks. In this
section, we show an attack against the binary left-to-right double-and-add-always
algorithm (see [Cor99, Joy03]), which is considered to be resistant against simple
power analysis (SPA). Our attack applies to other regular algorithms as well, simi-
larly to the original OTA [BCP+14].
4.5.0.1 Scalar multiplication module of mbedTLS
The cryptographic library mbedTLS, formerly known as PolarSSL, is open-source
[mbe] and it was acquired by ARM. MbedTLS contains C and assembly code to
speed up elliptic curve computations over the chosen finite field. The source code
is nicely decomposed into modular blocks and it can be used in embedded devices.
For ECC operations, the module ecp of the library is used.
MbedTLS is intended to be used in embedded systems which include a hardware
multiplier, like smart-phones. Scalar multiplication in mbedTLS consists of two
steps: multiplication and modular reduction. Faster scalar multiplication is achieved
by using the doubling operation in Jacobian coordinates (DBL) and mixed addi-
tion [CMO98] between a point in Jacobian and a point in affine coordinates (ADD).
The cost of these operations is explained and detailed by Bernstein and Lange
in [BL].
The double-and-add-always algorithm takes as input a point P = (xP , yP ) in
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affine coordinates and the scalar k. For our experiments the scalar is 256-bit long.
For every iteration the computation block performs a doubling operation and an
addition with P .
In PolarSSL v1.3.7 and mbedTLS v2.2.0 7 a multiplication between two el-
ements in the finite field is computed as described in Algorithm 10. The result
of the multiplication is stored in a 512-bit element, called “multiplication-before-
reduction”; then the result is reduced modulo p (the characteristic of the finite
field). For our experiments, we used the Brainpool curve brainpoolP256r1 recom-
mended by BSI [BSI10] and the NIST curve P-256 recommended by NIST [NIS13].
These curves are defined over a 256-bit field and have security level of 128 bits
(see [BCC+12] for more details). One element in the finite field of those curves has
a length of 256 bit.
The micro-controller used for the experiments is a Cortex-M4 with 32-bit reg-
isters for data operations (see Section 4.5.3.1 for more details). Therefore, one field
element corresponds to 8 words of 32 bits.
Algorithm 10: Multiplication in mbedTLS
Input: A and B7..B0 two elements of 256-bits long.
Output: X = A×B
1: X ← 0
2: for i from 7 down to 0 do
3: (C,Xi+7, Xi+6, . . . , Xi)← (Xi+7, . . . , Xi) +A×Bi
4: j ← i+ 8
5: repeat
6: (C,Xj)← Xj + C
7: j ← j + 1
8: until C 6= 0
9: end for
10: return X
LetA andB be two 256-bit elements in the finite field. Then,A (resp.B) can be
written as 8 words Ai for all i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 7} (resp. Bi) of 32-bits. A0 is the least
significant word (LSW) of A and A7 is the most significant word (MSW) of A. Let
X be the result of the multiplication A×B before reduction; X can be represented
by 16 words of 32 bits (X15X14 . . . X0).
7When we started this project in November 2014, we initially used PolarSSL v1.3.7. During this
month PolarSSL was acquired by ARM Holdings. Therefore, we tested later our results in mbedTLS
v2.2.0 and they were the same.
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4.5.1 Horizontal Leakage due to Propagation of Carry
Horizontal leakage usually occurs when there are conditional statements in the algo-
rithm. This is the case for PolarSSL v1.3.7, mbedTLS v2.2.0 and OpenSSL v1.0.2
and earlier versions. For mounting our attack, we focus in the doubling operation
inside the scalar multiplication. This is the interesting operation that we trigger and
create our templates from.
In case the whole doubling operation is used to construct templates, it is not
possible to achieve high similarity between our templates and the target, mainly
due to the noise and the non-constant time implementation. As explained later in
Section4.5.3.3, we cannot use the intermediate values (in Jacobian coordinates) as
input point (in affine) for the templates. However, by focusing on the operations in
the first doubling of the double-and-add-always algorithm to construct the template
traces, we achieve more accurate results. For the template pattern, we need only the
pattern of the first finite-field multiplication in the doubling.
In the implementation we used (Algorithm 13 in [Riv11]), the first operations
during the doubling of point P = (X,Y, Z) are the following:8
D1 ← X× X mod p
D2 ← Y× Y mod p
...
(4.1)
Algorithm 10 shows how multiplication is performed in mbedTLS. The result
A×Bi is stored in eight 32-bit words and there is a potential carryC, which needs to
be stored separately (see step 3). This potential overflow creates a significant pattern
that can be distinguished from its high amplitude when C = 1; this pattern is the
carry propagation as depicted in Figure 4.21.
The leakage due to the propagation of the carry depends on the MSW of the
input data A7. For BrainpoolP256r1, max{A7|A ∈ Fp} = 0xA9FB57DA and
the probability of having a carry propagation is close to p = 0.17. For P-256,
max{A7|A ∈ Fp} equals 232 − 1, so this probability is close to p = 0.25. As
shown in Figure 4.21, we can have 7 carry propagations during the multiplication,
but we cannot detect the last propagation. So, the probability to have two templates
with the same carry propagation, denoted by P(C), is:
P(C) =
6∑
i=0
(
6
i
)
p2i(1− p)2(6−i) , (4.2)
where p is the probability to have an internal carry propagation. The probability to
have horizontal leakage is 0.86 using p = 0.17 for brainpoolP256r1. For P-256, the
probability to have horizontal leakage is 0.95 using the fact that p = 0.25.
8The beginning of the doubling operation is the implementation in PolarSSL v1.3.7. The sequence
of the finite field operations in the doubling operation in the mbedTLS v2.2.0 changes to: D1 ←
X ×X,D2 ← 3×X , but this does not affect the efficiency of our attack.
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Figure (4.21) Propagation of carry during multiplication in the field
Figure (4.22) No carry propagation between target and template traces
Figure (4.23) Propagation of carry between target and template traces
However, it is more interesting from the OTA point of view to find out when a
difference in the carry propagation occurs between the target and template traces.
This is the only part of mbedTLS that is non-constant time and we take advan-
tage of this timing difference, every time it occurs. In this case, there is an obvious
horizontal leakage between the target and the template traces, as depicted in Fig-
ures 4.22, 4.23.
In Figure 4.24, we see how the squaring operation in the beginning of the dou-
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bling looks like, when carry propagation occurs.
Figure (4.24) Squaring of two random data with different carry propagation
4.5.2 Vertical Leakage due to Signal Amplitude
In constant time executions of our implementation, there is no difference in the carry
propagation and the template traces are synchronized with the target trace. In those
cases, we observe only a vertical leakage due to the amplitude of the signal and the
same method as described in [BCP+14] can be used. To observe this leakage, we
use the pattern matching technique using the Pearson correlation as a distinguisher.
4.5.3 Detailed Phases of the Attack in Practice
4.5.3.1 Experimental Setup
The target device is an STM32F4 micro-controller, which contains an ARM Cortex-
M4 processor running at its maximum frequency (168 MHz). We have ported the
assembly code originally included in PolarSSL v1.3.7 to ARM Cortex-M4 and im-
plemented the double-and-add-always procedure as described in [Cor99, Joy03].
For the acquisition, we used a 54855 Infiniium Agilent oscilloscope and a Langer
EMV-TECHNIK RF-U5-2 near field probe. The sampling frequency is 1 GSa/s with
50 MHz hardware input low-pass filter enabled. Matlab 2014b is used for the anal-
ysis, and Inspector SCA tool [Risa] for depicting the traces in this chapter. The
position of the probe was determined to maximize the signal related to the activity
of the 32× 32 hardware multiplier.9
For the curves defined in Section 4.5, one element in the finite field has a length
of 256 bits. Thus, each operation over the field consists of manipulating eight pro-
cessor words (8×32 bits). In our implementation, a multiplication-before-reduction
consists of eight multiplications between a 256-bit element by each 32-bit word of
the second element. It leads to eight easily identifiable patterns of eight blocks in
9This is a simple identification phase, where we scan the device and find where the crypto processor
is. Then we just move the probe around this position, in order to get a signal that is clear as possible.
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the EM traces. The length between two blocks can be different depending on the
carry propagation, as explained in Section 4.5.1.
4.5.3.2 Preprocessing Phase
The preprocessing phase starts with choosing an input point P and obtaining the
target trace from our target device; this is depicted in Figure 4.25. In this trace,
Figure (4.25) EM acquisition for scalar multiplication on P-256 with k =
0xA5A5
we need to spot the multiplication patterns, which are eight blocks of 256 × 32
multiplications depicted in Figure 4.26. We note here that this does not constitute a
building phase in the usual template setting, it is just an identification phase. From
the implementation and the device, we know that a 256-bit element is processed by
32-bit multipliers. Therefore, we expect to see eight patterns for each multiplication.
The multiplication procedure is described in Section 4.5.0.1.
When we have a clear pattern for the multiplication, we cross-correlate this
pattern with our target trace and we obtain the cross-correlation pattern with one
peak at the position of every multiplication. Figure 4.27 shows the cross-correlation
of the target trace with the multiplication pattern. By counting the peaks in the cross-
correlation trace, we can find the part of the computation that we are interested in.
Figure (4.26) Pattern of multiplication-before-reduction
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Figure (4.27) Cross-correlation between the pattern of the multiplication and the
target trace
For BrainpoolP256r1, as explained in [BL], the doubling consists of 10 multi-
plications (except for the first doubling, where there are only 7 multiplications10),
and the mixed addition consists of 11 multiplications.
For P-256, there is a particular parameter equal to (−3 mod p), so the multi-
plication by a in the doubling can be optimized. The doubling consists of 9 multipli-
cations and the mixed addition of 11 multiplications.11 In this way, we can “cut” the
target trace in sections according to the loop of the scalar multiplication operation
(as in Figure 4.28).
Figure (4.28) The first seven iterations of the scalar multiplication algorithm on
the curve
The first iteration of the double-and-add always algorithm is completed after
18 cross-correlation peaks. For the next iterations, we take into account that each
doubling consists of 9 or 10 multiplications and each addition of 11. For the first bit,
the interesting section on the target is the 19th multiplication. For the second bit, the
interesting section is the 39th multiplication for P-256 or the 40th multiplication for
10Because in the beginning Z = 1 and we computed aZ4 with 3 multiplications.
11The fact that doubling is performed faster for P-256, allows us to recover 7 bits of the scalar at
once.
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BrainpoolP256r1. For the third bit, the interesting section on the target is the 59th
multiplication for P-256 or the 61th multiplication for BrainpoolP256r1, and so on
for all the other bits of the scalar.
As the last step of this phase, we calculate multiples of the point P using our
implementation. We explain this in detail in the next section.
4.5.3.3 Template Acquisition
In mbedTLS every input point is represented in affine coordinates and then con-
verted to Jacobian coordinates. This is a common approach for the input of con-
straint devices, since inversion during the doubling and adding operation using
affine coordinates is not efficient.
Having the intermediate values represented in Jacobian coordinates, but the in-
put points to the device in affine coordinates, can make the template acquisition
phase complicated. Hence we need to find an input point in affine corresponding to
an intermediate value in Jacobian coordinates, in order to create templates.
The target trace is obtained with input pointP = (xP , yP ) given in affine coor-
dinates. In order to compute the intermediate values of the points 2P = (X2P , Y2P ,-
Z2P ) and 3P = (X3P , Y3P , Z3P ) with our implementation, we use the formulas
defined in [BL]. Note that this does not correspond to the point 2P and 3P in affine
coordinates, because Z2P , Z3P 6= 1. We cannot compare directly the templates with
input point 2P (resp. 3P ), since they are not in affine form.
We create our templates with a specific input point Qi such that the first field
multiplication D1 in 2P or 3P is the same with the one attacked on the target trace.
The squaring of the X-coordinate of the intermediate value is not affected by the
change of coordinates system.
The way to construct the input point for templates is more sophisticated. Let us
assume that we have the input point Q0 = (xQ0 , yQ0) in affine coordinates associ-
ated to the point value 2P and Q1 = (xQ1 , yQ1) corresponding to 3P . We need to
analyze the squaring of the X-coordinate in Jacobian coordinates.
The input pointQ0 = (xQ0 , yQ0) should be a solution in Fp×Fp of the follow-
ing system: {
xQ0 = X2P
y2Q0 = x
3
Q0 + axQ0 + b
(4.3)
with a, b the parameters of the curve as defined in [BSI10, NIS13].
The number X used as input in the squaring is random, so X3 + aX + b is also
random. If x3Q0 + axQ0 + b is not a square in the finite field, we can change one
bit in X as proposed in [BCP+14] to obtain another point on the curve that satisfies
Equation (4.3).
We locate the first multiplication in the template trace corresponding to the
squaring of theX-coordinate of the input pointQ0 orQ1, depicted in Figs. 4.30, 4.31
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respectively. With these two patterns and the target trace (Figure 4.29), we can per-
form template matching.
Figure (4.29) Pattern of the 19th multiplication in trace with input P
Figure (4.30) Pattern of the 1st multipli-
cation in trace with inputQ0
Figure (4.31) Pattern of the 1st multipli-
cation in trace with inputQ1
4.5.3.4 Horizontal Leakage
We present how to perform template matching by making the right hypothesis on
a scalar bit. This procedure is described for the cases of horizontal and vertical
leakage. The probability of having horizontal leakage corresponds to the probability
of having different carry propagation between the two templates.
When the traces are not synchronized (86% of cases in BrainpoolP256r1 curve,
and 95% in P-256), cross-correlation between the multiplication pattern and the
target trace is performed before template matching, in order to choose the correct
part of the target trace. Then we align the template and target traces and decide what
the correct guess for the key bit is.
Horizontal leakage is observed when there is different carry propagation be-
tween two multiplications 256× 32 in the field. In Figure 4.32 we see the misalign-
ment of the traces due to carry propagation.
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Figure (4.32) Misalignment of two template traces due to the carry propagation
4.5.3.5 Vertical Leakage
When the implementation is executed in constant time and the template traces are
synchronized with the target trace, the same method as described in [BCP+14] can
be used (14% of cases in brainpoolP256r1 and 5% in P-256). The carry propagation
is the same between the two templates and the target as depicted in Figure 4.33;
therefore, we can only observe a vertical leakage in our traces. In our experiments,
Figure (4.33) Two templates with the same carry propagation
we use the Pearson correlation coefficient ρ(X,Y ) as described in Chapter 3 and we
get a correlation of 0.81 for the multiplication obtained from the target trace and the
template trace of 2P . The same value drops to 0.78 for the correlation of the target
trace with the template trace of 3P . Thus, this leads us to conclude that the second
bit of the scalar is 0, which is indeed the correct key bit because the scalar used
in this experiment is 0xA5 = (10100101)2. However, the difference between the
correct and the wrong template correlation is too small to deduce with confidence
the correct bit in every round.
4.5.4 Success Rate for One Key-bit
In this part, the method used to calculate and increase the success rate of our attack
is described. As explained in Section 4.5.1, the probability to have a different carry
propagation between two templates is 95% for P-256 and 86% for brainpoolP256r1.
The horizontal attack scenario is easy, since if two templates have a different
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carry propagation, then the success rate of finding this bit is 100%. For the vertical
attack scenario, the success rate depends on the input data. Therefore, we examine
only the input data, for which the carry propagation is the same in two template
traces. By using random points on each curve for the target trace, we can compute
the success rate in the following way:
• Acquire 30 target traces and 100 template traces for each assumption when
the carry propagation is the same.
• Compute the Pearson correlation between the target and a template trace for
each assumption.
• With ki we denote the correct guess for the corresponding bit of the key k. If
ki gives the highest Pearson correlation, then the counter corresponding to the
success of the attack increases. If ¬ki has higher correlation, then the counter
corresponding to the failure of the attack increases.
The success rate per key bit in vertical leakage is 76.23% for P-256 and 69% for
BrainpoolP256r1. The total success rate to find one key bit, independent of the leak-
age model, is 1×0.95+0.76×0.05 = 98.8% for P-256, and 1×0.86+0.69×0.14 =
95.66% for BrainpoolP256r1.
Averaging template traces can increase the vertical information leakage. When
the scalar is randomized, we cannot perform the attack with more than one target
trace. However, we can still acquire more than one template trace. By using only
one target trace with an average of a few template traces, the success rate increases
as shown the Table 4.3 on the BrainpoolP256r1 curve. For instance, by using 100
template traces the success rate for BrainpoolP256r1 curve is 1 × 0.86 + 0.99 ×
0.14 = 99.86%
Table (4.3) Different success rates according to the number of average template
traces on brainpoolP256r1 curve.
Number of average traces 1 10 50 100
Success Rate 69% 80.70% 91.60% 99.80%
4.5.5 Error Detection & Correction
The novelty of this method is the possibility of error detection and correction. The
method of error-detection is applied when two templates have the same carry prop-
agation. As we described in the previous section, the success rate to retrieve one bit
using OTA is close to 99%, which means that there is a 1% probability of having an
unsuccessful attack due to a wrong key guess.
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For a 256-bit scalar, if an error occurs in the beginning and it is not detected,
the success rate for the original OTA is 7.6% (0.99255 ' 0.076), since this error
will propagate and affect all the bits after the wrong guess. Therefore, it is very
important to detect and correct errors before making new templates. An error can
be made when both template traces have the same carry propagation. In order to be
sure for a key bit value, the value of this current bit and the following one can be
computed. For instance, if the two templates for 2P and 3P have the same carry
propagation, then we create templates for 4P , 5P , 6P and 7P . The following four
cases can occur:
1. One template has the same propagation as the target: Then, we can determine
correctly both key bits. For instance, if the template trace of 7P gives the
same carry propagation as the target trace, then the only possible bit values
are “1" for the second key bit and “1" for the third one.
2. Two templates have the same propagation as the target: We need to compute
the next 4 templates (4i, 4i + 1, 4i + 2, 4i + 3, where ki is the i-th bit of the
exponent), and recover the next bit using these 4 template traces.
3. Three templates have the same propagation as the target: We compute 6 tem-
plates, and recover the next bit using those 6 template traces.
4. Four templates have the same propagation as the target: We compute 8 tem-
plates, and recover the next bit using those 8 template traces.
The probability to have one template trace with the same carry propagation as
the target trace on BrainpoolP256r1 is 70%, two template traces is 14%, three tem-
plate traces is 3.9% , four template traces is 1.2%, five template traces is 0.4%, six
template traces is 0.1%. The probability for more template traces with the same
carry propagation is very low.
For P-256, the probability to have one template trace with the same carry prop-
agation as the target trace is, 90%, two template traces is 5.9%, 3 template traces is
0.7%, 4 template traces is 0.1%, 5 template traces is 0.01%. For both curves, this
probability reduces significantly for more template traces.
As a conclusion, the number of template traces cannot increase exponentially.
At the end of the attack, in order to retrieve the 256-bit scalar, there can be an
uncertainty for the last 2 or 3 bits. By exhaustive key search or by comparing the
corresponding templates with the template ofQ = [k]P , the last 22 or 23 scalar key
bits can be found.
Template matching is performed at suitable parts of the traces, where key bit
related assignments take place. In order to distinguish the right hypothesis on the
attacked bit of the scalar, we use a pattern matching technique based on the Pearson
correlation coefficient ρ(X,Y ) between the target trace and the template traces, as
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described previously in Section 4.4 and in Chapter 3. This metric is chosen again at
this point, since it is both scale and offset-shift invariant.
4.6 Classification Algorithms for Online Template Attacks
The fact that the template-building phase in OTA is not necessary, significantly
simplifies the process of retrieving the key, leaving the overhead of the attack in
the template-matching phase. The template-matching technique used for both OTA
projects [BCP+14, DPN+16] is based on the Pearson correlation coefficient. In
[OPB16], more efficient techniques from the field of Machine Learning are used
as distinguishers, and the proposed attack reaches a success rate of 100% with only
20 template traces per key bit. This work is the first step towards a framework for
“automating” the template-matching phase.
The attack can be classified as a form of OTA having the same attack model
and assumptions. The proposed classification techniques from the field of Machine
Learning (k-Nearest Neighbour, Naïve Bayes, SVM) provide an efficient and sim-
plified way to match templates during a Template Attack with very high success
rates. A practical application of this attack is demonstrated on the scalar multiplica-
tion algorithm for the Brainpool curve BP256r1 implemented in mbedTLS.
4.6.1 Machine Learning Techniques in Cryptography
Machine learning (ML) techniques are developed to provide efficient pattern recog-
nition and feature extraction algorithms, mainly used in artificial intelligence. ML
algorithms are used to build models, in order to make data-driven predictions or
decisions. Applying ML techniques to cryptanalysis is not a new concept for either
community. Initially proposed by Rivest in [Riv91], the use of learning algorithms
can facilitate the cryptanalysis of cipher feedback systems, and data compression
algorithms can be used for cryptographic purposes (for instance hash functions).
Combined concepts from both fields formalized new attack techniques, such as Dif-
ferential Cluster Analysis (DCA) proposed by Batina et al. in [BGLR09]. DCA uses
cluster analysis to detect internal collisions and it combines features from previously
known collision and DPA attack techniques. The results of fuzzy k-means cluster-
ing presented in [PITM14] using unsupervised learning for exponent recovery of a
512-bit RSA are pretty impressive, though it is quite challenging to find the points
of interest that give high success rates for the attack.
Feature extraction, classification and clustering ML algorithms can be used to
extract useful information from the patterns of the electromagnetic (EM) or power
traces that are related to the secret key. Our proposed attack uses classification al-
gorithms as an alternative distinguisher for the template matching phase of TA, in
order to provide accurate models for distinguishing between template traces and
eventually recover the key.
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There are many interesting publications about the three aspects of our contribu-
tion, namely template attacks, scalar multiplication attacks and classification meth-
ods in SCA. The related work that we present here can be regarded as an intersection
of any two of the previous aspects.
Lerman et al. in [LMV+13] presented a semi-supervised template attack based
on the “Partitioning Around Medoids” clustering technique [TK06]. The authors
show that by knowing the Hamming weight of one key byte, they are able to predict
the correct key using 10 traces (each representing the average of 128 acquisitions)
with 61.5% success rate. In contrast, our attack needs 20 template traces to achieve
100% success rate using three different classification methods and no knowledge of
the Hamming weight is required.
Karsmakers et al. proposed data reduction techniques for the profiling phase
in [KGP+09]. They showed that using principal component analysis in combination
with linear discriminant analysis reduces the number of necessary time samples and
therefore the computational complexity and data storage required for TAs. Our at-
tack focuses on the template matching phase and uses the properties of classification
algorithms as a distinguisher, which sorts each template in the appropriate class.
The work of this section can be considered a generalization of the attack of
Hanley et al. presented in [HTM11]. In their work, the Bayes method is used in the
operation level for classifying templates and distinguishing squarings from multi-
plications during an RSA exponentiation. We use classification for template match-
ing of the whole scalar multiplication routine and therefore recover the scalar bits
one-by-one. We also tested the validity of our attack with two more classification
methods, getting the maximum success rate for all.
Heyszl et al. showed in [HIM+13] how to use unsupervised cluster algorithms
to attack and recover cryptographic exponentiations. They use the k-means algo-
rithm to combine leakage information from multiple simultaneous measurements.
Although the unsupervised property of this attack is really interesting, their attack
model is quite restricted. It requires simultaneous measurements with many probes
and many leakage points of the device, which in real devices is very rare. Even when
it happens, it would have high signal-to-noise ratio. Our attack model is generic and
requires no previous knowledge of the leakage model, similar to OTA [BCP+14].
In [DPN+16] we show how to achieve high success rate in OTA and correct
possible errors in recovering the scalar bits with 69.5% success rate using one av-
erage template trace. The success rate reaches 99.8% when 100 average template
traces are used. The template matching that is used for both works is based on the
Pearson correlation coefficient. As a follow-up of this work, we use in this section
more efficient techniques from the field of ML as distinguishers, in order to achieve
a success rate of 100% with only 20 template traces per key bit. We achieve higher
success rates compared to related classification techniques in SCA, mainly because
we manage to use very efficient distinguishers. We demonstrate the practical appli-
cation of our attack on the scalar multiplication algorithm for the Brainpool curve
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BP256r1 implemented in mbedTLS, as described in Section 4.5.0.1.
4.6.2 Methodology for OTA with Classification Methods
In this Section we present our attack methodology, which is very similar to OTA
methodology described previously. The same attack model is assumed as in Sec-
tion 4.2.1. The only difference lies in the template matching phase, where we use
classification algorithms as distinguishers for templates instead of Pearson correla-
tion. We first describe the classification algorithms we used, then the experimental
setup and finally we present our results.
4.6.2.1 Classification Algorithms used for OTA
The classification algorithms that can be used in the SCA setting for ECC imple-
mentations, are described in detail in Section 3.5.3. For the template matching phase
of OTA, we used the following three classification methods:
• The Naïve Bayes Classification is a function that combines the naive Bayes
probability model with a decision rule, for instance the hypothesis that is most
probable. For each class ci, we pick as classifier the class index that gives the
maximum value for an event.
• The k-Nearest Neighbour Classification (kNN) is a classification method
based on the closest instances of the training set to the unlabeled data.
• The Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a supervised learning model that pro-
duces a discriminative classifier formally defined by a separating hyperplane.
For our analysis, a linear SVM classifier is used.
We first run the algorithm in the target device with input point P . Then, we
need to find a distinguished pattern in the target trace, which we use to "build" our
templates. We do that on-the-fly after the target trace is obtained. For our setup, the
repetitive multiplication patterns are the same as in Section 4.5.3.3. These patterns
appear for every operation for each one of the 32 bits of the scalar.
4.6.2.2 Experimental Setup
We used the traces taken from the target device used in [DPN+16], as described in
Section 4.5.3.1. The target and template traces are obtained from the same device,
i.e. the STM32F4 platform with an ARM Cortex-M4 processor running at 168 MHz.
The target implementation in mbedTLS accepts as input a pointP on an elliptic
curve in affine coordinates and the scalar k = (k0, k1, ..., kl−1). The auxiliary point
Q is used to store the result of every round and its value is returned at the end of the
algorithm. There is another point Q1, which is used to store the dummy addition.
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For every bit of the scalar the doubling of point Q is calculated and then addition
with P is performed. According to the scalar bit, the result of the addition is stored
either inQ or inQ1, but the value ofQ is always used for the next round. In that way,
the algorithm is regular and runs in constant time. The change of coordinates from
affine to Jacobian and then back to affine is done for efficiency reasons (addition
with mixed coordinates is faster than addition with affine coordinates).
Algorithm 11: Double-Add-Always mixed coordinates
Input: P = (x, y) and scalar k = (k0, k1, ..., kl−1)
Output: Q = [k]P
1: if P ∈ E and k ∈ Z then
2: Q ← 0,Q1 ← 0, l← len(k)
3: for i from l − 1 down to 0 do
4: Q ← DBL(Q)
5: if k = 1 then
6: Q← ADDmixed_add(Q,P )
7: else
8: Q1 ← ADDmixed_add(Q,P )
9: end if
10: end for
11: Q : (x, y)← (X/Z2, Y/Z3)
12: return Q
13: else
14: error
15: end if
For the template matching phase we used a computer running 64-bit Windows
7 with an Intel processor i5-4590 CPU at 3.3 GHz. The software implementations
are written in Matlab (version R2014a) environment. The classification methods are
implemented using the Matlab functions fitcsvm for SVMs, fitcknn for k-
Nearest Neighbour and fitNaiveBayes for Naive Bayes Classification. Those
functions use as training data the template traces and the multiplication pattern and
return the correct classification of that pattern. For all the methods, we used the
1000 samples long pattern from the target trace (sample = target_trace(1 :
1000)) as the sample that we want to classify. For the SVM classifier, we used
the default Gaussian kernel provided in the software with two-class learning. The
fitNaiveBayes(X,Y) function returns a Naive Bayes classifier model trained
by predictors X and class labels Y .
For our experiments, the template traces for each input point are the predictors
and the actual point that they represent works as the class label. In later versions
of Matlab (starting from R2015b) this function is replaced by the fitcnb method,
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which works in a similar way but offers additional options, such as specifying a dis-
tribution to model the data or prior probabilities assigned to classes. We trained a 4-
nearest neighbor classifier with the following properties fitcknn(templates,
class_number, ’NumNeighbors’, 4) and the default Euclidean distance
is chosen as metric.
4.6.3 Classification Scores for each Method
From the specifications of the BP256r1 curve [BSI10], we know that the first itera-
tion of the algorithm consists of 18 multiplications and the remaining iterations need
21 multiplications. Therefore, we cross-correlate the multiplication pattern with the
target trace and look for the 19th multiplication, where the manipulation of the point
2P starts.
Figure (4.34) Cross-correlation of multiplication pattern with the target trace
Since we are able to run the algorithm with input points of our choice for acquir-
ing template traces, we choose the multiples 2P and 3P of our initial input point
P . If the attacker obtains the template traces in a similar device as the target, then
the noise levels of the signal will be different; obtaining 10 templates for each input
point and taking the average trace cancels out those differences. When the template
traces for 2P and 3P are obtained, we cross-correlate the multiplication pattern
with the template traces and we focus in the beginning of those graphs. As it can be
observed in Figures 4.34, 4.35, 4.36 the result on cross-correlation looks almost the
same for both templates. However, the classification algorithms that we used, gave
as output the correct template (corresponding to the correct bit of the scalar) every
time we ran the experiments. We obtained 10, 20, 40, 80 and 160 template traces
for each point. For each classification algorithm the template traces were used as
training data, having a class "2" for data corresponding to the template traces of
2P and a class "3" for the templates traces of 3P . Then we used the template of
the multiplication obtained from the target trace as input to the classification algo-
rithms. According to the result of the classification, we could decide on the second
most significant bit. In our case, we used the scalar k = 10100101 and we got the
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Figure (4.35) Cross-correlation of multiplication pattern with template trace 2P
Figure (4.36) Cross-correlation of multiplication pattern with template trace 3P
correct result, namely classification of the multiplication pattern in class "2", for all
the algorithms used.
The procedure described in this section can be followed iteratively to recover all
the bits of the scalar.
The proposed attack has 100% success rate for each classification method used.
We can obtain this result with one template trace for 2P and one for 3P , but in
order to create training data sets and achieve high classification scores, we used
more templates. It is shown in Section 4.4 that Naïve Bayes and kNN methods give
always the correct classification with score [1,0]. The entries of this table are in the
form “a [b, c]”, where the classification output is indicated as "a" (class that the
chosen interval of the target trace belongs to) and [b, c] is the posterior probability
for the given classification method (1: all the training data belong in the first class,
0: none of the training data were classified as elements of the second class).
However, for the SVM method, we notice that with fewer templates, the training
data are closer to the hyperplane. The notation [a,-a] for the SVM method indicates
the distance of the data set from the hyperplane. Therefore, in cases where the signal
is more noisy, it is recommended to use more than 20 template traces for the SVM
training data, in order to have more accurate results.
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Table (4.4) Different success rates according to the number of average template
traces on BP curve.
]Templates Naïve Bayes kNN (k = 4) SVM
160 2[1,0] 2[1,0] 2[1.084593, -1.084593]
80 2[1,0] 2[1,0] 2[1.040720, -1.040720]
40 2[1,0] 2[1,0] 2[0.675875, -0.675875]
20 2[1,0] 2[1,0] 2[0.554645, -0.554645]
These success rates can be achieved only under the conditions described in Sec-
tion 4.2.2. Implementing randomization of the input point to the algorithm, changes
the interesting pattern of the multiplication and therefore, it cannot be classified
correctly to one of each class.
4.7 Conclusions
At this point, it is clear that OTA and the adaptive template attack techniques of Sec-
tions 4.5, 4.6 are very efficient methods to attack scalar multiplication during the ex-
ecution of ECC protocols. These methods can be easily adapted to other scalar mul-
tiplication algorithms as described in [Joy03, Riv11]. For binary algorithms, such
as Montgomery Ladder [JY02], we can create templates for the doubling operation
and find the correct key bit. For non-binary algorithms using windows, we can ob-
tain templates for all hypotheses and perform the same attack with more template
traces.
Error detection and correction of a wrong key bit guess is possible for the adap-
tive template attack, and it increases the success rate of the attack from 7.6% to
99.8% for a 256-bit scalar. We achieve these results by averaging 100 template
traces and using two template traces to recover each key bit, instead of using one
template trace as initially proposed.
Since the most commonly used scalar multiplication algorithms are vulnerable
to OTA, it is interesting to see which countermeasures can be applied against it. We
hereby give a list of the classical countermeasures against side-channel attacks and
their efficiency against OTA:
• Randomization of the scalar.
Randomizing the scalar results in getting traces with [k′]P instead of [k]P ,
with k′ defined below. The important property that thwarts scalar randomiza-
tion, is the fact that we need only one target trace, which is taken using the
same randomized k′ that is manipulated throughout the attack. For the tem-
plate traces, we always need the first part of the trace, which corresponds to
the beginning of the scalar multiplication algorithm running with input point
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a multiple m of P. This part of the trace is not affected by the scalar random-
ization. The different ways of scalar randomization are:
1. [k]P = [k − r]P + [r]P , two scalar multiplications are computedQ =
[k − r]P andR = [r]P ;
2. [k]P = [k × r−1]([r]P ), two scalar multiplications are computed Q =
[r]P andR = [k × r−1]Q;
3. [k]P = [k mod r]P + [bkr c]([r]P ), three scalar multiplications are
computedQ = [k mod r]P ,R = [r]P and S = [bkr c]R.
4. [k]P = [k′]P − [rq]P , where q is the order of the curve and k′ = k+rq
is the randomized scalar. Thus, [rq]P = O the neutral element on E .
For all these randomization techniques, OTA can be applied; the target trace
requires one acquisition on the second or third scalar multiplication. This ac-
quisition is possible using an oscilloscope with big memory. For the template
traces, we make assumptions for each part of the scalar multiplication. We
retrieve a random scalar part for each scalar multiplication part. In order to
retrieve the scalar, we compute the addition (randomization 1.), the multi-
plication (randomization 2.) or both addition and multiplication of the scalar
(randomization 3.). For the fourth case, we can recover the randomized scalar
k′. Therefore, scalar randomization is not efficient against our type of attack.
• Randomization of the point.
The Jacobian representation of the point can be easily randomized similar to
projective coordinates. For Jacobian coordinates, the randomization consists
of selecting a random r in the finite field Fp, and computing: (X,Y, Z) 7→
(r2 × X, r3 × Y, r × Z). In most cases, the input point is in affine coor-
dinates, so the randomization of the point is reduced to compute: (x, y) 7→
(r2 × x, r3 × y, r). The supplementary cost of this countermeasure is 5 finite
field multiplications. For comparison, the cost of one scalar multiplication
using 256-bit scalar with a regular algorithm such as double-and-add-always
is 5100 multiplications. Applying randomization of the input point does not
allow to predict intermediate values of the calculation and prevents the con-
struction of the template traces in a deterministic way. This countermeasure
is implemented in mbedTLS, and it should be used when the device under
attack has a random generator.
• Random isomorphic elliptic curve
The idea to protect scalar multiplication by transforming a curve through vari-
ous random morphisms was initially proposed by Joye and Tymen in [JT01b].
Assume that φ is a random isomorphism from EK → E ′K , which maps
P ∈ EK → P ′ ∈ E ′K . Multiplying P ′ with k will give Q′ = [k]P ′ ∈ E ′K .
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With the inverse map φ−1 we can get back toQ = [k]P . Our attack requires
knowledge of the internal representation of the point, so ifP ′ is on a different
curve that the adversary does not know, he cannot create input points in this
representation.
Horizontal leakage due to conditional statements was not expected to be seen
in recent cryptographic implementations, but unfortunately they are still used. An
implementation without conditional statements would not prevent the adaptive tem-
plate attack, but it would reduce its success rate to that of the original OTA.
Randomizing the input point, by randomizing its coordinates, for every execu-
tion of the attacked algorithm is the most efficient countermeasure against OTA,
though incurring with some cost for the performance of the implementation. Point
randomization is efficient against our attack, since we need to know the input point
and its intermediate values, in order to produce template traces. Actually, the adver-
sary needs to be able to choose input points for templates. The countermeasure of
point blinding must be activated, in order to use mbedTLS in ARM embedded de-
vices. Adoption of this countermeasure is not straight-forward, because it requires
the use of a random generator in the device under attack.
This chapter presented also a new approach to template matching by using clas-
sification algorithms as distinguishers. We showed the applicability of classification
algorithms in an OTA scenario, where we successfully recovered bits of the scalar.
The classification methods naïve Bayes, kNN and SVM can give 100% success
rate in classifying correctly template traces, when the templates are chosen and built
correctly. The fact that our attack scenario assumes binary classification, makes the
results really accurate and can explain the absolute success rate.
Chapter 5
Boolean Exponent Splitting
Το όλον είναι μεγαλύτερο αpiό το άθροισμα
των μερών του - The whole is more than the sum
of its parts.
Aristotle
A typical countermeasure against side-channel attacks consists of masking the
intermediate values with a random number. In symmetric cryptographic algorithms
Boolean shares of the secret are typically used, whether in asymmetric algorithms
the secret exponent/scalar is masked using group arithmetic properties. This chapter
presents a new exponent splitting technique with minimal impact on performance
based on Boolean shares. More precisely, it is shown how an exponent can be effi-
ciently split into two shares, where the exponent is the XOR sum of the two shares,
typically requiring only an extra register and a few register copies per bit. Our novel
exponentiation and scalar multiplication algorithms can be randomized for every ex-
ecution and combined with other blinding techniques, maintaining at the same time
the regularity feature. In this way, both the exponent and the intermediate values
can be protected against various types of side-channel attacks. We perform a secu-
rity evaluation of our algorithms using simulations based on the Mutual Information
framework and we verify formally that they are secure against first-order attacks.
The resistance of the proposed algorithms against side-channel attacks is practically
verified with test vector leakage assessment performed on a Xilinx’s Zynq zc702
evaluation board.1
1The coauthors of the corresponding paper created the diagrams of MI and performed the practical
TVLA experiments; both are included at the end of this chapter for the sake of completeness.
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5.1 Introduction
In public key cryptography one typically uses countermeasures based on redun-
dant representations to prevent side-channel leakage [WMPW98, Cor99] (referred
to as blinding). Exponentiation algorithms in cryptographic groups are common tar-
gets of side-channel attacks, and they tend to be prohibitively expensive to protect
using provable countermeasures like masking. To protect an exponent used in a
group exponentiation one would typically add a random multiple of the order of the
group to the exponent, providing a random bitwise representation of the exponent.
These countermeasures can provide a strong resistance to differential power analysis
(DPA), but are not convenient in some instances. As noted by Smart et al. [SOP08],
the random value used to blind an exponent needs to have a bit length larger than the
longest run of zeros or ones in the bitwise representation of the order of the group. If
we consider ECDSA [Nat09], for example, the bitwise representations of the orders
of the groups used typically contain long runs of ones making this countermeasure
undesirable. That is, to provide a randomized bitwise representation the random
value used would have a bit length comparable to the exponent it is protecting, lead-
ing to a prohibitive impact on performance. While some have proposed alternative
elliptic curves that avoid this problem [LMSS14], widely used curves will continue
to have long runs of zeros and ones in the bitwise representation of the order of the
group, since the modulus is typically chosen with this property to allow for the rapid
computation of a modular reduction. See, for example, the elliptic curves proposed
by Bernstein [Ber06], Hamburg [Ham15] and Bos et al. [BCLN16].
An attack applicable to exponents blinded by adding a random multiple of the
group order has been proposed by Walter [Wal01], where one seeks to determine
if the input to one operation in an exponentiation is the same as the input to an-
other operation. This is achieved by comparing traces of the instantaneous power
consumption during consecutive group operations. Many analyses of how this at-
tack could be applied to cryptographic algorithms have been described in the lit-
erature [OS02, AF08, KKYH10, WvWM11, CFG+12, BJ13, BJPW14]. Hanley et
al. [HKT15] have also shown that these attacks could be applied to a single trace.
Hence, protecting an exponent by adding a random multiple of the order of the
group may not be sufficient, since the randomized exponent is still equivalent to the
exponent. Furthermore, Hanley et al. further demonstrated that one can construct
an attack by determining if the output of one operation in an exponentiation is the
same as the input to another operation. These attack techniques can also be applied
to scalar multiplication algorithms for Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), for in-
stance when additive scalar blinding is used, as shown in [FRV14]. Furthermore,
online template attacks, as presented in Chapter 4, make it possible to attack im-
plementations of a blinded scalar by using one trace from the device under attack
and several template traces from a similar device running the same implementation.
It is, therefore, clear that the various ways of exponent (or scalar) blinding do not
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provide a single, efficient countermeasure against recent attacks.
5.1.1 Related Work
Exponent splitting is a known countermeasure that comes in various forms (additive,
multiplicative, Euclidean) [CJ01,CJ03]. It is generally avoided in practice, because
it typically doubles the execution time. Negre and Plantard [NP16] proposed a reg-
ular modular exponentiation using multiplicative half-size splitting. This method,
although performing 16% faster than related splitting algorithms, is still not very ef-
ficient since two exponentiations (of half-sized words) have to be performed. More-
over, it is only secure against SPA, but not against DPA, collision or template at-
tacks. The authors propose randomizing the exponent to protect against those types
of attacks, which should have additional performance overhead.
The countermeasures proposed in this chapter are based on a novel exponent
splitting technique with minimal performance overhead. Apart from randomizing
the exponent, the algorithms can be used to hide the exponent length and prevent
leakage from intermediate values. One could also consider our algorithms as an
enhancement of algorithmic countermeasures to address-bit side-channel attacks
(ADPA) [MDS99, IIT02], where one attempts to conduct a DPA on the addresses
of registers or memory locations rather than the intermediate states of an algorithm.
May et al. [MMS01] proposed a hardware countermeasure to address-bit side-
channel attacks where registers used to compute an exponentiation algorithm would
be randomly renamed. This idea was extended to software by Itoh et al. [IIT03] and
Izumi et al. [IISO10] who proposed exponentiation algorithms where accesses to
memory locations, or registers, is randomized from one execution to another.
Address-bit side-channel attacks, and the specific countermeasures, have re-
ceived relatively little attention in the literature since blinding methods typically
randomize the bitwise representation of an exponent, and therefore the accessed
addresses [Cor99, CJ01].
5.1.2 Our Contribution
In this chapter, we present a new countermeasure for exponent splitting. We de-
scribe a method of splitting an exponent into two Boolean shares, analogous to
the countermeasures that one would use for an implementation of a block cipher
and similar to the countermeasures used to prevent address-bit side-channel at-
tacks [MDS99, IIT02]. Having embedded devices as our targeted implementation
and an adversary able to get useful information from the length of the exponent or
the intermediate values, we provide a number of algorithms that resist a broad range
of side-channel attacks.
At the same time, the modifications that are required to a group exponentiation
algorithm have negligible effect on the time required to compute the actual group
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exponentiation, which is a significant advantage over previous examples of exponent
splitting [CJ01, CJ03].
In addition, our method can be efficiently combined with blinding techniques of
the message or the point on a curve, in order to prevent leakage of the intermediate
values. The blinded versions of our main algorithm come at the cost of only an inver-
sion and a multiplication (or subtraction and addition in the case of elliptic curves).
Therefore, this combined countermeasure has minimal cost in performance. We fur-
ther demonstrate that the proposed algorithms can be used to compute an ECDSA
signature where the nonce is generated in two shares that do not need to be com-
bined. This approach offers a convenient method for implementing a side-channel
resistant instance of ECDSA with limited significant impact on performance.
A further property that two of our algorithms have is that the exponent (or scalar)
length can be hidden. The way the operations are handled by registers combining
the Boolean splitting of the exponent can provide some algorithms with the useful
property of tolerating leading zero bits.
Finally, the method of Boolean exponent splitting, cornerstone of the proposed
algorithms, is evaluated in terms of security. An evaluation using the information-
theoretic framework of Standaert et al. [SMY09] and a Test Vector Leakage Assess-
ment (TVLA) by Goodwill et al. [GJJR11] are performed. We investigate the usual
leakage models based on data or location leakage and show that an adversary would
need either a second-order data attack or a third-order location attack to success-
fully break the security of our algorithms. In addition, we present for the first time a
hybrid model, where data leakage is combined with location leakage in a 3D graph,
offering new exploitation opportunities. The rich interactions between data and lo-
cation leakage corroborates the need for holistic countermeasures that encompass a
wide spectrum of side-channel attacks.
5.1.3 Organization of this Chapter
This chapter presents efficient algorithmic countermeasures that can be applied to
both exponentiation and scalar multiplication algorithms. More precisely, in Sec-
tion 5.2 the necessary preliminary notions are presented. In Section 5.2.1, we de-
scribe previously proposed exponent splitting methods, their efficiency and known
attacks against these countermeasures, and in 5.2.2 some prerequisites and termi-
nology for provably secure algorithms. Section 5.3 presents our proposed methods
of exponent splitting based on an XOR operation, applied on various regular algo-
rithms. A discussion on vulnerabilities in different versions of previously proposed
regular algorithms, is followed by our proposed modification, in order to achieve a
secure, highly regular and randomized exponentiation algorithm. In Section 5.3.4
we present our splitting method in the context of scalar multiplication for elliptic
curves. In Section 5.4, we demonstrate how this method can be used to generate
an ECDSA signature where only shares of the random nonce are manipulated. Sec-
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tion 5.5 presents the security evaluation of our algorithms based on formal methods
and the information theoretic framework. In Section 5.5.5 implementation consid-
erations are discussed and the results of TVLA of a practical implementation on a
Xilinx Zynq evaluation board are presented. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.6.
5.2 Preliminaries
5.2.1 Exponent Splitting Methods
The critical operation in public key cryptographic algorithms is exponentiation in
a given group G of order |G| = m, where the input message x ∈ G is raised to a
secret exponent κ and the result y = xκ is the public output of the algorithm. When
implementing a group exponentiation algorithm the exponent is typically blinded by
adding some random multiple of the group order to the exponent. Trivially, (rm) +
κ ≡ κ (mod m) for r, κ ∈ Z where r is random. Hence, computing xκ+rm is
equivalent to computing xκ. While this randomizes the bitwise representation of an
exponent, the entire exponent is still equivalent to the exponent in a given group.
For scalar multiplication over certain cryptographic elliptic curves, typically those
over a prime field Fp where p is a (generalized) Mersenne number, adding a random
multiple of the group order does not hide all the bits of scalar k [CJ03]. Examples of
attacks that have been proposed include analyzing a single trace (from SPA [KJJ99]
to collisions in manipulated values [KKYH10,WvWM11,HKT15]) or attempting to
find collisions in the random values used to then derive a (blinded) exponent [SI11].
One method that can hinder these attacks, is to split an exponent into two val-
ues whose bitwise representations are random. Then one would compute a group
exponentiation where the combined effect of the two values is equivalent to that of
the desired exponent. There are several methods of exponent splitting proposed by
Clavier and Joye [CJ01]:
• Additive Splitting. For a random integer r with bit-length larger than or equal
to the exponent k, we can define k = r + (k − r). The output of the modular
exponentiation y = xk in G can be computed by calculating y = xr · xk−r in
G.
• Multiplicative Splitting. For some group G we can define k′ = k r−1 mod
|G| for some integer r, which is relatively prime to the group order. Then the
exponentiation y = xk in G can be computed by using y = (xr)k
′
mod |G|.
The same techniques can be applied to scalar multiplication algorithms for elliptic
curves (ECs), in order to hide the secret scalar. The problem with these methods of
exponent splitting is that they will typically double the time required to compute
a group exponentiation, because r is required to have a similar bit-length to the
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exponent. A practical attack by Feix et al. [FRV14] demonstrates that a blinded
scalar can be determined if r is too small.
A further method described by Ciet and Joye [CJ03] is:
• Euclidean Splitting. By writing the exponent as k = bk/rcr+ k mod r and
letting s = xr for some r, then y = xk can be computed by y = sk′ ×
xk mod r = (xr)k
′ × xk mod r, where k′ = bk/rc.
The impact on the time required to compute an exponentiation is lower than the
other splitting methods listed above. In [CJ03] it is concluded that this variant ap-
plied to Shamir’s double ladder has the same cost as the ‘double-and-add-always’
algorithm (equivalent to the ‘square-and-multiply-always’ for exponentiation). Pre-
computation of powers of s can reduce the exponentiation cost compared to addi-
tive or multiplicative splitting. However, this method has the same constraints as
adding a multiple of the group order. That is, r needs to have a bit length larger
than the longest run zeros in k; otherwise, a big part of the exponent will appear
in clear [CJ03]. This fact will have a significant impact on performance in many
cases [SOP08].
5.2.2 Provable Security
This Section provides a simplified explanation of some basic definitions regarding
non-interference (NI) that are useful for the rest of this chapter. The interested reader
can refer to the paper of Ishai, Sahai and Wagner [ISW03] for the initial definitions
of private circuits and probing attacks and to the paper of Barthe et al. [BBD+16]
for the explanation of strong non-interference in higher order masking.
The baseline notion of security for masked algorithms is t-probing security. In
the current state-of-the-art, masking schemes usually come with a security proof
in the so-called probing model [ISW03], which offers a realistic framework in the
theoretical evaluation of implementations that offer security against side-channel
attacks. In this model, an adversary can perform a probing attack by placing a metal
needle on a wire of interest and reading off the value carried along that wire during
the target’s computation.
A basic notion in probing models is the private circuit, which is a Boolean
circuit as defined in [ISW03], whose vertices are (Boolean) gates and whose edges
are wires. A randomized circuit is a circuit augmented with random gates, namely
gates that produce a random output, uniformly and independently of everything else
and fresh for each invocation of the circuit. Gadgets are used to implement the
functionality of private circuits, i.e. using a probabilistic function f : Fnq → Fm
′
q on
a n-bit input, they produce a uniformly random m-bit output. According to [CS18],
the notion of t-NI security of gadgets is defined as follows:
Definition 5.2.1. A gadget is t-non-interfering (t-NI) if and only if every set of at
most t internal probes can be simulated with at most t shares of each input.
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For instance, a gadget is 2-NI or 2-probing secure, if the joint distribution of any
set of at most 2 of its positions, corresponding to adversary probes, depends on at
most 2 shares of the gadget’s inputs. This guarantees that, if the input is uniform, no
information about it leaks through any 2 probes in the circuit. Extending this defini-
tion to the algorithm level, an algorithmA is t−probing secure, if the observation of
up to t intermediate computations in the implementation during the execution of A
does not reveal anything about the secret variables (held by its inputs) [BBD+16].
In the following sections, we define some alternative algorithms for splitting ex-
ponents and scalars using an XOR operation. As this is a sort of masking, we also
provide proofs using the t-NI notion introduced here and we show that implemen-
tations of these algorithms are secure against first-order side-channel analysis.
5.3 Boolean Exponent Splitting Methods
In this section, we propose methods of exponent splitting based on XOR operation,
and how an XOR-split exponent can be applied to the Montgomery ladder.
5.3.1 Montgomery Power Ladder
The algorithm for the Montgomery Power Ladder (MPL) is described in Chapter 2.
We recall the description of the MPL given by Joye and Yen [JY02]: We consider the
problem of computing y = xκ in the multiplicative group G for inputs x and κ. Let∑n−1
i=0 ki 2i be the binary expansion of κwith bit length n (for ease of expression we
shall also denote this as (kn−1, . . . , k0)2 where convenient). Then, defining Lj =∑n−1
i=j ki 2i−j and Hj = Lj + 1, we have
Lj = 2Lj+1 + kj = Lj+1 +Hj+1 + kj − 1 = 2Hj+1 + kj − 2 (5.1)
and so we obtain
(Lj , Hj) =
{
(2Lj+1, Lj+1 +Hj+1) if kj = 0 ,
(Lj+1 +Hj+1, 2Hj+1) if kj = 1 .
(5.2)
If we consider one register containing xLj and another containing xHj then (5.2)
implies that
(xLj , xHj ) =

((
xLj+1
)2
, xLj+1 · xHj+1
)
if kj = 0 ,(
xLj+1 · xHj+1 ,
(
xHj+1
)2)
if kj = 1 .
(5.3)
Given that L0 = k one can build an exponentiation algorithm that requires two
group operations per bit of the exponent. Joye and Yen give several different ver-
sions, one of which is shown in Algorithm 12; these algorithms are all highly regu-
lar, meaning that a deterministic sequence of operations is executed for an exponent
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of a given bit length. Here 1G represents the neutral element of the multiplicative
group G.
Algorithm 12: Montgomery Ladder
Input: x ∈ G, an n-bit integer κ = ∑n−1i=0 ki 2i
Output: xκ
1 R0 ← 1G ; R1 ← x ;
2 for i = n− 1 down to 0 do
3 R¬ki ← Rki ·R¬ki ;
4 Rki ← (Rki)2 ;
5 end
6 return R0
In applying an XOR-split exponent to MPL we use one share to dictate the ad-
dress accessed and the other to act as the exponent. That is, we consider (5.2), where
the previous round may provide either (Lj , Hj) or (Hj , Lj) and the computation is
changed accordingly.
Let S0,j = Lj and S1,j = Hj and
∑n−1
i=0 ai 2i be the binary expansion of A
with bit length n (i.e. the same bit length as the exponent). Then we can use the
values of ai to dictate whether a pair of registers holds (Lj , Hj) or (Hj , Lj). Specif-
ically, (5.2) can be rewritten as
(Saj ,j , S¬aj ,j) =
{
(2Saj ,j+1, Saj ,j+1 + S¬aj ,j+1) if kj = 0 ,
(Saj ,j+1 + S¬aj ,j+1, 2S¬aj ,j+1) if kj = 1 .
(5.4)
In (5.4), the values of Lj andHj are assigned to S in an order dictated by the binary
expansion of A. Generating A as a random sequence of bits could provide some
side-channel resistance, but does not protect the exponent.
We further consider
∑n−1
i=0 ai 2i and
∑n−1
i=0 bi 2i be the binary expansion of A
and B, respectively, where κ = A ⊕ B of bit length n. We note that, as above,∑n−1
i=0 ki 2i is the binary expansion of κ and ki = ai ⊕ bi for 0 ≤ i < n. Then (5.4)
can be rewritten as
(Saj ,j , S¬aj ,j) =
{
(2Sbj ,j+1, Sbj ,j+1 + S¬bj ,j+1) if kj = 0 ,
(Sbj ,j+1 + S¬bj ,j+1, 2S¬bj ,j+1) if kj = 1 .
(5.5)
Rather than using the same value to control which order Lj andHj are assigned and
read, we use the bits of A to determine the order in which Lj and Hj are assigned,
and the bits of B to determine the order they are read. The combined effect is that
the order the Lj and Hj are assigned and read is dictated by the bits of κ.
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We note that (5.5) implies
(xSaj,j , xS¬aj,j ) =

((
x
Sbj ,j+1
)2
, x
Sbj ,j+1 · xS¬bj ,j+1
)
if kj = 0 ,(
x
Sbj ,j+1 · xS¬bj ,j+1 ,
(
x
S¬bj ,j+1
)2)
if kj = 1 .
Next we present Algorithm 13, which operates in much the same way as the MPL, as
it produces a regular sequence of multiplications and squaring operations. However,
one more register is required to allow the assignment in line 5 to affect R0 or R1.
This algorithm presents the core idea of our Boolean-split exponent method. Extra
security features, such as hiding intermediate values, can be provided by combining
countermeasures, for instance applying blinding of the input point. Algorithm 13 is
largely equivalent to an algorithm proposed by Izumi et al. [IISO10] were we set the
multiplication in line 4 to operate in a random order as it provides a better resistance
to collision attacks, as demonstrated by Kim et al. [KKYH10]. We discuss this
further in Section 5.3.4.
Remark 1. Algorithm 13 and the version proposed by Izumi et al. [IISO10] would
also potentially leak one bit of the exponent used if the Hamming distance model
is considered [MOP07]. That is, after the most-significant bit of the exponent is
treated R0 and R1 contain x and x2. When the next most-significant bit is set to one
they will be overwritten by x3 and x4, whereas if the next most-significant bit is set
to zero they will be overwritten by x2 and x3. In the latter case x2 may overwrite
x2 producing a Hamming distance of zero. Depending on the microprocessor, the
difference between zero and a random Hamming distance could be quite significant.
Hence, Algorithm 13, and likewise the algorithm proposed by Izumi et al. [IISO10],
should not be used where leaking the second-most significant bit could compromise
the security of an implementation.
Algorithm 13: Montgomery Ladder with XOR-Split Exponent I
Input: x ∈ G, n-bit integers A = ∑n−1i=0 ai 2i and B = ∑n−1i=0 bi 2i
Output: xκ where κ = A⊕B
1 R0 ← 1G ; R1 ← 1G ; R2 ← 1G ;
2 b′ R←− {0, 1} ; R¬b′ ← x ;
3 for i = n− 1 down to 0 do
4 R2 ← Rai ·R¬ai ;
5 Rai ←
(
R(bi⊕b′)⊕ai
)2
;
6 R¬ai ← R2 ;
7 b′ ← bi ;
8 end
9 return Rb′
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The intermediate states of the registers are not randomized in Algorithm 13 and
would require additional countermeasures to provide a secure implementation. For
example, inexpensive solutions such as randomizing projective points [WMPW98]
or Ebeid et al.’s blinding method for RSA [EL10] can be used (see Section 5.5.5).
In the following, we show that, under certain assumptions, an implementation of
Algorithm 13 is secure against first-order side-channel analysis. This means, that no
intermediate variable in the implementation processes information about the secret
key in clear, i.e. a random mask is applied in each intermediate state.
Lemma 1. If we assume that the values held in registers {R0, R1, R2} do not leak,
an implementation of Algorithm 13 is resistant to first-order side-channel analysis.
Proof. It suffices to consider each intermediate state and verify that at least one
random mask is applied. Verifying this for an entire group exponentiation would be
tedious, but can be simplified if we consider two rounds of Algorithm 13. That is,
if we consider round m, where 0 ≤ m ≤ n − 2, then the following operations are
performed:
1. R2 ← Ram ·R¬am
2. α← bm ⊕ b′
3. β ← α⊕ am
4. Ram ← Rβ2
5. R¬am ← R2
6. R2 ← Ram+1 ·R¬am+1
7. α← bm+1 ⊕ bm
8. β ← α⊕ am+1
9. Ram+1 ← Rβ2
10. R¬am+1 ← R2
Let proposition P(n) be that round n > 0 is resistant to first-order side-channel analysis for
the n-th treated bit of the exponent. If we consider the first round, we wish to show P(1)
is true and, in the above code fragment, b′ is set to a random value from {0, 1}. Then, it is
easy to see that:
• the results of the operations in lines 1, 4, 5, 6, 9 and 10 are dependent on the random
values {R0, R1, R2}.
• the results of the operations in lines 2, 3, 7 and 8 are uniformly distributed on {0, 1}.
If we assume that P(m) is true for m ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then we consider P(n+ 1) where b′ is
set to bn. As bn is one share of a previously treated exponent bit, it is indistinguishable from
a random value from {0, 1}. The above statements regarding the results of the operations
apply. Hence, by induction we have shown P(n) is true for all n > 0. To complete the
proof, we simply note that only half of the code fragment above will need to be considered
in the last round.
Remark 2. In [IIT03], the authors present the randomized addressing method (RA),
in order to provide protection against ADPA and eliminate the correlation between
the exponent bit and the register where an operation is stored. We do not aim to pro-
vide protection only against ADPA. Our goal is to perform operations on different
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exponent shares, in a way that an adversary would need a combination of leakages
(like Higher Order DPA combined with template attacks) in order to recover the
exponent. For instance, in Algorithm 13, knowledge of ai OR b′ OR the register
R[ai], would not give enough information to recover ki. The adversary would need
to know all those three values. Moreover, the way Algorithm 13 is structured, shows
that it can tolerate zeroes as most significant bits of the scalar and therefore, it can
hide the length of the scalar. The interested reader can run iterations of the algorithm
for an−1 = bn−1 = 0 or an−1 = bn−1 = 1, meaning that kn−1 = 0, and verify that
indeed the algorithm will perform all the operations and actually give the correct
result.
5.3.2 Using Inverses
In this section we propose an algorithm more suited to groups where inversions
can be readily computed. Le et al. [LTT15] propose a straightforward variant of the
Montgomery powering ladder that requires the computation of inverses. They note
that (5.2) can be rewritten as
(Lj , Hj) =
{
(Hj − 1, Lj+1 +Hj+1) if kj = 0 ,
(Lj+1 +Hj+1, Lj + 1) if kj = 1 .
(5.6)
This leads to the definition of Algorithm 14. If we let T0,j = Lj and T1,j = Hj , or
T0,j = Hj and T1,j = Lj and store the ordering in another variable we can rewrite
(5.6) as
(T0,j , T1,j) =
{
(Lj , Hj) if kj = 0
(Hj , Lj) if kj = 1
=
{
(Lj+1 +Hj+1, Lj − 1) if kj = 0 ,
(Lj+1 +Hj+1, Lj + 1) if kj = 1 .
(5.7)
This leads to Algorithm 15.
Algorithm 14: Variant with In-
verses I
Input: x ∈ G, an n-bit integer
κ = ∑n−1i=0 ki 2i
Output: xκ
1 R0 ← 1G ; R1 ← x ;
2 U0 ← x−1 ; U1 ← x ;
3 for i = n− 1 down to 0 do
4 R¬ki ← Rki ·R¬ki ;
5 Rki ← R¬ki · Uki ;
6 end
7 return R0
Algorithm 15: Variant with In-
verses II
Input: x ∈ G, an n-bit integer
κ = ∑n−1i=0 ki 2i
Output: xκ
1 R0 ← 1G ; R1 ← x ;
2 U0 ← x−1 ; U1 ← x ;
3 for i = n− 1 down to 0 do
4 R0 ← R0 ·R1 ;
5 R1 ← R0 · Uki ;
6 end
7 return R¬k0
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Following the previous notation, we notice that T0,j should contain the sum of
the registers in the previous round.2 Therefore, (5.7) can be rewritten as follows:
(T0,j , T1,j) =
{
(Tb′,j+1 + T¬b′,j+1, T0,j − 1) if kj = b′ = 0 ,
(Tb′,j+1 + T¬b′,j+1, T0,j + 1) if kj = b′ = 1 .
(5.8)
We note that to treat kj+1, b′ = kj . However, if we let kj = aj ⊕ bj , for aj , bj ∈
{0, 1} and h = aj ⊕ bj ⊕ bj−1, we can modify (5.8) as follows:
(T0,j , T1,j) =
{
(T¬h,j+1 + Th,j+1, T0,j − 1) if aj = bj ,
(T¬h,j+1 + Th,j+1, T0,j + 1) if aj = ¬bj .
(5.9)
By using the above equations as exponents of x, we can define Algorithm 16.
Algorithm 16: Montgomery Ladder with XOR-Split Exponent II
Input: x ∈ G, n-bit integers A = ∑n−1i=0 ai 2i and B = ∑n−1i=0 bi 2i, r ∈R Z
Output: xκ where κ = A⊕B
1 R0 ← 1G ; R1 ← 1G ; U0 ← x ; U1 ← x−1 ;
2 b′ R←− {0, 1} ; R¬b′ ← x ;
3 for i = n− 1 down to 0 do
4 R0 ← Rbi⊕b′ ·R(bi⊕b′)⊕ai ;
5 R1 ← R0 · Ubi ;
6 b′ ← bi ;
7 end
8 return Rb′
Algorithm 16 follows the same sequence of instructions as the MPL. Its cor-
rectness can be verified by the fact that at every round the difference R0/R1 = x
or R1/R0 = x, as for the usual ladder step. The advantage of Algorithm 16 com-
pared to Algorithm 13, and consequently previously proposed algorithms by Izumi
et al. [IISO10], is the elimination of the auxiliary register R2. Instead, the auxiliary
registers U0, U1 manipulate the known fixed value x or x−1 for computational pur-
poses, and they do not require additional computational power or updates when the
algorithm is executed.
Lemma 2. If we assume that the values held in registers {R0, R1, R2} do not leak,
an implementation of Algorithm 16 is resistant to first-order side-channel analysis.
Proof. It suffices to consider each intermediate state and verify that at least one
random mask is applied. Verifying this for an entire group exponentiation would be
2The algorithms are left-to-right, so j + 1 indicates the round preceding j.
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tedious, but can be simplified if we consider two rounds of Algorithm 16. That is,
if we consider round m, where 0 ≤ m ≤ n − 2, then the following operations are
performed:
1. α← bm ⊕ b′
2. β ← α⊕ am
3. R0 ← Rα ·Rβ
4. R1 ← R0 · Ubm
5. α← bm+1 ⊕ bm
6. β ← α⊕ am+1
7. R0 ← Rα ·Rβ
8. R1 ← R0 · Ubm+1
Let the proposition P(n) be that round n > 0 is resistant to first-order side-channel analysis
for the n-th treated bit of the exponent. If consider the first round, we wish to show P(1)
is true and, in the above code fragment, b′ is set to a random value from {0, 1}. Then, it is
easy to see that:
• the results of the operations in lines 3, 4, 7 and 8 are dependent on the random values
{R0, R1, R2}.
• the results of the operations in lines 1, 2, 5 and 6 are uniformly distributed on {0, 1}.
If we assume that allP(m) is true form ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then we considerP(n+1) where b′ is
set to bn. As bn is one share of a previously treated exponent bit, it is indistinguishable from
a random value from {0, 1}. The above statements regarding the results of the operations
apply. Hence, by induction we have shown P(n) is true for all n > 0. To complete the
proof, we simply note that only half of the code fragment above will need to be considered
in the last round.
Remark 3. All algorithms are presented with focus on the XOR-split exponent
technique. In the actual implementation, we need to make sure that the order of
computing the XOR-values by the compiler, will not cause another side-channel
leakage. For instance, at Step 6 of Algorithm 13, the register R(bi⊕b′)⊕ai is ma-
nipulated. A compiler could compute bi ⊕ ai first, as it is only obliged to provide
something functionally equivalent. Therefore, precomputing tempi = b′ ⊕ bi and
then performing the multiplication of registersRtempi ·Rtempi⊕ai would prevent the
implementation from leaking the value bi ⊕ ai in some way. This remark holds for
all the algorithms presented in this chapter.
5.3.3 Joye’s Add-Always Algorithm
Joye has proposed highly regular exponentiation algorithms [Joy07], where an ex-
ponentiation algorithm executes in a deterministic sequence of operations for an
exponent of a given bit length. In this section we shall consider Joye’s Add-Always
algorithm as shown in Algorithm 17. Summarizing the reasoning given by Joye: Let
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∑t−1
j=0 kj 2j with kj ∈ {0, 1} be the binary expansion of κ. Then
xκ =
t−1∏
j=0
x(kj 2
j) =
t−1∏
j=0
βj
kj where β = x2j .
For ` ≥ 0, we define U` =
∏`
j=0 βj
kj and T` = β`+1U` . Then
U` =
∏`
j=0
βi
ki = β`k`U`−1 = U`−1(1+k`)T`−1k` and
T` =
β`+1
U`
= β`
2
β`
k`U`−1
= T`−12−k`U`−11−k` .
This results in Algorithm 17:
U` =
{
U`−1 if k` = 0 ,
U`−12T`−1 if k` = 1 .
and T` =
{
U`−1T`−12 if k` = 0 ,
T`−1 if k` = 1 .
(5.10)
Algorithm 17: Joye’s Add-Always Algorithm
Input: x ∈ G, an n-bit integer κ = ∑n−1i=0 ki 2i
Output: xκ
1 R0 ← 1G ; R1 ← x ;
2 for i = 0 to n− 1 do
3 R¬ki ← R¬ki2 ;
4 R¬ki ← R¬ki ·Rki ;
5 end
6 return R0
Algorithm 18 can be defined with the input and intermediate states blinded by a
random element α ∈R G. For any α ∈R G, Equation (5.10) can be written as:
αU` =
{
αU`−1
(αU`−1)2 α−1T`−1
α−1T` =
{
αU`−1
(
α−1T`−1
)2 if k` = 0 ,
α−1T`−1 if k` = 1 .
(5.11)
The same sequence of instructions as for the Montgomery powering ladder are fol-
lowed, where the two registers are blinded by α. The advantage of Algorithm 18
compared to the previously proposed algorithms is that the intermediate states can
be blinded with a random value at the cost of an inversion.
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Algorithm 18: Blinded Add-Always Algorithm with XOR-Split Exponent
Input: x ∈ G, n-bit integers A = ∑n−1i=0 ai 2i and B = ∑n−1i=0 bi 2i
Output: xκ where κ = A⊕B
1 α
R←− {G} ; R0 ← α ; R1 ← α−1 ; R2 ← 1G ;
2 b′ R←− {0, 1} ; r′ ← b′ ; R¬b′ ← R¬b′ · x ;
3 for i = 0 to n− 1 do
4 h← (bi ⊕ b′)⊕ ai ;
5 R2 ← R¬h2 ·Rh ;
6 Rai ← Rh ;
7 R¬ai ← R2 ;
8 b′ ← bi
9 end
10 Rr′⊕b′ ← α−1Rr′⊕b′ ;
11 R¬(r′⊕b′) ← αR¬(r′⊕b′) ;
12 return Rb′
5.3.4 Boolean Scalar Splitting Algorithms
In the above, we define group exponentiations applicable to any multiplicatively
written groupG. However, specific groups may have particular characteristics, which
means the algorithms above are not suitable as described. In this section, we discuss
the algorithms in the context of a group formed from the points on an elliptic curve.
Following the definitions from Chapter 2, we consider an elliptic curve E defined
over a finite field Fq, for a large prime q. The set E(Fq) is defined as the set of
points E(Fq) = {(x, y) ∈ E |x, y ∈ Fq} ∪ {O} , where E(Fq) forms an Abelian
group under the chord-and-tangent rule and O is the identity element. The scalar
multiplication of a given point is a group exponentiation in E that uses elliptic curve
arithmetic, i.e. addition between points or scalar multiplication [κ]P for some in-
teger κ < |E|, and, as we have seen earlier in this thesis, it is an important part of
many cryptographic algorithms.
The algorithms presented above cannot be securely implemented as described
because of the neutral element. The neutral element 1G is represented in E as the
point at infinity O; it cannot be manipulated in a regular way. That is, one would
typically be obliged to test for a numerical representation of O and conduct a dif-
ferent operation if it is detected. In practice, one would implement the algorithm
such that the most significant bit (assumed to be set to one) is already treated by
the pre-processing. For example, Algorithm 13 can be implemented as shown in
Algorithm 19, and Algorithm 16 as shown in Algorithm 20.
The change is not so simple for Joye’s Add-Always algorithm, as any special
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Algorithm 19: MPL with XOR-Split Scalar on an EC
Input: E , Fq, P ∈ E , n-bit integers A = ∑n−1i=0 ai 2i and B = ∑n−1i=0 bi 2i
Output:Q = [κ]P where κ = A⊕B
1 R0 ← P ;R1 ← P ;R2 ← P ;
2 b′ R←− {0, 1} ;
3 R¬b′ ← 2P ;
4 for i = n− 2 down to 0 do
5 R2 ← Rai +R¬ai ;
6 Rai ← 2R(bi⊕b′)⊕ai ;
7 R¬ai ← R2 ;
8 b′ ← bi ;
9 end
10 returnRb′
Algorithm 20: MPL with XOR-split scalar II on an EC
Input: E , Fq, P ∈ E , n-bit integers A = ∑n−1i=0 ai 2i and B = ∑n−1i=0 bi 2i
Output:Q = [κ]P where κ = A⊕B
1 R0 ← P ;R1 ← P ;
2 U 0 ← P ; U 1 ← −P ;
3 b′ R←− {0, 1} ;
4 R¬b′ ← 2P ;
5 for i = n− 2 down to 0 do
6 R0 ← Rbi⊕b′ +R(bi⊕b′)⊕ai ;
7 R1 ← R0 +U bi ;
8 b′ ← bi ;
9 end
10 returnRb′
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treatment forO could reveal the number of least-significant bits (LSB) of the scalar
set to zero. Most applications check if the point entered to the scalar multiplication
is the point at infinity and perform a different operation if this is the case. It might
also be that the additions are performed with projective coordinates, where the point
at infinity will throw an exception. When the algorithm starts with the LSB, there is
the change that the scalar bit is 0 (which is not the case for the MSB, since it is com-
monly set to 1). In those cases, the algorithm will return the same valueP , as long as
a zero is encountered, revealing the number of least-significant zero scalar bits. To
prevent this Joye proposes changing line 1 in Algorithm 17 to R0 ← P ; R1 ← P
and inserting Rk0 ← Rk0 − P between line 4 and 5 [Joy07]. Alternatively, one
could use a random point, as shown in Algorithm 21, where initializing the points
R0 andR1 to random points removes the need to treat the neutral elementO differ-
ently. WhileM is defined as a random point, in practice this could be an arbitrarily
chosen point that is randomized when it is used. That is, a fixed affine point that is
used as randomized projective point [WMPW98].
Algorithm 21: Blinded Joye’s Add-Always Algorithm with XOR-Split Joye
on an EC
Input: P ∈ E , M a random point in E , , n-bit integers A = ∑n−1i=0 ai 2i and
B = ∑n−1i=0 bi 2i
Output:Q = κP where κ = A⊕B
1 R0 ←M ;R1 ← −M ;R2 ← P ;
2 b′ R←− {0, 1} ; r′ ← b′ ;R¬b′ ← R¬b′ +P ;
3 for i = 0 to n− 1 do
4 h← (bi ⊕ b′)⊕ ai ;
5 R2 ← 2R¬h +Rh ;
6 Rai ← Rh ;
7 R¬ai ← R2 ;
8 b′ ← bi
9 end
10 Rr′⊕b′ ← Rr′⊕b′ −M ;
11 R¬(r′⊕b′) ← R¬(r′⊕b′) +M ;
12 returnRb′
The correctness of all the algorithms of this section used for scalar multiplica-
tion elliptic curves has been verified by Sage and the scripts are included in Ap-
pendix A 7.3.
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5.4 Applying Exponent Splitting to ECDSA
In this section we describe how XOR exponent splitting can be transformed to a
multiplicative split of the secret scalar in order to increase the security of an imple-
mentation of ECDSA. We consider this scalar multiplication for use with ECDSA
separately as there are further security considerations in addition to those considered
in Section 5.3.
For ECDSA, given the base point P = (x, y) for an EC E over Fq, with private
key d and hash function h, the signer who wants to sign a messagem picks a random
κ < |E| = n (where n = |E| is the order of the curve) and computes
r
x←− [κ]P and s← κ−1 (h(m) + d r) mod |E| .
We denote the extraction of the x-coordinate of a point and its assignment to a
variable by x←−. The signature of m is the pair: {r, s}. We note that the security
of this signature scheme relies on the random value κ remaining unknown to an
attacker. Moreover, the nonce κ should be used only once and randomly generated
for every new signature, otherwise the private key d can be trivially derived [Nat09].
The verifier, after receiving the signature pair {r, s} needs to verify that this is
valid. First, he verifies that r, s belong to the interval [1, n − 1]. Then he computes
e = hash(m) and w = s−1 (mod n), u1 = ew and u2 = rw (mod n). Knowing
the public key Qs of the signer, he can calculate V = u1 ·G + u2 ·Qs. If V = O,
then the signature is rejected. Converting the x-coordinate of V to an integer x¯, the
verifier can compute if u = x¯ (mod n) = r. If the last equation holds, he can
accept the signature.
5.4.1 Securing the Scalar Multiplication
The scalar multiplication [κ]P during the computation of r is a critical operation in
ECDSA from a side-channel point of view, because an attacker only needs to derive
a small number of bits of κ to obtain the secret key d. For example, a lattice-based
analysis can reveal the private key from the knowledge of some bits of the scalar
κ [HGS01]. In practice, one could use the knowledge of one bit from around 30
signatures or eleven bits from one signature [NNTW05]. Similarly, one needs to
prevent an adversary from determining the bit length of the scalar used to prevent a
lattice attack.
When implementing a scalar multiplication, one could use any of the algorithms
described in the previous section, with extra care required to prevent the bit length
of the scalar from leaking. Algorithm 21 requires no further modification, as if the
most-significant bit is zero the algorithm still functions correctly. However, Algo-
rithms 19 and 20 require that the most-significant bit of the scalar is set to one and
need further modification to ensure that the bit length of the scalar is not revealed.
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In implementing Algorithms 19 or 20, one could add a multiple of the order
of the group to the scalar to hide its length [Cor99]. While this would seem to
make the algorithms redundant, one could choose a small multiple of the order
of the group without considering the longest run of ones or zeros in the bitwise
representation of the order. Indeed, one could multiply the order of the group by
a power of two such that increasing the bit length is impossible or fixed to a one
bit increase. That is, ensure that the carries produced by adding the multiple of the
order of the group do not extend the bit length or always extend the bit length.
Given the long runs of ones or zeros typically seen in the bitwise representation
of the order of many groups formed from the points of an EC, the increase in bit
length should be very small [Nat09, BCLN16, Ham15, Ber06]. For example, if we
consider P192 defined by NIST [NIS13], where the elliptic curve is defined over Fp,
with p = 2192 − 264 − 1, then the 128 most-significant bits of p are set to one. If
twice the order is added to a nonce then a carry from the most-significant bits will
be produced with an overwhelming probability, thus always producing a nonce of
194 bits. However, in some cases, one may wish to ensure that the carry has been
produced to prevent a theoretical reduction in the security of a system.
Alternatively, one could add some more logical functions to allow for the most
significant bit to be set to zero. In Algorithms 22 and 23 we show how this could be
done for Algorithms 19 and 20, respectively. In both cases we set the variable m to
the value three, while the most-significant bits of the scalar, A⊕B, are set to zero,
allowing the output of operations to be diverted into R2. In Algorithm 23, we do
this for both operations in the loop and keep the initial state ofR0 andR1 until after
the first bit set to one is treated. Then Algorithm 23 proceeds in the same way as
Algorithm 20. Algorithm 22 starts in the same way, using m to divert the output of
the operations intoR2. When the most-significant bit of the scalar,A⊕B, set to one
is treated the output stored in R2 is copied to either R0 or R1. Then Algorithm 22
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proceeds in the same way as Algorithm 19.
Algorithm 22: Montgomery Ladder with Fixed-Length XOR-split scalar on
an EC
Input: E , Fq, P ∈ E , `-bit integers A = ∑n−1i=0 ai 2i and B = ∑n−1i=0 bi 2i
where n ≥ `
Output:Q = [κ]P where κ = A⊕B
1 R0 ← P ;R1 ← P ;R2 ← P ;
2 b′ R←− {0, 1} ; h← 1 ; m← 3 ;
3 for i = n− 1 down to 0 do
4 R2 ← Rai +R¬ai ;
5 R((1+ai)∨m)−1 ← 2R(h⊕bi⊕b′)⊕ai ;
6 h = m ∧ 1 ;
7 m = 3 ((h ∧ ¬ai)⊕ (h ∧ bi)) ;
8 R((1+¬ai)∨m)−1 ← R2 ;
9 b′ ← bi ;
10 end
11 returnRb′
Algorithm 23: Montgomery Ladder with Fixed-Length XOR-split scalar II
on an EC
Input: E , Fq, P ∈ E , `-bit integers A = ∑n−1i=0 ai 2i and B = ∑n−1i=0 bi 2i
where n ≥ `
Output:Q = [κ]P where κ = A⊕B
1 R0 ← P ;R1 ← P ;
2 U 0 ← P ; U 1 ← −P ;
3 b′ R←− {0, 1} ; n← n ; h← 1 ; m← 3 ;
4 R¬b′ ← 2P ;
5 for i = n− 1 down to 0 do
6 R(1∨m)−1 ← Rbi⊕b′ +R(bi⊕b′)⊕ai ;
7 R(2∨m)−1 ← R0 +U bi ;
8 b′ ← (bi ∧ ¬n)⊕ (b′ ∧ n) ;
9 s = ((m ∧ ¬ai)⊕ (m ∧ bi)) ;
10 m = 3 s ;
11 end
12 returnRb′
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5.4.2 Using a Nonce as Two Shares
In this section we describe how one could generate an ECDSA signature where the
nonce is only present as two shares. That is, one could generate two random values
to represent the two shares of the nonce, and the actual value of the nonce would
never appear in the signing device.
We assume that the first half of the signature r has been generated using one of
the scalar multiplication algorithms given above, using shares A and B where the
nonce κ = A ⊕ B. To compute the inverse of κ modulo |E| we need to change the
way that κ is shared between two variables without revealing any information on κ.
Goubin defined a secure means of modifying two shares such that the secret
value is no longer given by the XOR of the shares, but by subtracting one from
the other [Gou01]. That is, the relationship κ = A ⊕ B becomes κ ≡ A′ − B′
(mod |E|). The essential observation of Goubin was that the function
Φ(a, b) : Z2 −→ Z : a, b 7−→ (a⊕ b) + b (5.12)
is affine over F2. If we consider α, β as Boolean shares of x, where x = α ⊕ β,
then, as defined by Goubin,
x+ α = β ⊕ Φ (β, γ)⊕ Φ (β, γ ⊕ α) , (5.13)
for a random variable γ. This is not side-channel resistant in Z because of the carries
produced by the addition operations. One needs to use a group Z2k , for some k ∈
Z+, and have γ be a random value from Z2k . However, we wish to change a Boolean
share into an additive share in the group Z|E| where (5.13) is not valid.
We can modify the shares such that Goubin’s mask conversion can be used
adding a random multiple of the order of the group as proposed by Coron for other
algorithms [Cor99]. One can generate a random integer ` ∈ Z2n for some conve-
nient bit length n. The Boolean shares (A = κ⊕B,B) can be modified to (A′, B′)
where (
A′, B′
)
= (A⊕ (`|E|+B)⊕B, `|E|+B) . (5.14)
We note that this gives A′ = κ⊕ (`|E|+B). If we consider the bit length of |E| is
m then the above modified shares can be used with (5.13) using the group Z2n+m to
change the shares (A′, B′) to (A′′, B′′) where(
A′′, B′′
)
= (κ+ `|E|+B, `|E|+B) . (5.15)
Then A′′ and B′′ can be reduced modulo |E| to provide additively split shares of
κ in Z|E|. We can generate a random integer ω < |E| and change the shares to a
multiplicative split (A′′′, B′′′) where(
A′′′, B′′′
)
=
(
ωA′′ − ωB′′ mod |E|, ω) . (5.16)
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We note that this gives A′′′ ≡ ωκ (mod |E|). The second part of the signature can
be generated from r by computing
s← B′′′
(
A′′′−1 (h(m) + d r)
)
mod |E| .
Thus, using the above, one can generate an ECDSA signature where the nonce κ
only exists as two shares. An explicit algorithm requiring 16 operations is given in
Algorithm 24.
Algorithm 24: Secure Boolean-to-Multiplicative Masking
Input: A,B ∈ Z2n , where κ = A⊕B, κ ∈ Z|E| and n is the bit length of |E|,
random value γ ∈ {0, . . . , 2n− 1}, random value ` ∈ {0, . . . , 2m− 1} where
m is the bit length of one computer word and random value ω ∈ {1, . . . , |E|}.
Output: κω mod |E|.
1 x1 ← `× |E| ;
2 B′ ← x1 +B ;
3 x2 ← B′ ⊕B ;
4 A′ ← A⊕ x2 ;
5 x3 ← A′ ⊕ γ ;
6 x4 ← x3 + γ ;
7 x5 ← B′ ⊕ γ ;
8 x6 ← A′ ⊕ x5 ;
9 x7 ← x6 + x5 ;
10 x8 ← x4 ⊕ x7 ;
11 x9 ← A′ ⊕ x8 ;
12 B′′ ← B′ mod |E| ;
13 A′′ ← A′ mod |E| ;
14 x10 ← B′′ × ω mod |E| ;
15 x11 ← A′′ × ω mod |E| ;
16 x12 ← x11 − x10 mod |E| ;
return x12 ;
5.5 Security Evaluation
In this section, we provide a security evaluation of Algorithm 16 presented in this
chapter in terms of security and their resistance to multiple forms of side-channel
attacks. We note that similar analysis can be carried out for all exponent splitting
variants presented in this work. Section 5.5.3 discusses the probing security of algo-
rithms, using formal methods. Section 5.5.4 analyzes security in the noisy leakage
model, using an information-theoretic approach.
5.5.1 Theoretical Comparison with the State-of-the-Art Algorithms
In this section, we compare our proposed algorithms with a selection of algorithms
discussed in the previous sections.
The first block of algorithms in the table, contain exponentiation algorithms
using the Montgomery power ladder without splitting the exponent (Algorithm 12),
with additive splitting or with variations of XOR-splitting (Algorithms 13, 14, 15).
Multiplicative or Euclidean splitting are not included in this table, because in terms
of security they have the same side-channel resistance as the algorithm with additive
splitting. In terms of performance, the number of operations is the same, unless the
values sk′ are precomputed and stored in memory.
The second block of algorithms refer to Joye’s Add-Always algorithm (Algo-
rithm 17). The blinded version of this algorithm (Algorithm 18) with XOR-split
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Table (5.1) Comparison Table for scalar multiplication algorithms, where M in-
dicates a multiplication, S a squaring, A a point addition, D point doubling, and I
a modular inversion
Algorithm for ] operations registers Hide ADPA Inter.
n-bit scalar length Values
Algorithm 12 nM + nS 2 7 7 7
Additive Split 2(nM + nS) 2 7 7 7
[CJ01]
Algorithm 13 nM + nS 3 3 3 7
Algor. 14, 15 2nM 4 3 3 7
Algorithm 16 2n ·M 4 3 3 7
Algorithm 17 nM + nS 2 7 7 7
Algorithm 18 (n+ 1) M + nS + 1I 4 3 3 3
Algorithm 8 (n− 1)D+ 3 7 3 7
[IIT03] (n− 1)A+ 1I
Algorithm 2 (n− 1)D + (n− 1)A 3 7 3 7
[IISO10]
Algorithm 19 (n− 1)D + (n− 1)A 3 7 3 7
Algorithm 20 2(n− 1)A 4 7 3 7
Algorithm 21 (n+ 1)A+ (n− 1)D 4 3 3 3
Algorithm 22 (n− 1)A+ (n− 1)D 5 3 3 7
Algorithm 23 (n− 1)A+ (n− 1)D 6 3 3 7
exponent provides protection against ADPA, leakage of the length and intermediate
values. Finally, the last block of algorithms summarizes the behavior of the corre-
sponding scalar multiplication algorithms.3
5.5.2 Security Against Template Attacks
Template Attacks in general are a powerful attack technique, because they take ad-
vantage of most of the information available in the traces that are measured [CRR02].
As we saw earlier in this thesis, the attacker is assumed to possess a device similar
to the device under attack, and he can build templates for some instructions knowing
their power consumption characteristics on this device.
In a template-based DPA attack, the attacker matches the templates based on
different key hypotheses with the recorded power traces [OM07]. The templates
3We do not count XORs, which can be implemented almost for “free" compared to the cost of
multiplications (M), squarings (S) and modular inversions (I) in the chosen field or point additions
(A) and doublings (D) on an elliptic curve. The subtraction of points on an elliptic curve has the same
cost as an addition, so we do not count them separately.
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that match best indicate the key. This type of attack is the best attack in an informa-
tion theoretic sense and in a masking scheme, like ours, it would work if we build
templates for each share ai and bi. Simultaneous knowledge of the two shares is
necessary, because for every possible value of the key bit, there are two different
possibilities for ai, bi that could give the same result, as follows:
ki = 1⇒ (ai = 0 and bi = 1) or (ai = 1 and bi = 0)
ki = 0⇒ ai = bi = 0 or ai = bi = 1
In operations where b′ is also involved, such as line 5 of Algorithm 13, line 4 of
Algorithm 16 etc., we need to store the bi−1 value from the templates of the previous
round. This procedure seems quite complex and unlikely to succeed in devices with
small signal-to-noise ratio.
In Chapter 4 we presented Online Template Attacks (OTA) [BCP+17]. OTA use
templates of the multiples of points on the curve kP , for k ∈ Z and compares them
with the result of a specific operation, for instance doubling, for every round of
the algorithm. As explained previously, every unprotected implementation of scalar
multiplication is vulnerable to OTA, unless the coordinates of the base point are ran-
domized.4 The algorithms presented in this chapter are secure against OTA, because
the doubling (or not) of a specific point, does not reveal the bit of the scalar ki. We
demonstrate this claim, using two algorithms for case studies, one for the case of
exponentiation and one for elliptic curves. Extension to other algorithms presented
in the previous sections is straightforward.
Algorithm 13: In line 4 Rai ←
(
R(bi⊕b′)⊕ai
)2
the squaring is performed and
we can make templates for the potential valuesR20 andR
2
1, in order to find out which
operation is most probable to take place. Let us assume that there is a pattern match
of 99% with the value R20. Even if we know with high probability which value is
calculated at this step, we do not know which register will be used in the next step
using OTA. Moreover, the index 0 can be derived from several combinations of
ai, bi, b
′. Namely, if ai = bi = 0, b′ = 0, or ai = bi = 1, b′ = 0 or ai = 0, bi =
1, b′ = 1 or ai = 1, bi = 0, b′ = 1. If the previous shares are known, therefore
b′ is known, there are still two possible values for ai and bi that can give the same
result with equal probability. The success probability of OTA is then 1/2 which is
not more than a random guess.
Algorithm 19: Let us assume that templates on doubling showed that in line 6
of Algorithm 8, we have 2R1. The possible values of ai, bi, b′ that could result in 1
are: (ai = bi = 0, b′ = 1), or (ai = bi = 1, b′ = 1) or (ai = 0, bi = 1, b′ = 0) or
(ai = 1, bi = 0, b′ = 0). The success probability of OTA is again 1/2 if the previous
shares are known. We note here, that in both cases, knowledge of the previous bit is
4Although OTA is initially presented for the case of elliptic curves, the attack can be used against
exponentiation algorithms as well, as long as templates for certain exponent values can be created.
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not enough to give a success probability of 1/2, but knowledge of at least one of the
shares is needed.
This analysis shows that it would be impractical to create templates for all the
possible values of the shares for a scalar of 192-bits or an exponent that is thousands
bits long.
5.5.3 Provable Security Against First-Order Attacks
It is common for masking schemes to provide security proofs showing that ev-
ery masked intermediate value is statistically independent of the secret (unmasked)
value. When a secret value is masked by two shares, the scheme is considered secure
if it can be proven to resist first-order attacks. More generally, a nth-order masking
scheme can protect an implementation up to nth-order attacks.
For the algorithms presented in the previous sections using the countermea-
sure of Boolean splitting, the goal is to protect the exponent (or scalar) key bits
(kn−1, kn−2, ..., k0) by using the XOR-mask ki = ai ⊕ bi∀i ∈ {0, ..., n − 1}.
The goal of the adversary is, therefore, to recover the current bit ki by observing
the available intermediate values each time. During the design phase of all the al-
gorithms, we prevented combined access to shares ai and bi. To detect potential
1st-order security flaws, we use the Lisp-based formal verification tool suggested
by Coron [Cor17]. The tool can generate all possible tuples of intermediate values
(with dimension less or equal to our order) that stem from the schemes and verifies
the security properties using circuit transformations. The tool checks all possible tu-
ples of intermediate values computed during a single iteration of the exponentiation
algorithm. In order to integrate location leakage in the formal verification we do
not focus solely on manipulated values but also on register indexes used during the
every algorithm. Using the tool we have shown that Algorithms 13,16,18,19,20,21
have the 1-NI security property. Rephrasing, we show that any set of at most one
intermediate variable can be perfectly simulated with at most one share of each
input [BBD+16].
5.5.4 MI-based Evaluation of Boolean Exponent Splitting
Having established that the proposed exponent splitting algorithms are 1-NI, we
proceed to analyze the noise amplification stage of the proposed countermeasure.
Analytically, we perform an evaluation of Boolean exponent splitting using the
information-theoretic framework of Standaert et al. [SMY09]. We present the eval-
uation of our countermeasure as described by Algorithm 16. However, analogous
approaches can be carried for all exponent splitting algorithms, yielding very simi-
lar results. Our analysis considers two sources of leakage, namely data-based leak-
age and location-based leakage (also known as address leakage). Using these two
leakage sources, we demonstrate three possible attack paths against Algorithm 16,
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covering all possible combinations between sources. Thus we show the noise am-
plification stage when only data-based leakage is exploited (data attack), when only
location-based leakage is exploited (location attack) and finally the noise amplifi-
cation stage when the adversary combines data and location leakage (hybrid attack).
Notation & MI Metric. In this section, random variables are denoted with capital
letters. Instances of random variables and constant values are denoted with lower-
case letters. Capital bold letters are used for random variable vectors and matrices
and calligraphic font denotes sets. All simulations in this section are carried out
with the identity leakage function. Observable data-based leakages of a certain in-
termediate value v are denoted using subscript Lv. Likewise, observable location-
based leakages caused by accessing register Ri (where i the index) are denoted
using subscript LR-i. To distinguish between data-based leakage and location-based
leakage we use superscript Ldata and Lloc. In addition, we assume that different
sources of leakage (data, location) have different noise levels i.e. we assume ho-
moscedastic data noise Ndata ∼ N (0, σ2data) and homoscedastic location noise
N loc ∼ N (0, σ2loc). We use the following formula to compute the MI metric.
MI(S;L) = H[S] +
∑
s∈S
Pr[s] ·
∑
m∈Md
Pr[m] ·
∫
l∈L(d+1)
Pr[l|s,m] · log2 Pr[s|l] dl
where Pr[s|l] =
∑
m∗∈R Pr[l|s,m∗]∑
s∗∈S
∑
m∗∈R Pr[l|s∗,m∗]
.
The random variable S denotes the secret exponent bit, L denotes the leakage vector
and M is a d-dimensional randomness vector that we need to sum over.
Data dependent leakage attack. The first obvious way to recover kn−1 is by ob-
serving the data leakage of the values bn−1 and an−1 at the same time. We run the
algorithm for the first two rounds and note the intermediate values that can leak
information.
Algorithm 25: Two iterations of Algorithm 16
1 b′ ∈R {0, 1}, R0
2 i = n− 1
3 bm = bn−1 ⊕ b′;
4 am = bm ⊕ an−1;
5 R0 = Rbm ·Ram ;
6 R1 = R0 · Ubn−1 ;
7 b′ = bn−1;
8 i = n− 2
9 bm = bn−2 ⊕ b′;
10 am = bm ⊕ an−2;
11 R0 = Rbm ·Ram ;
12 R1 = R0 · Ubn−2 ;
13 b′ = bn−2 ;
As can be observed in Algorithm 25, the value bn−1 is accessed in the first iter-
ation (i = n − 1) three times, once when bm is calculated (line 1), once implicitly
for the index of Ubn−1 (line 4) and finally for b
′ (line 5). The value an−1 is accessed
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once during the first iteration (i = n − 1) and it is not used in the second iteration
(i = n − 2). We notice that the value bn−1 is used implicitly again in the second
iteration, since it is equal to b′. An attacker observing the power leakage of this algo-
rithm should be able to probe at two different points in time, in order to observe both
leakages Ldataan−1 , L
data
bn−1 and eventually the key, i.e. we conclude that a second-order
attack is possible for this scheme. Note also that an adversary with horizontal ex-
ploitation capabilities can observe the leakage of bn−1 multiple times, average them
by computing L¯databn−1 =
1
4 ∗
∑4
j=1 L
data
bn−1 in order to reduce the noise level and finally
perform a 2nd-order attack. The results of the MI evaluation are visible in Figure
5.1. As expected, the exponent splitting scheme performs noise amplification and
has a different slope compared to an unprotected exponentiation (Algorithm 12). In
addition, we observe the curve’s horizontal shift to the right caused by the horizon-
tal exploitation of the available leakage, i.e. we can quantify the effect of multiple
leaky points for bn−1.
Figure (5.1) MI evaluation for Algorithm 16 exponent splitting, using a data
leakage attack, with and without horizontal exploitation. Observed leakage vector
L = [Ldataan−1 , Ldatabn−1 ]
.
Location dependent leakage attack. Let us assume that the adversary can distin-
guish between the manipulation of registers according to which address is accessed,
similar to the address-bit DPA attack described in [IISO10]. If he can distinguish be-
tween access of e.g. U0 and U1, a direct consequence is recovery of value bn−1. To
mount a successful attack against Algorithm 5 using solely location-based leakage,
we need the simultaneous observation of the address of Ui1 and Ri2 and Ri3 , for
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indexes i1 = bn−1 (line 4) and i2 = bm (line 3) and i3 = am (line 3). Thus, in order
to recover kn−1, we need to observe the leakage vector Lloc = [LlocU -i1 , L
loc
R-i2 , L
loc
R-i3 ],
i.e. perform a 3rd-order attack. The results are visible in Figure 5.2 where we can
observe the noise amplification effect that increases the curve’s slope. Naturally a
3rd-order attack using only location-based leakage tends to be less effective com-
pared to the 2nd-order attack using only data-based leakage. However, depending
on the device, exploiting the address dependency may be more effective than ex-
ploiting the data dependency, thus the 3rd-order attack can become more efficient if
σdata > σloc.
Figure (5.2) MI evaluation for Algorithm 16 exponent splitting, using a location
leakage attack. Observed leakage vector L = [LlocU -i1 , L
loc
R-i2 , L
loc
R-i3 ]
.
Hybrid leakage attack. Last, we analyze the scenario at which the adversary can
observe both data-based and location-based leakage. Using this information the ad-
versary can use leakage vector L = [Ldataan−1 , LlocU -bn−1 ] to carry out a 2nd-order attack
that uses data leakage to recover bit an−1 and location leakage w.r.t. register U
to recover bit bn−1. Since data and location leakage imply different noise levels
(σdata 6= σloc then we need to represent the available information using the 3D plot
of Figure 5.3. The wave-like plot quantifies the attainable information w.r.t. a par-
ticular data and location noise level. Thus, it assists the side-channel evaluator to
analyze the scheme’s security in a more holistic way that factors in location leakage
and demonstrates the trade-off between data noise and location noise.
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Figure (5.3) MI evaluation for Algorithm 16 exponent splitting, using a hybrid
leakage attack. Observed leakage vectorL = [Ldataan−1 , LlocU -bn−1 ]
.
5.5.5 TVLA Results
In this section we will describe the results of applying Test Vector Leakage Assess-
ment (TVLA) [GJJR11] to implementations of some of the algorithms above. We
further describe modifications required to achieve a secure implementation where
the hardware architecture can mean that variables that should leak independently at
the same time, potentially unmasking a secret value [BGG+14].
Our implementations were developed using Xilinx’s Zynq zc702 evaluation
board [Xil]. The Zynq zc702 microprocessor contains two ARM7 cores and an
FPGA fabric. We used one ARM7 core for our implementations, we clocked at
667 MHz, and the FPGA provided a means of triggering an oscilloscope at a con-
venient point in our implementations. We acquired a trace of the electromagnetic
emanations around one of the coupling capacitors.
The test that we used from TVLA is to determine whether there are statistically
significant differences in the mean traces of two sets of traces, one acquired with a
fixed scalar and the other with random scalar. One would typically randomly inter-
leave acquisitions so that environmental effects are the same for both sets and there
are no erroneous indications of leakage, caused, for example, by the least signifi-
cant bit of a variable used to count the number of acquisitions. In applying this, one
would take two sets of data, and conduct Welch’s t-test point-by-point to determine
whether there is evidence against the null hypothesis that the sets are the same. We
determine that leakage is present if we observe values above ±6σ which gives the
probability of indicating leakage where no leakage is present, often referred to as a
Type I error, of approximately 1×105. The interested reader is referred to Goodwill
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et al. [GJJR11] for a thorough description and Sections 3.6.1,6.3.1 of this thesis for
specific details on applying TVLA to public key algorithms.
Figure (5.4) TVLA plots showing the unprotected implementation (left), the
masking conducted before the execution of the scalar multiplication (right).
We made a straightforward implementation of Algorithm 19 using NIST’s P192
curve and conducted a test where we compared a set of traces with a fixed scalar
compared to a set of traces with a random scalar. The elliptic curve points were
implemented as homogeneous projective points. We use the x and z-coordinates
in conjunction with so-called x-only algorithms for point arithmetic [BJ02], as one
would for an implementation of ECDH. The instantaneous electromagnetic emana-
tions around the targeted capacitor were measured during the execution of the first
20 rounds of the implementation. The left trace in Figure 5.4 shows the result of a
TVLA analysis with 1× 103 traces where leakage can be seen in numerous places.
A straightforward implementation of Algorithm 19 was tested in the same way.
The algorithm is similar to that proposed by Izumi et al. [IIT03] but with masking
conducted before the execution of the scalar multiplication, rather than on-the-fly.
The resulting TVLA traces is shown in the right of Figure 5.4, where we note that
significant leakage is present with 1 × 106 traces. This is caused by the micropro-
cessor combining values held in registers because of the architecture chosen by the
designers of the evaluation board [Xil].
A more secure implementation can be made by computing some of the required
indices before the execution of the main loop of the scalar multiplication, as shown
in Algorithm 26. We set C to B⊕
⌊
B
2
⌋
such that individual bits of B are masked by
adjacent bits. The resulting TVLA trace is shown in the left Figure 5.5, where we
observe that there is only one place where we see significant leakage with 1 × 106
traces. This leakage occurs because the initial state of {R0,R1} contains {P , 2P }
in some random order. In the first loop of the scalar multiplication {R0,R1} is
overwritten with {2P , 3P } or {3P , 4P }, in some random order, depending on
whether the second most-significant bit of κ is set to 0 or 1, respectively. When 2P
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Figure (5.5) TVLA plots showing precomputation of some required indices before
the execution of the main loop (left) and the fully secure implementation (right).
overwrites 2P the side-channel leakage will be significantly different to any other
possible combination, since the Hamming distance will be zero.
Algorithm 26: Montgomery Ladder with XOR-split scalar on an EC
Input: E , Fq, P ∈ E , n−bit integers A = ∑n−1i=0 ai 2i and B = ∑n−1i=0 bi 2i
Output:Q = [κ]P where κ = A⊕B
Uses: C = ∑n−1i=0 ci 2i
1 R0 ← P ;R1 ← P ;R2 ← P ;
2 C ← B ⊕
⌊
B
2
⌋
;
3 b′ ← bn−1 ;
4 R¬b′ ← 2P ;
5 for i = n− 2 down to 0 do
6 R2 ← Rai +R¬ai ;
7 Rai ← 2Rai⊕ci ;
8 R¬ai ← R2 ;
9 end
10 returnRb0
A fully secure implementation can be achieved by randomizing the point pro-
duced by the doubling operation, by multiplying the x and z-coordinate of the re-
sulting point by a random value. In implementing Algorithm 26, this was achieved
by randomizing R0 and R1 before the main loop of the scalar multiplication. The
resulting TVLA trace is shown in the right of Figure 5.5, where we observe that
there is no significant leakage with 1× 106 traces. Applying this randomization, we
can prevent from overwriting the registers with values having Hamming distance of
zero.
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5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we show how an exponent can be split into two shares, where the
exponent is the XOR sum of the two shares and the cost is typically an extra register
and some register copies per bit. This approach offers a significant advantage over
previously proposed exponent splitting methods, which have a prohibitive impact on
performance [CJ01]. Our method can also be applied to groups whose order con-
tains long runs of bits set to 0 or 1 without any penalty on performance or security.
We showed that our algorithms are secure using formal methods, MI-based evalua-
tion and TVLA on an implementation of Boolean exponent splitting. Furthermore,
we showed how an ECDSA signature can be generated by only manipulating shares
of the random nonce used to secure the scheme. We note that our method does not
prevent an attacker from using the intermediate states generated by the algorithms
as a means of attack. However, inexpensive solutions such as randomizing projec-
tive points [WMPW98] or Ebeid et al.’s blinding method for RSA [EL10] can be
combined with our method to provide a high level of side-channel resistance.
The algorithms presented above will be more efficient than adding a multiple of
the group order to the exponent, since the bit length of the exponent is not increased.
Moreover, the resistance to collision attacks is superior, since one would need to
conduct several attacks to derive each share and reconstruct the exponent. Where
one is adding a random multiple of the exponent any bits recovered directly relate to
bits of the exponent used. It has not yet been shown that one can derive an exponent
from gaining partial information on a series of blinded exponents, but significant
advances have been made [SI11, JL12, Sch14, WS14].
Chapter 6
Residue Number System
Wherever there is modularity there is the potential
for misunderstanding: Hiding information implies
a need to check communication.
Alan J. Perlis, Epigrams on Programming
Residue Number System (RNS) is an arithmetic representation of an integer by
its residues in a given base of coprime numbers. RNS is appropriate for paralleliza-
tion of computations and it can speed up public-key cryptographic implementations.
In this chapter, we present a secure RNS based Montgomery power ladder algorithm
implemented on an ARM Cortex A8 processor. We perform a generic and thorough
evaluation for various scalar multiplication implementations with RNS and tradi-
tional Side-Channel Attack (SCA) countermeasures, in an effort to assess the re-
sistance of RNS against SCA. Three different countermeasures, namely scalar and
point randomization and random base permutations, are implemented and evaluated
using Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) and template attacks. More specif-
ically, variations of RNS-based Montgomery power ladder scalar multiplication al-
gorithms are evaluated on a BeagleBone Black using an EM probe for acquisition
of the traces. We show experimentally and theoretically that new bounds should be
put forward when TVLA evaluations on public key algorithms are performed. On
the security of RNS, our data and location dependent template attacks show that
even protected implementations are vulnerable to these attacks. A combination of
RNS-based and traditional countermeasures is the best way to protect against side-
channel leakage.
6.1 Introduction
Residue Number System (RNS) arithmetic is gaining grounds in public key cryptog-
raphy, because it offers fast, efficient and secure implementations over large prime
123
Chapter 6. Residue Number System 124
fields or rings of integers. In cryptographic applications of public key cryptography,
the recommended bit length varies between 256 bits (for ECC) to 3072 bits (for
RSA) [Gir]. RNS-based implementations offer the possibility to perform the re-
quired modular operations in smaller numbers by distributing the integer operations
on the residue values. Furthermore, RNS computations can be executed indepen-
dently for each modulo, allowing parallelization of the calculations.
A broad range of countermeasures has been devised, in order to protect cryp-
tographic operations against SCA. In Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) where
scalar multiplication is the key security operation, traditional countermeasures fo-
cus on randomizing the scalar, randomizing the input point or manipulating the
EC parameters and point representation (e.g. randomized projective coordinates).
An extensive study of countermeasures proposed for ECC is done by Fan and Ver-
bauwhede [FV12a]. Several research groups explore alternative SCA resistance ap-
proaches that are focused on redundant arithmetic systems like the Nonadjacent
Form (NAF) and the Residue Number System (RNS).
RNS was originally devised for parallel processing of arithmetic operations in
order to increase computation speed [PP95, BDK97]. Since it can effectively rep-
resent elements of cyclic groups or finite fields there is merit in adopting it in fi-
nite field operations for elliptic curve arithmetic. In 1997 Bajard et al. [BDK97]
presented an RNS Montgomery modular multiplication for very large operands by
adapting the Montgomery multiplication to the mixed radix system. Their algorithm
can be implemented to run in O(n) time on O(n) processors, where n is the num-
ber of moduli in the RNS basis. Efficient RNS hardware implementations of Mont-
gomery multiplication for elliptic curves [BDE10] and RSA [CNPQ04] showed the
potential of using RNS for public key applications. Furthermore, RNS has been
recently used for other cryptographic schemes such as Lattice-based cryptogra-
phy [BEHZ16] or in the work of Halevi et al. [HPS18], in order to optimize the
implementation of the Fan-Vercauteren variant of the scale-invariant homomorphic
encryption scheme of Brakerski [FV12b]. As this number system has a broad poten-
tial for cryptography, using it for SCA resistance seems to be inevitable. However,
a practical evaluation of RNS as an SCA countermeasure is still not performed.
6.1.1 Related Work
The potential of RNS as an SCA countermeasure is observed in several research pa-
pers, for instance Bajard et al. in [BILT04, BEG13], Guillermin [Gui11], Fournaris
et al. [FKSK15, FPBS16], Schinianakis et al. [SS13]. RNS parallel processing of
finite field operations apart from speed offers also different representation of the
elliptic curve points, which may reduce SCA leakage. Also, a single bit fault in an
RNS number’s moduli can lead to “difficult to trace" changes in an overall finite field
element, supports the argument that the RNS can be introduced as SCA and Fault
injection Attack (FA) countermeasure. It has also been observed that the periodic
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change using base permutation during the modular exponentiation (and consecu-
tively scalar multiplication) computation flow can introduce enough randomness to
thwart SCAs. This approach led to the introduction of the leak resistant arithmetic
(LRA) technique [BILT04]. LRA has been applied to modular exponentiation de-
signs in two ways, either by choosing a new base permutation once at the beginning
of each modular exponentiation or by choosing a permutation once in each modular
multiplication during exponentiation [FPBS16].
Theoretical evaluations for secure RNS scalar multiplication are presented in
[FPS17,CATB18]. Both papers discuss the resistance of RNS randomization against
various SCA attacks. In [FPS17] we collected traces for an initial analysis on a
Raspberry Pi 2, but due to the constrains of the target platform, no proper eval-
uation was made. The SCA analysis of the [FPS17] implementation is limited to
identifying the rounds of RNS with and without the countermeasures. We imply
that an Online Template type of attack (OTA) [BCP+14] should not be possible in
our protected implementation, but detailed SCA results are missing. In [CATB18]
Monte Carlo simulations are used to verify the resistance of the countermeasure
against several attacks, but no practical t-tests are made. To the best of our knowl-
edge, the only practical evaluation of an RNS hardware implementation is presented
by Perin et al. [PITM13] but it is constrained to an RSA design and is focused on
comparative horizontal attacks (Doubling/relative Doubling attacks) and signal to
noise measurement estimations for SCA resistance.
6.1.2 Our Contribution
The above observations highlight the need for a practical, broad and generic evalua-
tion approach of scalar multiplication implementations that rely on RNS arithmetic
and led us to the results of this chapter. Such an approach and overall assessment
could provide a definite answer on if and how RNS and its LRA technique can con-
tribute to a scalar multiplier overall SCA resistance. This answer is based not only
on theoretical analysis but, most importantly, on actual measurements.
In an effort to formulate a generic and broad methodology for evaluating the se-
curity of an RNS scalar multiplier, we use Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA),
initially proposed by Goodwill et al. [GJJR11] and presented in Chapter 3.6. This
methodology consists of several statistical tests between two trace sets of acqui-
sition and uses Welch’s t-test to evaluate if the two sets have significant statisti-
cal differences, that would distinguish for example a fixed versus a random input.
This test provides results simultaneously for all the intermediate values and indi-
cates potential points of leakage. Since its introduction to public-key algorithms in
2011 [JRW11], few research groups have used TVLA so far for the evaluation of
RSA or ECC. Namely, Nascimento et al. [NLD15], Chmielewski et al. [CMV+17]
used it for evaluation of Curve25519 on Chipwhisperer and the complete Weier-
strass formulas on an FPGA respectively. Tunstall and Goodwill [TG16] give an
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overview of cases and algorithms that can be applied during public key TVLA eval-
uations. TVLA requires thousands or even millions of acquired traces to show the
existence of leakage. This fact, combined with the low operation speed and the large
trace lengths of public key implementations, make TVLA evaluations quite chal-
lenging for public-key cryptography. In Section 6.3, we show how to apply TVLA
in an even more challenging target implementation, a RNS software implementation
for the Montgomery power ladder on ECC. Theoretical analysis of TVLA for ECC
leads to new threshold settings, which are validated by our experiments.
Furthermore, we developed a complementary template attack methodology, us-
ing data and location dependent leakage. Our goal is to validate the TVLA results
and to expose additional vulnerabilities in the protected RNS designs. The tem-
plate attacks are mounted on RNS LRA protected scalar multiplication and, indeed,
achieve high success rate results in classifying correctly the template traces. Lo-
cation dependent template attacks are introduced by Heyszl et al. [HMH+12] and
used to attack an ECC implementation on an FPGA. We use here location dependent
leakage templates for the first time in an RNS-ECC implementation setting.
6.1.3 Organization of this Chapter
This chapter includes the results of the author’s research regarding RNS as a coun-
termeasure in ECC implementations. More precisely, the combined results of three
papers are presented. After briefly introducing the potential of using RNS as an
SCA and FA countermeasure following [FPBS16], Section 6.2 highlights the ba-
sics of RNS arithmetic and presents the implementation of a secure, blinded Mont-
gomery power ladder algorithm with RNS as published in [FPS17]. Then, the SCA
resistance of this algorithm is discussed together with some preliminary results. In
Section 6.3 we present a thorough security analysis of this algorithm using TVLA
and template attacks. The implementation runs on a Cortex A8 processor and the
experiments are performed for protected and unprotected versions of the implemen-
tation. The countermeasures tested include the typical randomization of the input
point and an RNS specific technique based on randomization of the bases. Finally,
in Section 6.4 we perform template attacks (data and location dependent) on the
different variations of the implementation, in order to examine the behavior of the
countermeasures. All these results will be published in the paper [PFPB19].
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6.2 Efficient and Secure RNS Software Implementation for
ECC
6.2.1 RNS Arithmetic for ECC
RNS is a non-positional arithmetic system where an integer X is represented by a
set of individual n moduli xi (x
RNS→ X : (x1, x2, ...xn)) of a given RNS basis B :
(m1,m2, ...mn) as long as 0 ≤ x < M where M = ∏ni=1mi is the RNS dynamic
range and all mi are pair-wise relatively prime. The elements of the RNS basis need
to be coprime, in order to uniquely reconstructX , as shown in the proof the Chinese
Remainder Theorem (CRT).1 We recall here that CRT states the following:
Theorem 1. We consider a n-tuple of coprime numbers (m1,m2, . . . ,mn). We
note M = ∏ni=1mi. If we consider the n-tuple (x1, x2, . . . , xn) of integers such
that xi < mi, then there exists a unique X , such that 0 ≤ X < M and xi = X
(mod m)i = |X|mi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
We can clearly see that RNS is based on the CRT. Each xi in an RNS basis
can be derived from X by calculating xi = 〈x〉mi = x mod mi. In contrast to bi-
nary arithmetic, addition, subtraction and multiplication in RNS is performed within
each modulus (in n independent channels) thus enabling the parallelism of small
bit length operations to obtain an arithmetic result [BDK01, FKSK15]. Assuming
that we have two integers a and d represented in RNS as A : (a1, a2, ...an) and
D : (d1, d2, ...dn) we can obtain addition, subtraction and multiplication in RNS as
A D = (〈a1  d1〉m1 , ... 〈an  dn〉mn) where  : (+,−,×). Exact division by
D coprime with M is equivalent to multiplying by the inverse 〈D−1〉M . Since RNS
is a non-positional representation, comparisons, divisions and modular reductions
are complex operations, which are performed either by converting the number from
RNS to binary representation or by using base extension algorithms.
Binary reconstruction from RNS representation can be done either by using the
Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) or through a Mixed Radix System (MRS) trans-
formation.
Using CRT, an integer x can be written as x =
〈∑n
i=1
〈
xi ·M−1i
〉
mi
·Mi
〉
M
where Mi = Mmi and M
−1
i is the multiplicative inverse of Mi modulo mi. Due
to the high bit length of M , the modular inverse is computationally demand-
ing; it is typically computed by introducing a correction factor w, where x =∑n
i=1
〈
xi ·M−1i
〉
mi
· Mi − w · M (introducing the concept of Cox and Rower
[KKSS00]). Using the MRS approach, this correction factor can be avoided but
RNS numbers need to be transformed into MRS representation (a weighted moduli
1The earliest known statement of the theorem is by the Chinese mathematician Sunzi in the 3rd
century AD.
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RNS variant) [BILT04] and then from this representation to binary numbers. This
technique will be explained in the next section.
For elliptic curves defined over GF(p) (elliptic curves on GF (2k) are not dis-
cussed in this chapter), all GF(p) operations (addition, subtraction, multiplication)
are modular operations. The RNS modular multiplication over GF(p) is a compu-
tationally difficult operation. It is usually realized through the RNS Montgomery
multiplication algorithm that avoids modular inversions, but includes base exten-
sion operations [BDK97, FPBS16, Fou17].
6.2.2 RNS Base Extension
Base extension (BE) is used when an RNS number represented in an RNS base
Bn = (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) needs to be represented in a different base B´n = (mn+1,
mn+2, . . . ,m2n). The elements of bases should be coprime, that is gcd(mi,mj) =
1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {n+ 1, . . . , 2n}. Base extension can be realized
in various ways, but essentially, it consists of one step where the RNS number is
transformed to binary using base Bn and a second step where the binary number is
transformed to RNS using base B´n. As such, base extension is strongly related to
the methods of transforming an RNS number to binary.
Two main approaches to base extension are used in practice for RNS arith-
metic: the Mixed Radix System (MRS) and the Cox-Rower architecture introduced
in [KKSS00]. The Cox-Rower architecture consists of parallel arithmetic units,
the Rowers, which perform the independent computations for each base concur-
rently, and the Cox unit dedicated to the computation of an approximation of the
correction factor w. Therefore, it can be efficiently implemented in hardware. An
interesting work in protecting the Cox-Rower architecture against multi-fault at-
tacks is presented in [BEM16]. While the Cox-Rower method favors parallelism,
the MRS system is often used for RNS Montgomery Multiplication base exten-
sion, because it offers benefits in terms of leakage resistance and fault propagation
as discussed in [Fou17, BILT04, BEG13]. Moreover, MRS can be combined with
techniques, such as the Leak Resistant Arithmetic, described in Section 6.2.3 and
it can be efficiently implemented in software. The representation of an integer x in
MRS is X˜ : (u1, u2, ..., un); the MRS can be used for RNS to binary conversion.
Using the naive approach of [ST67], the MRS number X˜ can be obtained from
X : (x1, x2, ..., xn) by executing the Mixed Radix Conversion (MRC) algorithm of
Equation 6.1.
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u1 = x1
u2 =
〈
(x2 − u1) ·m−11,2
〉
m2
u3 =
〈
((x3 − u1) ·m−11,3 − u2) ·m−12,3
〉
m3
· · ·
un = 〈((xn − u1) ·m−11,n − u2) ·m−12,n − . . .− un−1) ·m−1n−1,n〉mn .
(6.1)
The multiplicative inverse of mi modulo mj is m−1i,j , i.e. mi ·m−1i,j ≡ 1 mod mj .
From the MRS number representation, an integer x can be recovered by performing
x = u1 + g2u2 + g3u3 + . . .+ gnun where gi =
∏i
j=1mj . In [BMP05], the authors
observe that the conversion from binary to MRS can be reduced to one shift and four
additions, then conversion to binary needs at most two shifts and four additions. As
an example with a three elements base, {m1,m2,m3} = {2k − 1, 2k, 2k + 1}, we
see that m1 (mod m)2 = 2,m1 (mod m)3 = 1 and m2 (mod m)3 = −1. For
the elements needed in Equation 6.1, m−11,2 = 2n−1,m−11,3 = 1,m−12,3 = −1, thus
one shift and one bitwise addition is necessary for the calculation of u1 and three
additions for u2, u3.
In MRS base extension, the integer XBn is converted into a number in base B´n
XB´n and vice versa. A similar two step procedure is followed for base extension
from B´n to Bn. As we showed in the previous example, an efficient basis extension
operation relies heavily on the choice of Bn and B´n. Most studies on optimal base
moduli agree that moduli of the form of Mersenne numbers 2k ± ci, 2k − 2ti ± 1 or
2k, 2k − 1, 2k−1− 1, 2k+1− 1 for various values i, n, k, provide good performance
results [BKP09, ESJ+13]. This happens because division in modular reduction can
be replaced with bitwise shifts and AND operations. Recent results from Bigou and
Tisserand in [BT15] show how to perform RNS modular multiplication with a single
base bit width instead of a double one, which results in two times faster implemen-
tation for the same area, but in this case the Leakage Resistant Arithmetic (LRA)
approach followed in our approach cannot be used.
6.2.3 Leak Resistant Arithmetic
In 2004, Bajard et al. proposed, originally for modular exponentiation, a random
permutation of the base Bn and B´n moduli thus creating
(2n
n
)
random permutations
of Bn and B´n [BILT04]. We denote each such RNS Base γ permutation as Bn,γ
and ´Bn,γ . The periodic change of a base permutation during the modular exponenti-
ation, as presented in Figure 6.1, can introduce enough randomness to thwart SCAs
as long as the number of moduli is high. This approach leads to a leak resistant
arithmetic (LRA) technique that can be applied to modular exponentiation designs
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(used for RSA) in two ways, either by choosing a new base permutation once at
the beginning of each modular exponentiation or by changing a permutation in each
RNS Montgomery Multiplication (RNS-MM) operation of the exponentiation pro-
cess. The base transition of an RNS number A represented in a base permutation γ
to a new permutation γ´ can be achieved by performing two consecutive RNS-MMs.
Initially A1 = RNS −MM(A,MB∪B´ mod P, P, B´n,γ´ , Bn,γ´) 2 is performed and
it is followed by RNS −MM(A1, 1, P, ´Bn,γ , Bn,γ)
b1 b2 b3 b4 b2n-3 b2n-2 b2n-1 b2n
…
Base Bn Base B’n
Pool of 2n RNS Base moduli
b1 b3 b2n-3 b2n b2n-2 b2 b4 b2n-1… …
m1 m2 … mn-1 mn mn+1 mn+2 … m2n-1 m2n
Bases to be used in RNS MM (Base extension)
Random placement (permuta!on) of n moduli as Bn and the remaining n moduli as B’n
Figure (6.1) Leak Resistant Arithmetic approach to Base Randomization
Applying the LRA technique in scalar multiplication follows a similar approach
to modular exponentiation. Some attempts to introduce LRA in scalar multiplication
have been made in [Gui10, Gui11], however, they are applicable only to the CRT
type base extension using the Cow-Rower method when pseudo-Mersenne numbers
are used for base moduli. In scalar multiplication, a permutation transition can be
done
1. only once per scalar multiplication,
2. in every round of the scalar multiplication process,
3. before every GF(p) RNS-MM operation of every point operation of every
round.
Taking into account that the transition from one permutation to another costs
2 RNS-MM, the third approach is not affordable in terms of speed. As suggested
in [FPS17], the first approach may be vulnerable to horizontal SCA attacks (depend-
ing on the implementation methodology). Therefore, the second approach where the
RNS bases are permuted once per scalar multiplication round, is the most promis-
ing, offering a balance between performance and SCA resistance strength.
2Note that A has the form A ·MBn,γ mod P (Montgomery form) since it is an output of some
previous RNS-MM.
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6.2.4 RNS Modular Multiplication
As mentioned in Section 6.2.1, the modular multiplication in RNS format is a com-
putationally expensive operation. It is usually realized by Montgomery modular
multiplication for efficiency reasons.
The Montgomery multiplication is a modular multiplication where one reduc-
tion is performed at each iteration of the multiplication. When the operands are in
Montgomery form, the reduction can be performed by a shift instead of a division.
This is a challenging property to use in RNS, since it is a non-positional repre-
sentation. However, Bajard et al. presented in [BDK97] a RNS-MM for very large
operands based on an adaptation of the Montgomery methods to mixed radix sys-
tems. The basic idea of the algorithm is that the least significant digit of a mixed
radix representation can be chosen as any one of the residues of the RNS repre-
sentation when the two systems are based on the same set of moduli. A simplified
variation of this algorithm is presented in Algorithm 27.
Assuming that we introduce two RNS basesBn = (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) and B´n =
(mn+1,mn+2, . . . ,m2n) such that gcd(mi,mj) = 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈
{n+ 1, . . . , 2n}, we express a GF(p) number x in base Bn or B´n as XB and XB´
respectively, while in both RNS bases asXB∪B´ . We also defineMB =
∏n
i=1mi and
M−1B as the multiplicative inverse of MB in base Bn, as well as MB´ =
∏2n
i=n+1mi
and M−1
B´
as the multiplicative inverse of MB´ in base B´n. The RNS Montgomery
multiplication (RNS-MM) as an outcome calculates SB = A ·B ·M−1B mod p and
SB´ = A ·B ·M−1B´ mod p. Base extension from one base to the other in RNS-MM
is needed, since M−1B does not exist in base Bn and therefore computations must be
migrated to the B´n base to come up with SB .
In the first step of RNS-MM Base extension operation, the baseBn RNS number
is converted into a base Bn MRS number. In the second step, the base Bn MRS
number is converted into a base B´n RNS number. A similar two step procedure is
followed for base extension from B´n to Bn respectively to provide a correct RNS-
MM outcome.
It must be noted that each RNS number A used in Montgomery multiplica-
tion must be represented in the Montgomery format, meaning in the form AB ·
MB modPB or AB´ ·MB´ modPB´ . To transform a number in the Montgomery nor-
malized form, an RNS-MM must be performed between A andMB∪B´ mod P using
the basesBn and B´n in reverse order (i.e. RNS-MM(A,MB∪B´ modP, P, B´n, Bn)).
To leave the Montgomery domain we must perform an RNS-MM of number A with
1 (i.e. RNS-MM(A, 1, P,Bn, B´n)).
To increase computation efficiency, most studies on optimal base moduli [BKP09]
agree that moduli of the form 2k ± ci, 2k − 2ti ± 1 or 2k, 2k − 1, 2k−1− 1 2k+1− 1
(Mersenne numbers) for various i values provide high performance results. As we
showed earlier, if the elements of the bases are some power of 2, the division is
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Algorithm 27: RNS Montgomery Modular Multiplication
RNS-MM(A,D,P,Bn, B´n)
Input: Bn = (m1, . . . ,mn), B´n = (mn+1, . . . ,m2n),
PB∪B´ = PB ∪ PB´ : (p1, p2, ...pn, pn+1, ...p2n),
MB =
∏n
i=1mi, MB´ =
∏2n
i=nmi,
AB∪B´ = AB ∪AB´ : {a1, . . . , an, an+1, . . . a2n} ,
DB∪B´ = DB ∪DB´ : {d1, . . . , dn, dn+1, . . . , d2n},M−1B´ ,−P
−1
B
Output: SB = AB ·DB ·M−1B modPB and
SB´ = AB´ ·DB´ ·M−1B´ modPB´
1 GB∪B´ = AB∪B´ ×DB∪B´
2 i.e. (gi = 〈ai × di〉mi in base Bn and g´i =
〈
a´i × d´i
〉
m´i
in base B´n)
3 QB = GB × (−P−1B ) i.e.
(〈
gi ×
〈−p−1〉mi〉mi
)
in Bn
4 QB → QB´ Base extension Bn → B´n;
5 RB´ = GB´ +QB´ × PB´ ;
6 SB´ = RB´ ×M−1B´ ;
7 SB´ → SB Base extension B´n → Bn;
8 return SB and SB´
avoided in modular reduction and replaced by bitwise AND and shift.
The number of base moduli n should also be optimized as well as each moduli’s
k value (defining the bit length of all the values). Usually, such numbers are specified
according to the GF(p) defining the EC. For RNS applications on ECC, RNS moduli
are proposed with variant bit lengths, in order to achieve different dynamic ranges
for implementations of 192, 256 and 320 bits. 3 The dynamic range of the RNS
bases Bn and B´n must be close to the prime p (4p < M ) specifying the underlying
field arithmetic. The choice of moduli in the RNS bases does not depend on the
type of curve, but on the prime field that the curve is defined on. Following the
approach of [BKP09] and [ESJ+13] we adopt 4 moduli RNS bases (n = 4) of the
form Bn : (2k − 2t1 − 1, 2k − 2t2 − 1, 2k − 2t3 − 1, 2k − 2t4 − 1) and B´n :
(2k, 2k − 1, 2k+1 − 1, 2k−1 − 1). In that case, we employ RNS bases that have a
200-bit dynamic range consisting of four approximately 50-bit moduli (k = 50) for
each involved RNS base Bn and B´n as follows:
The above base moduli can simplify modular reduction during a GF(p) mul-
tiplication and provide simple multiplicative inverses m−1i,j i.e. m
−1
5,6 = 1,m−15,7 =
3The dynamic range of a base is defined as the difference between the largest and smallest element
of the base. A large dynamic range offers higher levels of security due to the entropy produced by the
variations of the Hamming weight of the base elements.
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Table (6.1) Bases for GF(p) RNS Montgomery Modular Multiplication with p
192-bit prime
Bn
m1 = 250 − 220 − 1 m5 = 250
m4 = 250 − 210 − 1 m6 = 251 − 1
B´n
m3 = 250 − 218 − 1 m7 = 251 − 1
m4 = 250 − 210 − 1 m8 = 249 − 1
2,m−16,7 = −2. If the bases share a common mi, as it is the case for Table 6.1,
we could achieve more efficient implementations, since some values are computed
faster. The security of such an implementation is not threatened, as long as the dy-
namic range of the bases is large. However, if an attacker can trigger the algorithm at
this low arithmetic level, he could find similarities in the power signal and conclude
that the same mi is used.
6.2.5 RNS Montgomery Power Ladder Implementation
Considering that LRA can be a strong randomization tool in an SCA resistant scalar
multiplication algorithm, we adopt a Montgomery powering ladder (MPL) algo-
rithm for scalar multiplication that is proposed and analyzed in [FPBS16, FPS17].
This algorithm realizes LRA as a random RNS Base permutation once per scalar
multiplication round and it is combined with more traditional techniques like base
point randomization, in order to provide resistance to a broad range of SCA.
In the rest of this chapter, we extend the approach followed in [FPS17] and
present the implementation of several RNS scalar multiplication algorithms. Fur-
thermore, we provide experimental results on the SCA resistance of the LRA tech-
nique when used autonomously, with RNS random operation sequence or in combi-
nation with traditional SCA techniques. To achieve that, using the MPL algorithm
publicly available in [Fou18b] as a starting point, we implemented four different
scalar multiplier variants in C software code for embedded devices using the GMP
6.1.0 library. The GMP library was chosen for its usability and speed on calculat-
ing big-number values during scalar multiplication. Versions of GMP newer than the
6.0.0 release have side-channel resistant functions, such as silent modular operations
without branching and constant time. Nevertheless, use of GMP during scalar multi-
plication is limited to basic RNS GF(p) building blocks (modular addition, subtrac-
tion) that are not directly related to sensitive information. We implemented our own
big-number RNS-based Montgomery modular multiplication that is constant time.
We also used the random generation function of GMP mpz_urandomb(), which is
a common software random generator. Therefore, we do not expect that this choice
of library will affect the evaluation of our countermeasures in terms of side-channel
leakage.
1. The first variant implements the original MPL algorithm [JY02] with no fur-
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ther countermeasures.
2. The second algorithm implements an MPL optimization with base point ran-
domization [Fou17, FV06], that is resistant against comparative, horizontal
SCAs. This variant, presented in Algorithm 28 takes advantage of the MPL
intrinsic coherence between two calculated points of each MPL round [Gir06]
in order to create a fault detection mechanism [Fou17]. The correct result is
unblinded at line 13, only if a fault is not induced.
3. In the third scalar multiplier implementation we infused LRA in the original
MPL algorithm, that is one random base permutation conversion is performed
per scalar multiplication round.
4. In the fourth variant we combined the countermeasures of variants (2) and
(3). This is a protected algorithm with base point randomization and random
base permutation and it is presented in Algorithm 29.
5. The fifth variant uses only RNS-specific countermeasures, namely the LRA
technique described previously, and the random moduli sequence. Performing
the operations using random moduli sequence offers a way of shuffling, which
enhances the side-channel resistance of an RNS implementation as verified by
our experiments.
We present the algorithms used in the second and fourth scalar multiplier im-
plementations (Alg. 28 and Alg. 29 respectively). As it can be seen there is a need
for a transformation to Montgomery format and a Random Base permutation (RBP)
conversion for various points in the algorithm. According to [BILT04], RBP can
be achieved by performing two consecutive RNS Montgomery multiplications per
point coordinate that use the old and new permutations’ bases Bn and B´n in reverse
order. All four variants of scalar multiplication can use a fixed or a randomized
scalar as input and are implemented with and without RNS random moduli opera-
tion sequence.
In all four implementations, GF(p) operations are performed in RNS. Perfor-
mance optimizations are out of scope of this work. We aim to evaluate a straight-
forward implementation and any sort of optimization might influence our results,
which is undesirable at this stage of evaluation. As is typically implemented in the
literature and in order to avoid excessive operations unrelated to the scalar multi-
plication, values related only to RNS Bases moduli are precomputed and stored in
memory for use in BE and random base permutation algorithms. Following the ap-
proach of [BKP09, ESJ+13] a four moduli RNS bases (n = 4) realization was used
in all four RNS implementations. For all the above approaches, a GF(p) twisted Ed-
wards EC was adopted with a = 1 and d = 2 where p = 2192 − 264 − 1. Twisted
Edwards Curves were chosen instead of Weierstrass ones since the first have never
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Algorithm 28: Blinded SCA-FA MPL [Fou17]
Input: V , R ∈ E(GF(p)), e = (et−1, et−2, ...e0)
Output: e · V or random value (in case of faults)
1 Choose base Bn and B´n permutation γt. ;
2 Transform V, R to RNS format using γt permutation;
3 R0 = R, R1 = R+ V , R2 = −R in permutation γt;
4 Convert R0,R1,R2 to Montgomery format;
5 for i = t− 1 down to 0 do
6 R2 = 2R2, performed in permutation γt;
7 if ei = 1 then
8 R0 = R0 +R1 and R1 = 2R1 in permutation γt;
9 end
10 else
11 R1 = R0 +R1 and R0 = 2R0 in permutation γt;
12 end
13 end
14 if (i, e not modified and R0 + V = R1) then
15 return R0 +R2 in perm. γt
16 end
17 else
18 return random value
19 end
been tested under the RNS arithmetic framework. However, the twisted Edwards
curve shape was used and not the equivalent Montgomery form that can be com-
bined with MPL, in order to keep the solution generic enough so as to be usable for
other EC types. To retain compatibility with NIST Curves and implementations of
other similar works [ESJ+13], the prime field was left to be p = 2192− 264− 1 (al-
though the implementation can be easily adapted to any Edwards Curve including
the popular Curve 25519). The security of the chosen Edwards Curve does not alter
the results of our leakage study, since it relies on the employed countermeasures.
We performed experiments with the secure Edwards Curve (a=107, d=47, cofac-
tor=4) as proposed in [BBJ+08] and came up with similar results that are presented
in Section 6.3.5.
For GF(p) with p a 192-bit prime, we employ RNS bases that have a 200-bit
dynamic range consisting of four approximately 50-bit moduli (k = 50) for each
involved RNS base Bn and B´n as suggested in [BKP09, ESJ+13, FPS17]. Since
n = 4 there exist 70 different base permutations, which as an individual SCA coun-
termeasure, introduce a small randomization. The security level provided by 70 dif-
ferent bases might not seem enough, however this is a trade-off between memory
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Algorithm 29: LRA SCA-FA Blinded MPL [Fou18b]
Input: V , R ∈ E(GF(p)), e = (et−1, et−2, ...e0)
Output: e · V or random value (in case of faults)
1 Choose random initial base permutation γt. ;
2 Transform V, R to RNS format using γt permutation;
3 R0 = R, R1 = R+ V , R2 = −R ;
4 Convert R0,R1,R2 to Montgomery format
5 for i = t− 1 down to 0 do
6 R2 = 2R2, performed in permutation γt ;
7 Choose a random base permutation γi;
8 RBP from γi+1 to γi for R0 and R1 ;
9 if ei = 1 then
10 R0 = R0 +R1 and R1 = 2R1 in permutation γi;
11 end
12 else
13 R1 = R0 +R1 and R0 = 2R0 in permutation γi;
14 end
15 RBP from γi to γt for V ;
16 end
17 if (i, e not modified and R0 + V = R1) then
18 RBP from γ0 to γt for R0;
19 return R0 +R2 in permutation γt ;
20 end
21 else
22 return random value
23 end
137 6.3. Practical Evaluation of RNS Using Test Vector Leakage Assessment
cost and SCA resistance. Increasing the number of moduli would result in a big pre-
computation table (currently 70×70 50-bit numbers) used in every RNS base exten-
sion operation. Instead of increasing the number of moduli, we propose combining
LRA with the low overhead technique of randomizing the RNS moduli operation
sequence, offering 24 different combinations (for n = 4) for each RNS operation.
By randomizing the sequence of the moduli operations, we take advantage of the
basic RNS property of parallel computations, which offers a way of shuffling and
enhances the side-channel resistance of an RNS implementation as verified by our
experiments. This will enable us to create uniquely random computation patterns
for each EC point operation and each MPL round.
6.3 Practical Evaluation of RNS Using Test Vector Leak-
age Assessment
As indicated in the above analysis, the emerging use of RNS systems for cryp-
tographic implementations and the broad belief that RNS offers a potential SCA
countermeasure makes practical evaluations of RNS implementations essential. The
complexity of RNS together with the fact that software implementations of RNS are
slow, make it challenging to apply common evaluation techniques for such systems.
Considering the above challenges, we propose a broadly applicable practical evalu-
ation approach based on TVLA and template attacks for RNS based scalar multipli-
cation. Our primary goal is to examine and validate the RNS SCA capabilities using
practical results. Our evaluation is performed on the RNS implementation described
in Section 6.2.5, including both RNS and traditional SCA countermeasures.
6.3.1 New TVLA Threshold for Public Key Algorithms
The Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) methodology, initially proposed by
Cryptography Research International (CRI) [GJJR11], is described in Section 3.6.
As it is commonly used, we will apply several TVLA statistical tests as a first step
towards evaluation of the SCA resistance of our RNS implementation with various
countermeasures. In the proposed evaluation approach, we verify and extend previ-
ous theoretical results and simulations on the boundaries of the t-test threshold for
the case of traces with high number of samples that are obtained by a public-key
cryptographic implementation. A generic methodology to provide those boundaries
is proposed.
Current TVLA evaluations for the Welch’s t-test use the critical value of ±4.5
[GJJR11, TG16, NLD15, CMV+17], which corresponds to a statistical significance
level of α < 0.00001 for the univariate test. However, in most previous works, the
significance level of a < 0.00001 does not consider the total number of samples
on the trace. As noted in [ZDD+17], the overall significance level increases as the
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number of leakage points on the trace increases. Therefore, the authors propose to
adjust the significance level according to the number of points on a trace. For long
traces, meaning for more than 105 samples per trace, the overall test statistic value
will be larger than ±4.5 and therefore a non-leaky device can not pass the TVLA
t-test with the critical value of ±4.5. Hence, Balasch et al. [BGG+14] suggested
raising the critical value to ±5 for longer traces based on numerical experiments.
For longer traces, as the ones obtained from the implementation of public-key algo-
rithms, a non-leaky device can not pass the t-test even with this higher value of ±5.
However, numerical experiments for one implementation have no impact of what
should be done for another implementation. A few peaks above±4.5 were observed
also by the authors of [CMV+17], who used random versus random values, in order
to check if those are ghost peaks and verify the security of their implementation. It
is obvious that an explicit rigorous way of setting the threshold value would help
for sound application of the current TVLA procedure in every implementation.
As mentioned in Section 3.6.1, one of the applications of Welch’s t-test is to test
the location of one sequence of independent and identically distributed random vari-
ables, as the ones obtained from SCA measurements. It is obvious that the number
of errors per statistical test is relevant to the number of samples in the SCA traces.
The S˘idák correction aSID = 1−(1−a)ns provides a calibration of the significance
level in relation to the number n of samples, and therefore changes the threshold of
the statistical tests [DZD+17].
Taking all these into consideration we created a Matlab script which calculates
the threshold value based on the number of samples and the variance of each sample
in a given trace. We calculate the t-value according to the S˘idák correction; the
larger the number of traces obtained, the closer is the t-test value to the normal
distribution’s value. By using Algorithm 30 and 5 M samples per trace, we obtain
a threshold of ±6, which suggests that the boundaries can be relaxed further. This
result is generic and should be applied, in order to define the threshold before any
t-test evaluation starts. It makes more sense to use this algorithm when public-key
cryptographic implementations are used or in any case that the traces contain more
than 1 M samples, because of the false positives that would appear with the threshold
set to ±4.5
At this point, it is worth noticing that the above observation affects public
key cryptographic TVLA evaluations and explains the results of previous papers.
For instance, Nascimento et al. [NLD15] with 400 k samples and Chmielewski et
al. [CMV+17] with 32M samples for their t-tests observed some peaks above±4.5,
which they discarded as false positives. Using 400 k and 32 M samples in our Mat-
lab script, with guessed values for standard deviations, gives threshold values of
±6.7 and ±7.3 respectively, which would evaluate their implementations as secure
with no false positives. Therefore, it is important to adjust the boundaries for every
set of traces.
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Algorithm 30: t-test Threshold
Input: number of traces for group A and B ntA, ntB , number of samples ns,
sampled standard deviation sA, sB
Output: threshold value for student t distribution tht
1 Choose level of significance a. Here a = 0.00001.;
2 S˘idák correction sidaka = 1− (1− a)ns ;
3 df =
( s2A
ntA
+ s
2
B
ntB
)2
/...
(( s2A
ntA
)2
/(ntA − 1) +
(( s2B
ntB
)2
/(ntB − 1)
))
;
4 Threshold tht = tinv(1− sidaka/2, df)
6.3.2 Experimental Setup
For the experiments we chose to load the implementation on a BeagleBone Black,
which is a typical processor for portable devices. Apart from being a widely used
processor, its high frequency of 1 GHz is necessary for our experiments, since a
software implementation of RNS requires a lot of computational power to operate.
As an indication, a full scalar multiplication for a 192-bit scalar takes 1.5 seconds
when both SCA countermeasures are activated. The experimental setup we used, as
depicted in Figure 6.2, is the following:
• BeagleBone Black with Cortex A8 processor running at 1 GHz.
• EMV Langer probe LF B-3, H Field 100 kHz up to 50 MHz.
• Lecroy Waverunner 8404M-MS sampling at 2.5 GS/sec.
• A Windows PC with the Inspector 4.12 and Matlab R2016b software.
Figure (6.2) The BeagleBone Black with the spot where the EMV probe is fixed to
take measurements on the left and the complete setup with the Lecroy oscilloscope
and the PC on the right
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We used the secure RNS scalar multiplication algorithm from the public reposi-
tory [Fou18b] modified with the appropriate functions to perform various types of t-
tests and template attacks. For the analysis of our traces we used Matlab R2016b and
the Inspector 4.12 software for Side-Channel Attacks provided by Riscure [Risa].
6.3.3 Processing of Traces and Alignment Technique
Misalignment of traces is a common obstacle in security evaluations. It is often due
to the noise of the target device or it is imposed on purpose as "jitter", in order
to make the target device more resistant to SCA. Having our implementation on
the BeagleBone Black, where other processes of the operating system are running
at the same time, it was expected to have some noise from the device. However,
this is what makes a target and a leakage assessment more realistic. With some
common signal processing techniques, such as the absolute value (ABS) operation,
the window resampling and low pass filter, we could get a clear signal and we were
able to perform TVLA. The misalignment due to random interrupts is handled by
acquiring a big number of traces (in some cases we reached 50 k traces), and by
throwing out the traces that had interrupts. These were not many, mostly it was
about 1/10 of the total number of traces.
The ABS operation, as its name suggests, results in traces where the absolute
value of each sample is depicted. The Inspector module of ABS computes the aver-
age value of each sample and uses it as a reference offset value. The result for each
trace si in a trace set S is: Abs_offset(si) = |si − offset|.
Window resampling is a technique, where the samples of the acquired trace are
resampled in a window of a desired length, in order to “clear out" some noise from
the trace and make it shorter and easier to process. This technique offers a Signal-to-
noise-ratio improvement by averaging several samples that carry the same signal. A
second advantage is performance improvement. The compression of many samples
into one, results in smaller traces which can be processed faster. As with every
resampling technique, it results in some loss of information, which could possibly
include leakage points and lower the leakage levels. This loss of information is
prevented in our experiments by using a 75% of overlap of samples, at the cost of
performance. After experimenting with different window values, 200 samples per
window with an overlap of 75% gave good results, with minimal information loss
and without affecting the leakage levels.
A technique that we applied to get clear patterns for alignment is the Low Pass
Filter, which allows only certain frequencies to pass. From the Fast Fourier Trans-
formation (FFT), we found the dominant frequencies of our device during execution
of the cryptographic algorithms. As seen in Figure 6.3, the maximum energy seg-
ments are at 0− 300 MHz and a high frequency appears also at 1 GHz, the running
frequency of our processor. As seen in Figure 6.4, applying a low-pass filter in a
trace, would make patterns, as the selected one, more clear in all the traces. We
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Figure (6.3) Applying FFT to find the dominant frequencies
chose these repetitive patterns to perform alignment.
Figure (6.4) Applying low pass filter to find good alignment points
6.3.4 TVLA Analysis & Results
The leakage analysis for the RNS implementation was applied for the following
four cases:
1. The unprotected version, where no countermeasures are incorporated apart
from the fact that a constant time MPL implementation is used (function
unprotect()).
2. Scalar multiplication with random input point (function rdm_point()).
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3. Scalar multiplication with random base permutations (function LRA()).
4. The fully protected version of scalar multiplication, where both point and base
permutation randomizations are applied (function LRA_rdm_point()).
We performed five sets of experiments. In the first experiment set, we performed
t-tests for fixed versus random scalar, when the countermeasure of scalar random-
ization is not used. The scalar is usually the secret value of the protocols used in
public key cryptography; for instance during scalar multiplication or during sign-
ing, the aim is to hide the scalar, i.e. the private key, from an adversary. Therefore,
it is interesting to test the correlation of the implementation traces to random ver-
sus fixed scalar. In Section 6.3.4.1, we kept the secret scalar unmasked. In a sec-
ond set of experiments, we differentiated between random and fixed input point.
In Section 6.3.4.2, we present a series of t-tests for the four variations of the RNS
implementation, in order to evaluate the correlation of the implementation leakage
to a fixed or a random input point. Then, we implemented and tested scalar ran-
domization. In the experiment set of Section 6.3.4.3, the t-tests for fixed versus
random scalar show the correlation between the randomized scalar and the alterna-
tions between random and fixed values of it. Section 6.3.5 shows the same set of
experiments using random versus fixed point and the implementation with unified
formulas on the secure twisted Edwards curve. Finally, in Section 6.3.6 we imple-
ment two RNS specific countermeasures, namely the LRA with the RNS random
moduli operation sequence, on the secure twisted Edwards curve. We then perform
the t-tests using random versus fixed input points.
All sets of experiments that we performed, followed the rationale presented ini-
tially in [JRW11]. The acquired traces are compared with a constant scalar−constant
input point test vector, in order to reveal any systematic relationship between the
power consumption and the secret scalar or the input point respectively. The test
fails if there is a single point in time where the t-value for the chosen set exceeds
+6 or−6, the new t-test boundaries that we defined in Section 3.6.1 due to the large
trace length of RNS scalar multiplication algorithm. The Matlab code used for the
TVLA evaluation can be found in Appendix B.
6.3.4.1 t-test Random Versus Fixed Scalar
At first we performed the t-test in raw traces, without any pre-processing and align-
ment. Since we are interested in the leakage of the scalar, we performed the t-tests
with fixed versus random scalar.4 We observed that the levels of noise and misalign-
ment were so high, that even in the unprotected case, the leakage was not significant.
This is depicted in Figure 6.5, where we see that there is leakage in the beginning of
4At this point, we assume that we are able to control the input of the secret scalar, but in later
experiments we have more realistic attack scenarios, where we can manipulate only the input points.
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Figure (6.5) Not aligned
traces
Figure (6.6) Alignment
around 60000 samples
Figure (6.7) Alignment
around 130000 samples
the traces, related to the processing of the scalar k. However these peaks disappear
in the next rounds due to misalignment. In Figure 6.6, we notice a peak at the point
where we performed alignment.
Apart from the fact that window resampling offers a natural way of alignment,
we also performed static alignment in the resampled traces following the procedure
described in Section 6.3.3. Aligning at interesting patterns rather than interesting
points is useful in our case, since we have a large number of points in all experi-
ments, ranging from 105 to 8 · 105.5 A high density of leakage peaks is observed
at the places where alignment is applied. It is noticeable that the leakage “moves"
on the trace following the alignment points, as shown in Figures 6.6−6.7. This fact
makes us conclude that the leakage is spread all over the trace and good alignment
is necessary, in order to reveal it.
It is important to note at this point, that despite having two randomization coun-
termeasures switched on, there is leakage from the unprotected scalar. This fact
indicates the necessity to apply scalar randomization for a secure implementation,
even if it might be a costly countermeasure. The following figures show the t-test re-
sults for all four cases for aligned traces obtained by interchanging between random
and fixed scalars.
Figure 6.8 shows the leakage for the unprotected implementation where both
countermeasures are switched off. Figures 6.9− 6.10 show the leakage when there
is only the randomization of the input point or the random base permutation (LRA)
respectively. In Figure 6.9 we can identify the manipulation of the scalar in every
round and the results are in accordance with our expectations, as we have collected
about 7 rounds of the implementation for the rdm_point() case. The first round
is between 105−1.5 ·105 time samples, the second is between 1.5105−2 ·105 time
samples and so on. The peaks indicating the rounds are above the threshold line and
they are the points where the highest leakage of each round is observed, due to a
scalar-dependent operation. The initial peaks between 0 − 0.5 · 105 time samples
5When the number of samples is small, the method to find interesting points of Section 4.2
in [PITM13] can be followed.
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Figure (6.8) unprotected() ran-
dom vs fixed scalar
Figure (6.9) rdm_point() random
vs fixed scalar
Figure (6.10) LRA() random vs fixed
scalar
Figure (6.11) LRA_rdm_point()
random vs fixed scalar
are also indicating leakage and they are associated with the initialization of the the
variables, where also the value of the scalar is assigned to a variable.
An obvious observation is that the introduction of the LRA technique effec-
tively reduces leakage compared to the t-test in Figure 6.10. Thus, it seems that
the LRA technique is more effective as a countermeasure when compared to input
point randomization. Finally, Figure 6.11 shows the leakage of the implementation
with combined countermeasures. It is important to note here that the leakage of the
scalar happens in the beginning of the execution, where most probably the location
of the scalar is accessed and the value of the scalar retrieved, in order to get its most
significant bits and start the bitwise scalar multiplication. This leakage is expected,
since no scalar randomization is implemented in this case. It is also expected to see
the leakage disappear after a few rounds, because the other two countermeasures are
active and they are able to hide the scalar as well. What is not expected is that the
combination of randomized base permutation (LRA) with randomized input point
increases leakage, especially in the first MPL rounds. This fact might be platform
specific and it seems to be possible to launch an attack during the first two MPL
rounds of this implementation.
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6.3.4.2 t-test Random Versus Fixed Input Point
As a next set of experiments, we take a set of randomly interleaved acquisitions
of fixed versus random input point. The scalar is fixed and the countermeasures of
randomized input point and/or random base permutations are applied as before. It is
obvious for the t-test illustrations that the leakage in this case is significantly smaller
than in Section 6.3.4.1.
Figure (6.12) unprotected() ran-
dom vs fixed input point
Figure (6.13) rdm_point() random
vs fixed input point
Figure (6.14) LRA() random vs fixed
input point
Figure (6.15) LRA_rdm_point()
random vs fixed input point
In Figure 6.12 we see that there is significant leakage in the first rounds that
reduces later, but this is only due to misalignment caused by the noise. When we set
the trigger at a later round, starting for instance at the 10th scalar bit, we got a similar
picture, with many leakage peaks in the beginning of the t-test. Figures 6.13−6.14
show that applying one of the two proposed countermeasures is enough to reduce
the leakage of the implementation only around the aligned area, which might be
enough to exploit the implementation, but due to the limited number of leakage
points it would be hard to perform a successful attack. Finally, Figure 6.15 shows
that our protected implementation passes the t-test as expected.
6.3.4.3 t-test Random Versus Fixed Scalar for Randomized Scalar Variation
The evaluation of a countermeasure with TVLA consists of distinguishing between
random and fixed values of a certain parameter. If this parameter is randomized and
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used as countermeasure, then an adversary should not be able to distinguish between
a random or a fixed value of it. This is the case for this part of our experiments. t-
tests for fixed versus random scalar, when the scalar randomization countermeasure
is applied, show that there is no leakage in all four cases as expected. The same pre-
processing steps of absolute value, window resampling and alignment are applied
as before.
Figure 6.16 indicates the t-test results for the scalar multiplication variant of
MPL with RNS without input point randomization and LRA, only the scalar ran-
domization is applied. Since we perform 1st order t-tests and we blind the secret
scalar, our implementation passes the statistical tests. Depending on the order of the
masked value and the order of the t-test, it can happen that higher order t-test will
fail. For instance, if additive splitting of the scalar with more than 2 shares is used,
then the 1st order t-test should fail. For this work, we performed only 1st order t-
tests and we blind the scalar by adding to it a random multiple of the order of the
group. As indicated in all figures applying randomized scalar combined with the
other RNS countermeasures can give a secure implementation.
Figure (6.16) random vs fixed
scalarunprotected_scalar_rdm()
Figure (6.17) random vs fixed scalar
rdm_point_scalar_rdm()
Figure (6.18) random vs fixed scalar
scalar_rdm_LRA()
Figure (6.19) random vs fixed scalar
scalar_rdm_LRA_rdm_point()
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6.3.5 Secure Twisted Edwards Curve and Unified Formulas
The TVLA results presented above are independent of the chosen curve and the
applied group law. The results of Sections 6.3.4.1- 6.3.4.3 are performed on the
Edwards curve a = 1, d = 2, which is not included in the list of secure curves ac-
cording to [BCLN16]. The tests of this section are performed on the secure twisted
Edwards Curve (a = 102, d = 47) [BBJ+08] and the results are similar to the
previous ones. We also replaced the dedicated group law (which was chosen for
efficiency reasons in the first series of experiments), with the unified group law.
The Figures 6.20- 6.23 show the t-tests for the case of random versus fixed input
point. As we see from these figures, the number of samples is of order 104, instead of
105 as it was in previous experiments. Higher misalignment levels in the new traces
compared to previous ones, led us to perform the processing steps with different
parameters. Apart from that, the graphs are similar to that of Section 6.3.4.2, with
much leakage for the unprotected version, less leakage when one countermeasure
is applied, and no leakage for the fully protected version. In Figure 6.22, we see
that applying only randomization of the point cannot hide the correlation between
random and fixed points, and this leakage is spread throughout the trace, not only
in the aligned area as before. This might be due to the fact that we achieved better
alignment in this set of traces, so the leakage is more obvious.
Figure (6.20) rdm vs fixed point
unprotected()
Figure (6.21) rdm vs fixed point LRA()
Figure (6.22) rdm vs fixed point
rdm_point()
Figure (6.23) rdm vs fixed point
LRA_rdm_point()
Chapter 6. Residue Number System 148
6.3.6 Secure Twisted Edwards Curve with RNS Random Moduli Op-
eration Sequence
At this point, we examine the TVLA results of two RNS-specific countermeasures,
namely the LRA technique and the RNS random moduli operation sequence tech-
nique. We notice that the leakage is significantly less compared to the results of the
previous sections for the case of LRA. This is due to the fact that extra randomiza-
tion is added in the implementation.
Figure (6.24) t-tests for random moduli operation sequence LRA_rdm_oper()
Figure 6.24 (left) shows the results for random versus fixed scalar, when the
scalar is not randomized. Leakage is observed as expected, but it is much less com-
pared to Figure 6.10 from previous results. Figure 6.24 (middle) shows the results
for random versus fixed scalar, when the scalar is randomized. We notice only one
peak around the 38000 sample, which is above the threshold and can be considered a
ghost peak, since it disappears when we perform random vs random TVLA. Finally,
Figure 6.24 (right) shows the results for random versus fixed point, when the point is
random and shows clearly no leakage. This is an improvement over previous results
for LRA in Section 6.3.4.2. The above results imply that the combination of the two
RNS countermeasures lead to reduced leakage compared to implementations with
single countermeasures or LRA with base point randomization.
6.4 Template Attacks on RNS Scalar Multiplication
TVLA offers a generic framework for evaluating an implementation and the t-tests
presented in the previous section show the expected leakage of RNS with the com-
bination of LRA and traditional countermeasures. However, there are several issues
with TVLA about coverage of all possible values: how can we be sure that the fixed
scalar "triggers" all parts of the circuit to ensure that any possible leakage that could
occur does actually occur? TVLA offers an indication about the effectiveness of
the applied countermeasures, but failing to mount an actual attack shows strong evi-
dence for that. In this section, we perform template attacks in the different variations
of the implementation, in order to further examine the behavior of the RNS-LRA
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and randomization or RNS operations techniques and to validate the fact that cer-
tain countermeasures are necessary to prevent leakage of the implementation. The
attacks explore data dependent and location dependent leakage and give similar re-
sults for all cases. When the randomized scalar or operations countermeasures are
activated the results are different as expected. As an evaluation metric for the leak-
age of the RNS algorithm we used Perceived Information (PI) introduced to SCA
by Renauld et al. [RSV+11]. Compared to the mutual information metric, which as-
sumes a hypothetical adversary who can perfectly profile the leakage, PI uses actual
estimation procedures and practical traces to profile the Probability Density Func-
tion (PDF) of the implementation. More precisely, following the steps to estimate
the PI of the implementation of RNS on the BeagleBone, as defined by Durvaux et
al. in [DSVC14] we first collected profiling traces to estimate the leakage model.
Then, we collected a set of test traces to estimate the PI corresponding to the actual
leakage of the chip. Finally, we evaluated the estimation errors and the assumption
errors from which the misclassification percentage can be calculated. The Matlab
code used for counting the success rate of template attacks can be found in Ap-
pendix C.
Estimation errors occur when the number of collected traces is too low to esti-
mate the model properly. In our approach, we avoid estimated errors by collecting
50 k traces. After alignment about 20 k traces are left, for which the template clas-
sification results were not so high. For 80% alignment threshold and the resulted
20 k aligned traces, we get success rates between 65 − 70%. These success rates
are rather low, if we want to avoid assumption errors. Assumption errors can occur
when the template model may not be able to correctly predict the distribution of
samples, even after intensive profiling. If the alignment is stricter and by using a
group of 10 traces for detection of the correct group instead of a single trace each
time, then we can reach success rate of 99% as described later.
6.4.1 Data Dependent Leakage
Data dependent leakage is observed when the value of a secret variable can be mon-
itored by an adversary. This happens when the variable is unprotected. Leakage can
also be observed when that specific variable is protected but at the observation time
the variable is sent or retrieved from a memory location in clear view. In our case,
the unprotected scalar is used during scalar multiplication in the variation of the
unprotected RNS implementation and the one with LRA countermeasure activated.
The only case that behaves differently in data dependent leakage is the variation that
uses scalar randomization or LRA randomized operations.
The key dependent assignment, the if-statement in Algorithm 1-step 4b (or Al-
gorithm 2-step 4d), is the one that could be observed for this experiment. We created
templates for scalars s1 = 0x000001000· · ·000 and s2 = 0xFFF0· · ·00F.
Since we wanted to observe only one instruction, we collected 50 k traces of 700
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samples each. After alignment, we kept around 3 k-7 k traces (more precisely 3385
traces for the unprotected case, 3132 traces for the protected one, 7622 traces for
LRA-rdm_operations), from which we used half to create templates and the other
half to test if the classification in the correct template group is successful. Fig-
ure 6.25 shows the acquired traces from the protected (top) and unprotected (bot-
tom) implementations. The selected part from each trace is used for alignment for
both variations of the algorithm for 700 samples.
Figure (6.25) The selected part for aligning the protected and unprotected imple-
mentation
For the training of the templates and the classification we used only the aligned
part for each group of traces, which is about 350 samples long as shown in Fig-
ure 6.26. The success rate of the unprotected algorithm is 91.73% for group 1 cor-
responding to the current bit ei being 0, and 90.54% correctly classified traces to
group 2, corresponding to the current bit being 1. The corresponding results for the
LRA_rdm_point protected version is 97.47% for ei = 0 and 82.12% for ei = 1. The
results when one countermeasure is activated give similar percentages of classifica-
tion, above 90% of success rate. We did not perform the actual attack to recover
each key bit, we just show here with high classification results, that with template
attacks it is possible to distinguish bit 0 from bit 1.
Scalar randomization and randomized RNS operations seem to be an efficient
countermeasures against data dependent template attacks. We performed the same
procedure as with the previous sets of traces. More specifically, we collected 50 k
traces for all variations of the implementation. Then we performed alignment, and
trained templates from the aligned part of the traces. We note here that we use only
the selected part to train and classify templates.
The initial results give a success rate of 65-72% for all four variations of scalar
randomization, which are quite low to give us confidence for the classification re-
sults. This might be a result of the bias of the GMP randomization function. We
could not achieve higher success rate for this amount of traces and it is possible that
more traces would eliminate the bias and give better results. However, since we per-
form the attack on the blinded scalar, it is expected that the data dependent leakage
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Figure (6.26) Aligned template traces for scalar assignment protected (top) and
unprotected (bottom) algorithms
is very low in this case and therefore, simple classification techniques cannot sepa-
rate the two sets as before. Clustering algorithms from machine learning, as applied
in [OPB16, PITM14] might give better results for the scalar randomization version.
Finally, we tried to classify the template traces for the LRA_rdm_operations()
function and we got 55 − 58% of correct classification, which shows that by using
this combination of RNS countermeasures randomizes the data enough to make
template attacks hard to succeed.
6.4.2 Location Dependent Leakage
In this section, we present location dependent template attacks. The templates are
created based on the storage structure that handles a key-dependent instruction, in
our case the doubling during scalar multiplication. As indicated in Algorithm 28
(lines 9-14), during an MPL round an addition and a doubling of points on the curve
happen every time in the same order. The only thing that differs according to the cur-
rent scalar bit is the manipulated register. More specifically, when the current scalar
bit is 1, then the content of storage variable R1 is doubled, otherwise R0 is doubled.
We exploit this vulnerability and the fact that the implementation has no memory
address randomization. By capturing the doubling operation, we can successfully
create and classify templates for R0 and R1. In this way the scalar could be recov-
ered bit-by-bit. This sort of memory access leakage is exploited in [PITM14] for the
case of RSA using RNS, where the authors used unsupervised learning and cluster-
ing algorithms to classify their traces. We show here how to obtain high classifica-
tion results using template attacks for the case of ECC with RNS on our software
implementation.
The template classification results for all four variations of scalar multiplica-
tion vary between 87-99% and thus give a very high probability of a successfully
launched template attack. We calculated the two normal distributions for ei = 0 and
ei = 1 for every variation of the implementation and they are indeed very different
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(N (−24.3, 9.7) andN (19.6, 6.1)).6 This is why the misclassification percentage is
very low.
Figure (6.27) Selected area for alignment for protected and unprotected doubling
For the doubling operation, we collected 50 k traces of 3000 samples. After
alignment, we used the remaining 14 k traces for the location dependent attack. We
use half of the traces, that is 7 k traces of 3000 samples, for training the templates,
and the remaining 7 k traces for classification.7 Figure 6.27 shows the raw traces and
selected pattern for alignment and Figure 6.28 shows the aligned traces for doubling
in the case of the randomized scalar implementation. As previously, we use the 451-
samples-long area to train and classify traces. The result of classification is correct
with 99.44% for group 1 and 99.97% for group 2. For the case where randomization
of the scalar is activated together with LRA, the situation is similar and the success
rate of correct classification of templates reaches 95%. The fact that scalar random-
ization does not seem to be an efficient countermeasure against localized templates
is also worth extra justification. We believe that the bits of the randomized scalar is
what is correctly classified and can be recovered, not the initial, unblinded scalar.
For the implementation protected_rdm_scalar() the classification results
are in the range 63− 70% for various chosen alignment segments. This result is not
high enough to give us the confidence of guessing correctly each key bit. Therefore,
we can consider the location dependent template attack unsuccessful in this case.
When we use unified formulas, we create templates for the first addition oper-
ation (corresponding to the doubling of the value of the register). We collect 50 k
traces, each one being 7 k samples-long, and we perform the template classification
in Matlab as before. The results are similar to the first case with the non-unified
6By definition of the normal or Gaussian distribution for a random variableN (µ, σ2), µ indicates
the mean and σ2 the variance of the distribution.
7This number of traces may seem too low for an evaluation of a symmetric key implementation.
For instance, Unterstein et al. in [UHSS17] performed EM location dependent templates for the case
of the AES S-Box and they used 1 M traces for profiling. Acquiring 1 M is unrealistic for public-key
evaluations, because it is not possible for the analysis tools to process this amount of information.
Therefore, we have to draw our conclusions with the amount of traces that we can acquire.
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Figure (6.28) Zoom-in on aligned traces for doubling operation with randomized
scalar
formulas. The classification percentages range between 72 − 91% for the differ-
ent implementations, but they are still high enough, in order to consider a location
template attack successful.
The case of LRA_rdm_operations shows lower classification levels of 70−
83% which indicates that combining two RNS-specific countermeasures makes tem-
plate attacks harder to perform. Acquiring more traces might give better results, but
this might discourage the attacker, since already for 50 k traces we need 20 hours of
acquisition time. In order to obtain higher classification rates, we performed stricter
alignment, resulting in 8k aligned traces with segments of 370 samples. Then, we
could reach 82−95% classification rates, which shows that location template attacks
are successful also in the presence of two RNS-specific countermeasures.
The registers mentioned in the algorithms are not really single registers that hold
the result of doubling. In RNS all values are stored in chunks of 50 bits (in our case),
so the result of doubling is stored in 4 different memory locations. Therefore, the
location dependent leakage is not an expected result for an RNS implementation and
especially with the LRA countermeasure activated. We attribute the high success
rate of this attack to the leakage of the platform and the fact that those chunks of
values are probably stored in capacitors next to each other.
6.5 Performance Impact of Countermeasures
In this section, we discuss the performance impact of the various countermeasures
we implemented. At first, we note that performance optimizations were out of scope
of our work. Therefore, we did not apply SIMD instructions or parallel computa-
tions of RNS operations. An unprotected implementation of RNS takes 0.726 sec.
to perform a 192-bit scalar multiplication.
As a reference point we take the unprotected version of RNS and we measure
the extra time needed as we add countermeasures. Applying point randomization
costs more than performing random base permutations, because of one extra point
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doubling that is necessary. So we have 1.101 sec. for point randomization instead
of 1.090 for the LRA algorithm. When both countermeasures are applied, the scalar
multiplication takes 1.525 sec., which is more than double compared to the un-
protected version. Adding scalar randomization to all the algorithms would add a
1−8% performance overhead (PO). Adding unified formulas makes our algorithms
16 − 30% slower. Using the LRA technique with random RNS operations takes
1.278 sec. and adds 76% overhead, which is much less than the combination of
LRA and randomization of the point. At the same time, this combination leaks less
and preclude data dependent template attacks. It is therefore proposed as a better
equivalent to traditional SCA countermeasures.
Table 6.2 shows the performance evaluation and the attack possibilities for every
algorithm in terms of this work.
Table (6.2) Collective Evaluation Table. The 7 sign shows that the correspond-
ing algorithm does not pass the t-test or it is not protected against template attacks,
while the3 sign shows a secure algorithm according to TVLA or against templates.
The N/A indicates that this type of attack is not applicable to the algorithm. The per-
centage numbers show the PO compared to the unprotected RNS implementation.
Algorithm Welch t-test Welch t-test TA TA PO
r-vs-f scalar r-vs-f point Data Location
unprotected 7 7 7 7 0%
rdm_point 7 7 7 7 52%
LRA 7 7 7 7 50%
protected_LRA 7 3 7 7 110%
unprotect_rdm_scal 3 N/A 3 7 19%
rdm_point_rdm_scal 3 N/A 3 7 54%
LRA_rdm_scalar 3 N/A 3 7 51%
protected_rdm_scal 3 N/A 3 3 110%
unprotect_unified 7 7 7 7 19%
rdm_point_unified 7 7 7 7 99%
LRA_unified 7 7 7 7 72%
protected_unified 3 3 7 7 144%
LRA_nc_rdm_operat 7 3 3 3 76%
LRA_nc_rdm_operat
_rdm_scalar 3 N/A 3 3 76%
The TVLA experiments for RNS-MPL shows that the proposed RNS-LRA al-
gorithm with combined countermeasures can indeed provide high levels of security
compared with the simple RNS implementation or an implementation with a sin-
gle countermeasure. More precisely, the systematic correlation between the power
consumption and the input point can be prevented by using the classical counter-
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measure of point randomization and by randomizing the base point representation
that is used in every round. A very interesting observation is that using the RNS
LRA representation and randomizing the input point, but not the scalar, leaks secret
information. Another important remark is that the LRA countermeasure is the best
trade-off between security and performance compared to traditional point blinding,
which is usually 2− 20% more expensive to implement in RNS.
6.6 Conclusions
In this section we summarize the conclusions of our practical evaluation of RNS
implementations with various countermeasures. Different RNS representations of
elliptic curve points, randomization of the input point, scalar randomization and
the regularity of MPL during scalar multiplication are good countermeasures to
protect against horizontal type of attacks and SPA. However, even in the presence
of these countermeasures the TVLA results show that leakage is still exploitable
most of the times. When two countermeasures are combined, but the secret scalar
is not randomized, there seems to be still exploitable leakage. The TVLA results
are verified by high classification levels for two types of template attacks in the
presence of countermeasures. When we randomize secret data, it is shown that data
dependent template attacks are not successful, but the manipulated registers can still
give very high classification results for the correct scalar guess.
Another important contribution of this chapter is for evaluators; they should
not take the TVLA bounds as rigid, since our evaluation shows that for public-key
cryptography the typical threshold of ±4.5 is not correct. TVLA threshold should
be established every time according to the distribution of the traces and the number
of samples that are collected.
As future work, it would be interesting to investigate further the possibilities of
location dependent template attacks in the presence of countermeasures. The clas-
sification rates for templates of the algorithms that use randomization of the RNS
operations is also an interesting follow-up work that could investigate clustering and
other algorithms from machine learning. Furthermore, evaluating the combination
of these countermeasures in a FPGA implementation of RNS with parallel execu-
tion of the RNS operations for various moduli sizes would give further insights in
the security of RNS.

Chapter 7
Conclusions
By believing passionately in something that still
does not exist, we create it. The nonexistent is
whatever we have not sufficiently desired.
Nikos Kazantzakis, Report to Greco
We conclude this thesis by summarizing the results of our research and their
impact on secure ECC implementations. Future research directions inspired from
this work are also provided, followed by a discussion in the end of this chapter.
7.1 Summary of Results
The main research goal of this thesis was to investigate practical and theoretically
supported techniques, in order to provide side-channel resilient cryptographic im-
plementations. We sufficiently covered this goal by proposing a new attack tech-
nique and effective countermeasures against it, by proposing new countermeasures
and by evaluating an existing countermeasure with practical measurements. The
main results of this research are summarized as follows:
• We presented OTA, a powerful template attack technique that is applicable to
most exponentiation and scalar multiplication algorithms. The impact of the
attack is verified by the fact that the German Federal Office for Information
Security (BSI) includes OTA in the document "ECC-Guide Minimal Require-
ments for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance of Elliptic Curve Im-
plementations" [FGI+]. It is, therefore, highly advised that countermeasures
against OTA should be included in a secure ECC design.
• A new approach to template matching by using classification algorithms as
distinguishers is presented in Chapter 4. We showed the applicability of clas-
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sification algorithms in an OTA scenario, where we successfully matched
template traces to the correct target trace, in order to recover bits of the scalar.
• An important contribution of this work with direct application to security
evaluations is the re-establishment of the TVLA threshold. Evaluators should
not take TVLA bounds as rigid, since this threshold depends on factors such
as the number of samples per trace and the sampled standard deviation of each
group of traces. We showed experimentally and theoretically that new bounds
should be put forward when TVLA evaluations on public key algorithms are
performed. Furthermore, we provided the formulas and Matlab code to cal-
culate this threshold, which can be applied to any public key implementation
evaluation.
• Exponent splitting methods might be an effective countermeasure against cer-
tain types of side-channel attack, but their impact on performance made it
prohibitive for applications with space limitations. We proposed a new ex-
ponent splitting technique, where the exponent is the XOR sum of the two
shares and the cost is typically an extra register and some register copies per
bit. Our method can also be applied to additive groups (ECC) and to values
whose order contains long runs of bits set to 0 or 1 without any penalty on per-
formance or security. We showed that our algorithms are secure using formal
methods, MI-based evaluation and TVLA on an implementation of Boolean
exponent splitting. Furthermore, we showed how an ECDSA signature can be
generated by only manipulating shares of the random nonce used to secure
the scheme. Our method cannot prevent leakage from intermediate values,
but it can be easily combined with inexpensive solutions such as randomizing
projective points, in order to provide a high level of side-channel resistance.
• RNS is already used for distributing large dynamic range computations to
independent, modular operations in smaller fields. This property, based on
the Chinese Remainder Theorem, is very useful for public-key cryptography,
where computations in large prime fields are necessary. Apart from speeding
up the computations by parallelization of operations on smaller fields, RNS
has an intrinsic SCA protection mechanism, which is observed but not thor-
oughly studied. We performed a broad and generic evaluation of variations of
RNS scalar multiplication algorithms based on the TVLA methodology and
template attacks. The results of our research showed that a combination of
RNS-based and traditional countermeasures is the best way to protect against
side-channel leakage.
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7.2 Future Research
As we discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, machine learning explores the construction
of algorithms that can learn from and make predictions on data by exploiting more
dimensions of the available information. Therefore, machine learning techniques
can provide some other arrows in the quiver of an evaluator. Classification algo-
rithms from machine learning are already applied to template matching with very
promising results. The Least Squares Support Vector Machines (LSSVMs) is used
in [HGM+11], the Bayes classifier, the k-Nearest Neighbor and SVM are used in
Chapter 4 of this thesis. The results from both works showed that the data sets can
be easily separated and the success rate of template attacks are much higher when
classifiers from machine learning are used.
Lerman et al. [LPB+15] showed that attacks based on machine learning cannot
be more efficient than template attacks in the online phase if the profiling phase is
sufficiently accurate. This comes from the fact that the (mutual) information leakage
estimated with a template attack exploiting a perfect model is independent of the
number of "useless dimensions" if the useless leakage samples are independent of
the useful ones. On the other hand, when the profiling base is relatively small, there
are not enough profiling traces and the estimation of the covariance matrix cannot
be computed properly. In that case, Picek et al. [PHG17] showed that evaluation
using the Bayes classifier gives more accurate results than the usual profiling based
on the covariance matrix.
Differential cluster analysis, introduced by Batina et al. [BGLR09], is a tech-
nique developed to detect internal collisions in the unsupervised analysis setting,
and extract keys from side-channel signals. Clustering analysis and unsupervised
learning was also used by Heyszl et al. [HIM+13], in order to exploit the location-
based single-execution leakage of an FPGA-based implementation of an elliptic
curve scalar multiplication using the k-means clustering algorithm. New attack tech-
niques based on machine learning and a systematic evaluation of implementations
based on these techniques could lead to faster leakage assessments and more effi-
cient side-channel analysis.
In Chapter 6, we mentioned that the classification rates for templates of the algo-
rithms that use randomization of the RNS operations is also an interesting follow-up
work. It would be interesting to investigate clustering and other algorithms from ma-
chine learning in the RNS setting and further examine the possibilities of location
dependent template attacks in the presence of countermeasures. Furthermore, eval-
uating the combination of these countermeasures in a hardware implementation of
RNS with parallel execution of the RNS operations for various moduli sizes would
give further insights in the security of RNS.
Finally, a very interesting project would be the research on applications of XOR
exponent splitting. Further software and hardware implementations, adopting XOR
splitting to real-world applications and more side-channel evaluations on different
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platforms would unfold the full potential of this new and promising countermeasure.
7.3 Discussion
The readers of this thesis are convinced by now that there are various sophisticated
side-channel attacks, which could threaten the security of public key implementa-
tions. Given a specific budget, in terms of space, speed, capacity, memory or finan-
cial requirements, it is impossible to protect an implementation against all possible
side-channel attacks. An implementation with many countermeasures would either
be too slow and impractical to use, or it would require sophisticated hardware (for
instance hardware random generator) that would make it hard to fulfill in restricted
environments.
On the other hand, the fact that an implementation will leak, does not mean
that this leakage is always exploitable. Because of the advances in the security of
implementations and the countermeasures applied on chips at the hardware level,
it can be that traditional SCA techniques do not provide efficient ways to exploit
a leakage. New SCA techniques inspired by the field of machine learning arise.
But still, it might take months to launch a successful attack on a cryptosystem,
especially when the secret keys are updated regularly or the exact details of the
implementation are not known. A take-away lesson for organizations is to update
secret keys and passwords on a regular basis, as this action can prevent an adversary
from launching a successful attack on their systems.
The fact that secure implementations are emerging and countermeasures are
applied can give us a positive feeling towards a more secure digital world. It is,
however, an individual choice how aware we are on security issues and at the end,
how vulnerable we can afford to be.
Appendix
A. Sage code
In this first section of the Appendix, we give the Sage scirpts that can be used to ver-
ify the correctness of the algorithm with XOR-split scalar, presented in Chapter 5.
Sagemath [OSS] is an open-source mathematical software, built out of nearly
100 open-source packages. It can be used for elementary and advanced mathemat-
ics, and it is well-suited for research. The main user language is Python. Elliptic
curve computations over Q or over finite fields are possible in Sage, since there are
many built-in functions and methods to facilitate the calculations [OSS].
The scripts are written in Python, saved with .sage extension, then load to the
Sage server and call the relevant function. For instance
>> load: algorithm20.sage
>> ml_split_scalar()
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First, we present algorithm 19, the Montgomery Ladder with XOR-split scalar,
where the first bit is always set to 1. So the random register R¬b′ is initalized with
the point 2P and this is also reflected in the for-loop that starts with the second
MSB.
1 #!/usr/bin sage -python
2
3 #Algorithm 19: Montgomery Ladder with XOR-split scalar on
an Elliptic Curve
4 import sys
5
6 def ml_split_scalar():
7 p = random_prime(2^512-1, 2^555)
8 F = FiniteField(p)
9 E = EllipticCurve(F,
[F.random_element(),F.random_element()])
10 P = E.random_point()
11 I = E(0)
12 k = randint(0,100)
13 Q = k*P
14
15 k = str(bin(k)).lstrip(’0b’)[::-1]
16 R = [P, P, P]
17 k1, a, b = []
18
19 for i in range(0,len(k)):
20 k1.append(int(k[i]))
21 a.append(randint(0,1))
22 b.append(k1[i] ^^ a[i])
23 bp = randint(0,1)
24 R[1-bp] = 2*P
25
26 #Main loop for lines 4-9 in the thesis
27
28 for i in range(len(k1)-2,-1,-1):
29 R[2] = R[1-a[i]] + R[a[i]]
30 R[a[i]] = 2*R[(b[i] ^^ bp) ^^ a[i]]
31 R[1-a[i]] = R[2]
32 bp = b[i]
33
34 if (R[bp]==Q):
35 return ’P=’, P, ’R[bp]’, R[bp], ’Q’, Q, ’Good!’
36 else:
37 return ’P=’, P, ’R[bp]’, R[bp], ’Q’, Q, ’error’
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Montgomery Ladder with XOR-split scalar 20, where elimination of the third
register R2 is achieved by using two auxiliary registers U0, U1 with precomputed
values P and −P .
1 #!/usr/bin sage -python
2
3 #Algorithm 20: Montgomery Ladder with XOR-split scalar II
on an Elliptic Curve
4
5 import sys
6
7 def ml_split_scalar2():
8 p = random_prime(2^512-1, 2^255)
9 F = FiniteField(p)
10 E = EllipticCurve(F, [F.random_element(),
F.random_element()])
11 P = E.random_point()
12 M = E.random_point()
13 I = E(0)
14 k = randint(0,100)
15 Q = k*P
16
17 k = str(bin(k)).lstrip(’0b’)[::-1]
18 R = [P, P]
19 U = [P, -P]
20 k1, a, b = []
21
22 for i in range(0,len(k)):
23 k1.append(int(k[i]))
24 a.append(randint(0,1))
25 b.append(k1[i] ^^ a[i])
26 bp = randint(0,1)
27 R[1-bp] = 2*P
28
29 #Main for loop lines 5-9 in the thesis
30
31 for i in range(len(k1)-2,-1,-1):
32 h = (bp ^^ b[i]) ^^ a[i]
33 R[0] = R[bp ^^ b[i]] + R[h]
34 R[1] = R[0] + U[b[i]]
35 bp = b[i]
36 #for testing: print R[0], R[1], R[0]-R[1]
37
38 if (R[bp] == Q):
39 return ’P=’, P, ’R[bp]’, R[bp], ’Q’, Q, ’Good!’
40 else:
41 return ’P=’, P, ’R[bp]’, R[bp], ’Q’, Q, ’error’
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This algorithm corresponds to Algorithm 21 and it removes the need for special
treatment for the point at infinityO by initializing the registers with random points
on the curve.
1 #!/usr/bin sage -python
2
3 #Algorithm 21: Blinded Joye’s Add-Always with XOR-split
scalar on an Elliptic Curve
4 import sys
5
6 def blinded_addalways():
7 p = random_prime(2^512-1, 2^555)
8 F = FiniteField(p)
9 E = EllipticCurve(F,
[F.random_element(),F.random_element()])
10 P = E.random_point()
11 M = E.random_point()
12 I = E(0)
13 k = randint(0,100)
14 Q = k*P
15
16 k = str(bin(k)).lstrip(’0b’)[::-1]
17 R = [M, -M, P]
18
19 k1 = []
20 a = []
21 b = []
22
23 for i in range(0,len(k)):
24 k1.append(int(k[i]))
25 a.append(randint(0,1))
26 b.append(k1[i] ^^ a[i])
27 bp = randint(0,1)
28 r = bp
29 R[1-bp] = R[1-bp] + P
30
31 #Main loop for lines 3-9 in the thesis
32
33 for i in range(0,len(k1)):
34 h = (b[i] ^^ bp) ^^ a[i]
35 R[2] = 2*R[1-h] + R[h]
36 R[a[i]] = R[h]
37 R[1-a[i]] = R[2]
38 bp = b[i]
39
40 R[r ^^ bp] = R[r ^^ bp] - M
41 R[1-(r ^^ bp)] = R[1-(r ^^ bp)] + M
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42 if (R[bp]==Q):
43 return ’P=’, P, ’R[bp]’, R[bp], ’Q’, Q, ’Good!’
44 else:
45 return ’P=’, P, ’R[bp]’, R[bp], ’Q’, Q, ’error’
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B. Test Vector Leakage Assessment
This section includes the Matlab code used to perform TVLA for various differ-
ent trace sets collected from the RNS implementationpresented in Chapter 6. Each
trace set was collected with different countermeasures (or combination of counter-
measures) activated, it was partitioned and processed in pieces (lines 9-18 in the
code), in order to speed up the calculations. This is necessary when the traces have
more than 500k samples, which is the case for public key implementations. The
total number of traces corresponds to no_pieces∗no_traces.
Each trace contains data and in the beginning there is a label "0x0000..."
or "0x1000..." to indicate whether this trace has randomized input (scalar or
point) or not. We alternated between random input and fixed input in a random way
during acquisition. The code lines 36-44 show how the traces are split into two
groups or randomized input or not. The rest of the code (lines 72-88) deals with the
computation of the statistical values needed to calculate the t value for the t-test.
1 %modified t-test code, based on the paper by Tobias
Scheider CHES 2015 and the Lockheed Martin formulas
2008, to use for the public-key t-tests for RNS
2
3 clear all;
4 tic;
5 %select the t-test order
6 test_order=1;
7 max_order = 2*test_order;
8
9 %import params for fixed and random traces
10 no_traces=300; %size of the partition in traces -- change
according to the partition choice
11 no_samples=1000000;
12 no_pieces=15;
13 offset=61; %trs file offset
14 data_size=68; %relates to the cipher\implementation
15 trs_fileID =
fopen(’protected_1msamp_trigger_doubling_Abs_align.trs’)
;
16 traces_noB = int8(zeros( no_traces , no_samples )) ;
17 data = uint8(zeros( no_traces , 68 ));
18 status = fseek(trs_fileID, offset, ’bof’);
19
20 % seperate fixed vs random traces in a group - do it for
each collection of traces (for each piece)
21 for p=1:no_pieces
22 disp(’piece number’);
23 p
24 i_fixed=1;
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25 i_rand=1;
26 traces_fixed = (zeros(no_traces , no_samples )) ;
27 traces_rand = (zeros(no_traces , no_samples )) ;
28 data_fixed = (zeros(no_traces , 68 )) ;
29 data_rand = (zeros(no_traces , 68 )) ;
30
31 for i = 1:no_traces,
32
33 header = uint8(fread(trs_fileID,37,’uint8’)) ‘ ;
34 data(i,:) = uint8(fread(trs_fileID,68,’uint8’)) ‘; %
should be 32 for AES
35
36 if (
(data(i,1)==hex2dec(’00’))&&(data(i,2)==hex2dec(’00’)
) )
37 traces_fixed(i_fixed,:) =
(fread(trs_fileID,no_samples,’uint8’));
38 data_fixed(i_fixed,:)= data(i,:);
39 i_fixed=i_fixed+1;
40 else
41 traces_rand(i_rand,:) =
(fread(trs_fileID,no_samples,’uint8’));
42 data_rand(i_rand,:)= data(i,:);
43 i_rand=i_rand+1;
44 end
45
46 mid= floor(size(traces_rand,1)/2);
47 final=size(traces_rand,1);
48 traces_fixed=traces_rand(1:mid,:);
49 traces_rand=traces_rand((mid+1):final,:);
50 data_fixed=data_rand(1:mid,:);
51 data_rand=data_rand((mid+1):final,:);
52
53 end
54
55
56 if (p==1)
57 CMd_A = zeros(max_order,no_samples);
58 SMd_A = zeros(max_order,no_samples);
59 M1_A = zeros(1,no_samples);
60 CSd_A = zeros(max_order,no_samples);
61 CMd_B = zeros(max_order,no_samples);
62 SMd_B = zeros(max_order,no_samples);
63 M1_B = zeros(1,no_samples);
64 CSd_B = zeros(max_order,no_samples);
65 end
66
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67
68
69 [n1(p),temp1]=size(data_fixed);
70 [n2(p),temp2]=size(data_rand);
71
72 % computation of statistical values for the t-test
73 [CMd_A, SMd_A, M1_A, CSd_A] =
univariate_moment_computation(traces_fixed(1:n1(p),:),
74 test_order,p,n1,CMd_A, SMd_A, M1_A,CSd_A);
75 [CMd_B, SMd_B, M1_B, CSd_B] =
univariate_moment_computation(traces_rand(1:n2(p),:),
76 test_order,p,n2,CMd_B, SMd_B, M1_B,CSd_B);
77
78
79
80 if (test_order==1)
81 mA=M1_A;
82 mB=M1_B;
83 varA=CMd_A(2,:);
84 varB=CMd_B(2,:);
85 end
86
87
88 %computing the HW t-test
89 t=t_test(mA,mB,varA,varB,sum(n1(1:p)),sum(n2(1:p)),test_order);
%no history
90
91
92
93 end
94 close_trs(trs_fileID);
95 toc;
96
97 %ploting
98 x=1:no_samples;
99 threshold=6*ones(no_samples,1);
100 figure; plot(x,abs(t),’b’);hold on;
101 plot(x,threshold,’r’); hold off;
102 xlim([0 no_samples]);
103 ylim([0 18]);
104 title(’1st-order t-test’);xlabel(’Time
samples’);ylabel(’t-statistic value’);
169
C. Template Attacks on RNS software implementation
Template traces were collected by triggering either a register with value 0 or 1 (for
the data leakage) or an operation of doubling/adding (for the location leakage). After
importing the trace set, we split the traces into two groups. One group contains the
traces that were collected when the register was manipulating the value 0 and the
other group contains traces collected for the value 1. Then, we partitioned the data
set into two roughly equal sets, at a 50–50 ratio. These are the training trace-set and
the test trace-set. The success rate funtion SR() computes the success rate based
on the correct classification of the test traces to one of the training sets.
1
2 %code based on the ’Templates Code for MiceTemplates
Project’ by Kostas Papagiannopoulos, modified and used
to perform RNS Location and Data Template Attacks
3
4 clear all;
5 close all;
6
7 %import trace trs
8 offset=123; %trs file offset
9 data_size=68; %relates to the cipher\implementation
10 filename1 =
’3kprotected_scalar0001_trigger_doubling_StaticAlign.trs’;
11 filename2 =
’3kprotected_scalarFF00_trigger_doubling_StaticAlign.trs’;
12
13 %Number of groups used for the template building phase
14 no_groups=2;
15 no_traces = [19340 19340]; %number of traces per group
16 data1 = uint8(zeros( no_traces(1) , 68 ));
17 data2 = uint8(zeros( no_traces(2) , 68 ));
18 sdim=3000; %number of samples per trace
19 poi=1:sdim;
20
21 [S{1},status1,traces1,data1] =
open_trs(filename1,no_traces(1),sdim,data_size,offset);
22 [S{2},status2,traces2,data2] =
open_trs(filename2,no_traces(2),sdim,data_size,offset);
23 S{1} = traces1(:,391:758);
24 S{2} = traces2(:,391:758);
25
26 %Success rate 50-50 train/test ratio
27 partition_vec=linspace(0.5,0.5,1);
28 p_counter=1;
29 for p=partition_vec
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30 for i=1:no_groups
31 t=ceil(p*size(S{i},1));
32 train_vec{i}= 1:t;
33 test_vec{i} = (t+1):size(S{i},1);
34 end
35
36 for m=1:1 %SPECIFY YOUR CHOICE
37 success_rate(p_counter,m,:)=SR(S,sdim,train_vec,
38 test_vec,m);
39 squeeze(success_rate(p_counter,m,:));
40 end
41 p_counter=p_counter+1;
42 end
43 sr=squeeze(sum(success_rate,3));
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